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Arellano v. Guldseth

United States District Court, Southern District of California
Jun 30, 2021
20-CV-1633 TWR (RBM) (S.D. Cal. Jun. 30, 2021)

Opinion

20-CV-1633 TWR (RBM)

06-30-2021

RAUL ARELLANO, CDCR #AH-1995, Plaintiff, v. DR. GULDSETH; S. ROBERTS CME, Defendants.


ORDER

1) DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (ECF NO. 22)

AND

2) DIRECTING U.S. MARSHAL TO EFFECT SERVICE UPON DEFENDANTS GULDSETH AND ROBERTS PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(D) AND FED. R. CIV. P. 4(C)(3)

Honorable Todd W. Robinson United States District Judge

Plaintiff Raul Arellano, currently incarcerated at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California, is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”) in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. (See ECF No. 1, Compl.) The Complaint alleges claims under the First and Eighth Amendments as well as state law against two individuals, his primary care doctor and the chief medical executive, and two state entities, California Correctional Health Care Services (“CCHCS”) and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). (See generally id.)

On October 30, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP and dismissed several claims and Defendants sua sponte for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sections 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). (See ECF No. 7, at 12-13.) Specifically, the Court held that Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment, Bane Act, and First Amendment claims against Defendant Guldseth and his Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Roberts survived the sua sponte screening process and dismissed in their entirety Plaintiff's claims against CCHCS and CDCR. (See Id. at 11.) Because Plaintiff's Complaint survived screening in part, the Court afforded Plaintiff the option to proceed only with those claims that survived sua sponte screening or to file an amended pleading addressing the deficiencies the Court noted in partially dismissing his Complaint. (See id.) Prior to the deadline for submitting an amended pleading or notifying the Court of his intention to proceed with only the surviving claims, Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration or, in the alternative, for an extension of time in which to file an amended pleading. (See ECF No. 9, at 1.) On February 1, 2021, the Court denied Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, but granted a 45-day extension of time for Plaintiff to file an amended pleading. (See ECF No. 10, at 3-4.)

Rather than file an amended pleading, Plaintiff filed a notice of interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit. (See ECF No. 11, at 1.) Shortly after submitting the notice of appeal, Plaintiff also filed another motion for reconsideration in this Court. (See ECF No. 15.) The Court denied this motion for reconsideration as well, again granting Plaintiff additional time in which to file an amendment pleading, and the Ninth Circuit subsequently dismissed Plaintiff's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. (See ECF No. 18, at 4-5; ECF No. 19, at 1.)

Before the Court is Plaintiff's third motion for reconsideration, which focuses in part on the same issue raised in the prior two motions: the Court's dismissal of Plaintiff's claims against the CDCR and CCHCS under California Government Code Section 844.6 and 845.6 for failing to summon medical care as barred by the Eleventh Amendment. (See ECF No. 22, at 1-2.) As the Court has repeatedly emphasized, these claims cannot be brought in federal court because “[a]s numerous other cases have concluded, California has not consented to suit in federal court under the Bane Act or California Government Code Sections 844.6 and 845.6 and, as a result, both the CDCR and CCHCS are immune from damages claims in federal court under these statutes pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment.” (See ECF No. 7 at 9-10 (collecting cases).) Plaintiff's citations to the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. Section 1367(a), and related case law does not undermine that conclusion. (See Id. at 1.) The fact that the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim does not abrogate a state's sovereign immunity with respect to that claim. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 121 (1984) (“[N]either [supplemental] jurisdiction nor any other basis of jurisdiction may override the Eleventh Amendment.”). As a result, the Court again declines to revisit its decision dismissing these claims.

In addition to reprising that issue, Plaintiff's motion also appears to challenge the Court's dismissal of his Government Code Section 845.6 claim against Defendant Guldseth. (See ECF No. 22, at 2-3.) This claim was premised on Guldseth's alleged failure to prescribe the appropriate medication and/or the proper dosage of medications that Plaintiff alleges was necessary to manage his medical conditions. (See Id. at 2.) As the Court explained previously, Section 845.6 is “‘very narrowly written to authorize a cause of action against a public entity for its employees' failure to summon immediate medical care only, not for certain employee's malpractice in providing that care.'” (ECF No. 7, at 9 (quoting Castaneda v. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 212 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1070 (2013)) (emphasis omitted).) “[F]ailure of a practitioner to prescribe or provide necessary medication or treatment . . . is . . . medical malpractice and clearly, as a matter of the plain meaning of the statutory language, cannot be characterized as a failure to summon medical care.” Nelson v. California, 139 Cal.App.3d 72, 81 (1982) (emphasis added). Despite Plaintiff's attempt to recharacterize his allegations against Defendant Guldseth as a failure to summon care, the previously quoted language makes clear that the conduct alleged does not violate Section 845.6. Accordingly, reconsideration of this aspect of the Court's prior ruling is also unwarranted.

Anticipating the Court's denial of reconsideration, Plaintiff's Motion explains that if the Court rejects these arguments, he would like the case to proceed with only the claims against Defendants Guldseth and Roberts that survived sua sponte screening. (See ECF No. 22, at 2-3.) As a result, the Court:

1. DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 22).

2. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Kathleen Allison, Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California 94283-0001.

3. DIRECTS the Clerk to issue a summons as to Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. 1) upon Defendants Guldseth and Roberts and forward it to Plaintiff along with a blank U.S. Marshal Form 285. In addition, the Clerk will provide Plaintiff with a certified copy of this Order, a certified copy of the Court's Order screening Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. 8), a certified copy of his Complaint, and the summons so that he may serve the Defendants. Upon receipt of this “IFP Package, ” Plaintiff must complete the Form 285 as completely and accurately as possible, include an address where Defendants may be served, see S.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 4.1.c, and return it to the United States Marshal according to the instructions the Clerk provides in the letter accompanying his IFP package.

4. ORDERS the U.S. Marshal to serve a copy of the Complaint and summons upon Defendants Guldseth and Roberts as directed by Plaintiff on the Form 285 provided to him. All costs of that service will be advanced by the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(c)(3).

5. ORDERS the Defendants Guldseth and Roberts, once served, to reply to the claims in Plaintiff's Complaint that survived sua sponte screening (see ECF No. 7, at 11) within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a). See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2) (while a defendant may occasionally be permitted to “waive the right to reply to any action brought by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility under section 1983, ” once the Court has conducted its sua sponte screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sections 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and thus, has made a preliminary determination based on the face on the pleading alone that Plaintiff has a “reasonable opportunity to prevail on the merits, ” defendant is required to respond).

6. ORDERS Plaintiff, after service has been effected by the U.S. Marshal, to serve upon Defendants, or, if appearance has been entered by counsel, upon Defendants' counsel, a copy of every further pleading, motion, or other document submitted for the Court's consideration pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(b). Plaintiff must include with every original document he seeks to file with the Clerk of the Court, a certificate stating the manner in which a true and correct copy of that document has been served on the Defendants or their counsel, and the date of that service. See S.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 5.2. Any document received by the Court which has not been properly filed with the Clerk, or which fails to include a Certificate of Service upon the Defendants, may be disregarded.

IT IS SO ORDERED.


Summaries of

Arellano v. Guldseth

United States District Court, Southern District of California
Jun 30, 2021
20-CV-1633 TWR (RBM) (S.D. Cal. Jun. 30, 2021)
Case details for

Arellano v. Guldseth

Case Details

Full title:RAUL ARELLANO, CDCR #AH-1995, Plaintiff, v. DR. GULDSETH; S. ROBERTS CME…

Court:United States District Court, Southern District of California

Date published: Jun 30, 2021

Citations

20-CV-1633 TWR (RBM) (S.D. Cal. Jun. 30, 2021)