Opinion
24-cv-00753-SVK
07-29-2024
NANCY NAHREN DAOUD ARAIZA, Plaintiff, v. BMW OF NORTH AMERICA LLC, Defendant.
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR ENTRY OF DEFALT JUDGMENT
RE: DKT. NO. 15
SUSAN VAN KEULEN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Nancy Nahren Daoud Araiza brings this action against Defendant BMW of North America, LLC (“BMW”), for alleged violations of California's Song-Beverly Act (the “Act”). See Dkt. 1 (the “Complaint”). Defendant did not appear or respond to the Complaint, and the Clerk subsequently entered default against it. See Dkt. 13. Plaintiff now moves for entry of default judgment against Defendant. See Dkt. 15 (the “Motion”). The Court has determined that the Motion is suitable for resolution without oral argument. See Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). After considering the Motion, relevant law and the record in this action, and for the reasons that follow, the Court DENIES the Motion.
I. BACKGROUND
The following discussion of background facts is based on the allegations contained in the Complaint, the truth of which the Court accepts in light of Defendant's default (except as to allegations of damages). See Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977). On September 28, 2021, Plaintiff purchased a 2018 BMW 650i from one of Defendant's authorized dealerships in California. See Complaint ¶¶ 8, 17. “Express warranties accompanied the sale of the vehicle to Plaintiff.” Id. ¶ 26. Even so, at the time of delivery, the vehicle suffered from “serious defects and nonconformities to warranty” and later “developed [during the warranty period] other defects and nonconformities to warranty, including, but not limited to, [] engine defects, engine electronics system defects, electrical defects and other serious nonconformities to warranty.” See id. ¶¶ 27, 31. Plaintiff subsequently brought the vehicle to one of Defendant's authorized “repair facilit[ies] for repair of the nonconformities.” See id. ¶ 32. However, “Defendant was unable to conform Plaintiff's vehicle to the applicable express [warranty] after a reasonable number of repair attempts.” Id. ¶ 33. Despite this failure, Defendant did not “promptly replace the new motor vehicle or . . . promptly make restitution.” See id. ¶ 34. Plaintiff then commenced this action to recover.
Plaintiff does not allege that she ever requested that Defendant replace the vehicle or provide restitution.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
“When entry of judgment is sought against a party who has failed to plead or otherwise defend, a district court has an affirmative duty to look into its jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties.” In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). A court must also “assess the adequacy of the service of process on the party against whom default is requested.” See Trs. of ILWU-PMA Pension Plan v. Coates, No. 11-cv-03998-EMC, 2013 WL 556800, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2013) (citation omitted). Even if these requirements are met, “[a] defendant's default does not automatically entitle the plaintiff to a court-ordered judgment.” DFSB Kollective Co. v. Bourne, 897 F.Supp.2d 871, 877 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (citation omitted). Rather, entering default judgment rests within a court's discretion. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 55; Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). In exercising its discretion, a court must consider the following factors:
(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff's substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff does not address the Eitel factors in the Motion, which “is an independent basis for denying h[er] request.” See Stebbins v. Polano, No. 21-cv-04184-JSW, 2022 WL 1601409, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2022) (citation omitted); see, e.g., Osgood v. Main Streat Mktg., LLC, No. 16-cv-02415-GPC, 2017 WL 7362743, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2017). The Court will nevertheless consider the Eitel factors, which weigh in favor of denying the Motion. Specifically, the second and third factors weigh in favor of denying the Motion, and the Court may properly deny the Motion based on these factors alone. See, e.g., FDIC v. RPM Mortg., Inc., No. 15-cv-05534-EMC, 2018 WL 1335812, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2018); George Chiala Farms, Inc. v. U.S. AG Sols., LLC, No. 11-cv-00884-EJD, 2012 WL 1600445, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 7, 2012).
Courts often analyze the second and third factors together, which “require the plaintiff ‘to plead facts sufficient to establish and succeed upon its claims.'” See GS Holistic, LLC v. MSA-Bossy Inc., No. 22-cv-07638-JSC, 2023 WL 3604322, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 22, 2023) (citations omitted). Plaintiff seeks entry of default judgment with respect to her first claim for breach of express warranty under the Act. To state a claim for breach of express warranty under the Act, Plaintiff must allege
Plaintiff brought three claims in the Complaint, seeks entry of default judgment with respect to just one of those claims and requests that the Court dismiss her remaining two claims in the event the Court grants the Motion. See Complaint ¶¶ 25-65; Motion at 9.
that (1) the vehicle had a nonconformity covered by the express warranty that substantially impaired the use, value or safety of the vehicle (the nonconformity element); (2) the vehicle was presented to an authorized representative of the manufacturer of the vehicle for repair (the presentation element); and (3) the manufacturer or his representative did not repair the nonconformity after a reasonable number of repair attempts (the failure to repair element).Donlen v. Ford Motor Co., 217 Cal.App.4th 138, 152 (3d Dist. 2013); accord Monaco v. Mercedez-Benz USA, LLC, No. 22-cv-04631-MEMF, 2023 WL 405312, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2023).
While Plaintiff does allege that she presented the vehicle to one of Defendant's authorized facilities for repair (the second element), she does not sufficiently allege that the vehicle did not conform to the express warranty provided or that Defendant failed to repair those conformities after a reasonable number of attempts (the first and third elements). With respect to nonconformities, Plaintiff alleges only generally that the vehicle experienced certain “defects and nonconformities to warranty,” including “engine defects, engine electronics system defects, electrical defects and other serious nonconformities to warranty,” but she does not offer any specific facts as to what features of the car did not work. See Complaint ¶¶ 27, 31. Plaintiff also fails to explain what precisely the express warranty covered. As for failure to repair, Plaintiff merely alleges that Defendant's authorized facility failed to repair the vehicle “after a reasonable number of repair attempts,” but she does not explain how many times the facility attempted to repair the vehicle. See id. ¶ 33.
The Court cannot accept these conclusory allegations in evaluating the Motion. See DIRECTV, Inc. v. Hoa Huynh, 503 F.3d 847, 854 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[A defaulting] ‘defendant is not held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded or to admit conclusions of law.'” (citation omitted)); see, e.g., Gottschalk v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 964 F.Supp.2d 1147, 1165 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (“Plaintiff's complaint fails to offer sufficient intelligible, non-conclusory factual allegations to support her claims. For this reason alone, Plaintiff's motion for default judgment must be denied.”). Thus, Plaintiff has effectively failed to state a claim, as required by the second and third Eitel factors, and the Court will therefore deny the Motion. See, e.g., Moore v. U.K., 384 F.3d 1079, 1090 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[I]f Moore has not adequately alleged that he has ‘a claim or right to relief' under FOIA, he is not entitled to a default judgment ....” (footnote omitted)).
The Court recognizes that Plaintiff offers significantly more detail in the Motion (including through appended evidence) than she does in the Complaint. But the Court cannot accept “facts which are not established by the pleadings of the prevailing party” in evaluating a motion for entry of default judgment. See Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1978) (emphasis added); see, e.g., Love v. Mustafa, No. 20-cv-02071-PJH, 2021 WL 7286006, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2021) (“Love cannot use his motion for default judgment to supplement his complaint.” (citation omitted)).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the Motion. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint by August 19, 2024. If Plaintiff elects to file an amended pleading, the Court will set aside the previous entry of default against Defendant, and Plaintiff will have to serve that new pleading on Defendant. If Plaintiff does not file an amended pleading by the deadline, the Court will direct the Clerk to reassign this action to a district judge with a recommendation that the district judge dismiss this action.
SO ORDERED.