Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Santa Cruz County Super. Ct. No. JU018151
Bamattre-Manoukian, ACTING P.J.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a petition for extraordinary writ A.R., the mother of the child S., seeks relief from the jurisdictional and dispositional orders of the juvenile court, which deny reunification services and set a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 to determine a permanent plan for S. (§ 366.26, subd. (l); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452.) Mother argues that the orders should be vacated due to several errors made in connection with the combined jurisdictional and dispositional hearing: (1) notice of the hearing was defective and untimely; (2) the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying mother’s request for a continuance of the hearing; (3) the juvenile court failed to ascertain whether the 11-year-old child had been informed of the hearing and her right to attend it; (4) ineffective assistance of counsel; and (5) the dispositional order was defective. In her petition for a writ of habeas corpus, mother also challenges the jurisdictional and dispositional orders.
Further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.
On October 11, 2007, we ordered that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus be considered with the petition for extraordinary writ.
For reasons that we will explain, we conclude that the notice given did not comport with the requirements of due process. We will therefore issue a peremptory writ directing the juvenile court to vacate the jurisdictional and dispositional orders and to hold a new jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, and deny the petition for a writ of habeas corpus as moot.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On May 3, 2007, an officer of the Watsonville Police Department and a Santa Cruz County social worker conducted a welfare check at the home of the mother of the child S. The social worker had been contacted by S.’s school counselor, who had reported S.’s statement that her mother and her “stepfather” (mother’s live-in boyfriend) were always drinking at home. Mother, age 51, told the police officer that she and her boyfriend both drank a 12-pack of beer every day and sometimes tequila or other hard liquor and that they also used cocaine.
The police officer then contacted S. at school. She told the officer that on May 3, 2007, she went home after school and found no one there, so she went to the 7-Eleven store with a friend. When S. returned, her mother was at home and drunk. S. also told the officer that her mother had gotten angry and tried to hit her with an electrical cord because she had gone to the 7-Eleven store. Additionally, S. said that her mother and her “stepfather” drank every day and got drunk on weekends, and she had seen a bag of cocaine in his pants and pieces of straws that she knew were used for taking cocaine.
The police officer determined that the parents’ alcohol and drug abuse prevented them from providing good care for S. and she was taken into protective custody by the social worker on May 5, 2007.
On May 7, 2007, the Santa Cruz County Human Resources Agency (the Agency) filed a petition as to S., pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (a) [serious physical harm], (b) [failure to protect] and (g) [no provision for support]. The petition alleged, on the basis of the May 3, 2007 incident and mother’s extensive history with child protective services in Santa Cruz and Monterey counties, that there was a substantial risk that S. would suffer serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally due to mother’s untreated substance abuse issues; that S. was exposed to the untreated chronic substance abuse of her mother and her mother’s live-in boyfriend; and the precise whereabouts of S.’s father were unknown and he had not been able or willing to protect S. from the substantial risk of abuse and/or neglect by mother.
A detention hearing was held on May 8, 2007. The juvenile court found that a prima facie showing had been made that S. came within section 300 and that continuance in the home of mother would be contrary to her welfare. Additionally, the court determined that the child’s detention was necessary because there was a substantial danger to her physical or mental health and there were no reasonable means by which her physical and emotional health could be protected without removing her from her mother’s physical custody. The court also appointed counsel for mother and for S. and ordered that mother be allowed a minimum of two supervised visits with S. per week.
A notice of jurisdictional hearing, which was set for June 1, 2007, was personally served on mother, her attorney, and S.’s attorney on May 8, 2007. On June 1, 2007, the juvenile court received and lodged the Agency’s “Jurisdiction/Disposition Report” and set a “Jurisdiction/Setting” hearing for June 7, 2007.
On May 8, 2007, the juvenile court ordered that any notice required to served on the child was to be served on the child’s attorney.
The “Jurisdiction/Disposition Report” filed by the Agency on June 7, 2007, requested that the juvenile court take jurisdiction over S. based on the evidence contained in the report, and also requested a two-week continuance to allow the Agency to determine the most appropriate disposition recommendation for her. The report stated that S. was currently residing in a licensed foster care home. The report also included a summary of mother’s extensive contacts with child protective services and the two prior juvenile dependency petitions filed under section 300 with respect to S.
The first juvenile dependency petition was filed on December 3, 1998, in Santa Cruz County and alleged medical neglect by mother. S. was born with a cyst in her brain that required follow-up MRI scans at Lucille Packard Children’s Hospital. Mother missed three of S.’s MRI appointments and was found to be intoxicated on several unannounced social worker visits to her home. The allegation of medical neglect was sustained and mother was offered voluntary services but did not fully comply, according to County of Santa Cruz Social Services. The dependency case was dismissed in January 1999 because S.’s medical condition did not require any further treatment.
A second dependency petition was filed in Monterey County on April 8, 2003. S. was placed in protective custody because mother was intoxicated when school officials telephoned her to request that S. be picked up from school because she had a temperature of 102 degrees. A deputy sheriff went to the home and found mother passed out on the bed. Reunification services were recommended and in June 2006 the dependency petition was dismissed and S. was returned to her mother’s care.
The “Jurisdiction/Disposition Report” also contained a summary of the Agency’s investigation. Mother was born in Mexico and has six adult children, all of whom live in Mexico. Mother was never married to S.’s father and they separated when S. was four months old. Father returned to Mexico and mother has had no contact with him. He has not provided any support to S. The Agency initiated an absent parent search for the father but had not succeeded in contacting him.
Mother met her live-in boyfriend when S. was approximately one and one-half years old. He rented a home for them and they moved in together. However, he was using drugs when they met and he “continues to struggle with chronic substance dependency.” Nevertheless, mother reported that he was willing to comply with any activity ordered by the court or the Agency.
Mother acknowledged that she started snorting cocaine approximately 13 years ago and begin drinking alcohol at the age of 26. She has been drinking to excess after relapsing from prior drug treatment. In October 2003 mother completed a nine-month outpatient drug treatment program at Fenix Services. Before that she completed a four-month program at the Hermanas Residential Program. A counselor at Fenix Services reported that mother blamed S. for many of her problems. Mother had stopped going to self-help meetings such as Alcoholics Anonymous.
Regarding the incident of May 3, 2007, mother asserted that she did not hit S. and that S. was very rebellious. Mother admitted using cocaine on May 2, 2007, and that she uses cocaine when she is at home alone.
S. is in fourth grade and struggling academically. When she was interviewed, S. stated that there were many things she likes about her mother, who tells her that she loves her and hugs and kisses her. However, S. would like mother to stop drinking and stated that mother frequently uses drugs and gets drunk. The foster parents reported that S. is a delight to have in their home but she is not used too much structure or rules. The social worker who supervises mother’s visits with S. reported that she is happy to see her mother, the visits were going well, and mother focuses on S. throughout the visit and prepares food for her.
As a result of its investigation following the incident of May 3, 2007, the Agency determined that court intervention was required to keep S. safe due to mother’s admitted history of alcohol and drug abuse and her relapse after attending multiple alcohol and drug programs. The Agency also found that mother’s judgment was impaired “as evidenced by her attempting to physically strike her child, entering into romantic relationships with other alcohol and/or drug users, and self medicating instead of obtaining proper mental health services.”
Mother attended the “Jurisdiction/Setting” hearing held June 7, 2007, along with her attorney, the minor’s attorney, county counsel, and a social worker. A Spanish interpreter was appointed. Mother’s attorney requested a continuance. The juvenile court granted the request and the matter was set for a jurisdictional and dispositional hearing on June 28, 2007.
At the hearing held on June 28, 2007, the Agency recommended that S. be declared a dependent child of the court, that no reunification services be offered to the parents, and that a section 366.26 hearing be set to determine a permanent plan for S. Mother did not attend the hearing held on June 28, 2007, and her attorney requested a continuance. The juvenile court granted the continuance after determining that the court had not given proper notice of a change of courtroom for the hearing. The court also ordered the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing to be continued to July 12, 2007, at 8:15 a.m.
The record does not reflect that the juvenile court served a notice of the July 12, 2007 hearing date on any party, including mother. On July 9, 2007, the Agency mailed a notice to mother, mother’s attorney, S.’s attorney and county counsel. The notice was captioned “Notice of Review Hearing,” and had boxes for “6 Month,” “12 Month,” “18 Month,” and “Other.” Only the “Other” box was check marked. The notice also had check marks on the boxes indicating that the social worker recommended “No change in orders, services, placement, custody or status.” Additionally, the notice advised the “Present Custodians of the children” that they could be present at the hearing and submit relevant written material to the court.
The documents attached to the July 9, 2007 notice included the Agency’s disposition report dated June 28, 2007; the Agency’s initial case plan dated June 21, 2007; the Agency’s initial case plan, undated but indicating project completion dates in May 2003; an undated Monterey County Department of Social Services Spanish language document entitled “Actualización Del Plan Del Caso De Servicios Para El Bienestar De Niños,” with project completion dates in November 2003; an undated Monterey County Department of Social Services Spanish language document entitled “Actualización Del Plan Del Caso De Servicios Para El Bienestar De Niños,” with project completion dates in December 2004; and an undated Monterey County Department of Social Services document entitled “Child Welfare Services Case Plan Update,” with project completion dates in June 2005.
The Agency’s June 28, 2007 disposition report recommended that S. be declared a dependent of the court, that no reunification services be provided to mother, and that a permanency planning hearing be set pursuant to section 366.26. The Agency’s recommendations were based on its finding that mother “has a poor track record of being able to maintain a drug free, sober healthy lifestyle in which to raise [S.] [Mother’s] Child Welfare history indicates that she is not able to stay away for an extended period of time from drug use or without Agency involvement. This pattern has caused a great deal of instability for [S.].” Further, the Agency recognized that although mother loves S., she was not able to maintain a “sober, stable and safe living environment” for S. despite her past participation in residential and outpatient substance abuse treatment programs, parenting classes, and counseling.
At the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing held on July 12, 2007, county counsel reiterated the Agency’s recommendations that S. be declared a dependent of the court, that no reunification services be offered, and that a section 366.26 hearing be set to determine a permanent plan for S. Mother’s attorney advised the court that mother was not present and requested a continuance on her behalf. County counsel stated that the Agency had notified mother of the July 12, 2007 hearing by mailing a hearing notice on July 9, 2007, to mother at her last known address. The juvenile court denied the request for a continuance, finding that “at the last court hearing, [mother’s attorney] requested a continuance on behalf of her client, and it does appear that her client was sent notice to the last known address, and because of that, the motion to continue is noted, for the record, but denied.”
Mother’s attorney again requested a continuance, stating that “I believe the . . . dispositional report dated June 28, 2007 is extremely misleading. The dispositional recommendation has changed from family reunification to bypass. [¶] However, there is a case plan attached, and there are objectives and responsibilities for the mother that are outlined in both English and Spanish, which I know that my client . . . is monolingual, Spanish-speaking. So if she were to just get this report, she would be under the impression that services were still being offered to her. [¶] I would request a minimum of one-week continuance, Your Honor, so that my office can continue to try to contact the mother. I know that we tried on a prior occasion, and we were told that she was at work and to call back later.”
County counsel pointed out, and the juvenile court agreed, that the case plans attached to the June 28, 2007 disposition report were intended to establish that mother had not completed earlier plans and also to document the services that had been previously offered to her. Additionally, county counsel noted that the June 28, 2007 disposition report had been mailed to mother on June 22, 2007, and that report indicated that the Agency was recommending bypass of reunification services. County counsel also argued that reunification services would not be in S.’s best interest because, as the disposition report showed, mother had failed two prior case plans. Mother’s attorney did not present any argument or evidence on mother’s behalf.
The juvenile court then ruled as follows: “[Mother’s attorney’s] request for a further continuance is noted for the record, and based on the service that I see in the disposition report, dated June 28th of 2007, indicating that a copy of the—and I appreciate the fact that it’s in Spanish and in English, at least portions of the report. It has been noted, but at this point the motion to continue is denied.”
The juvenile court then ruled that S. would be declared a dependent of the court, that she would remain in out-of-home care, and mother would not receive reunification services, based on the court’s findings that “numerous attempts have been made and, unfortunately, that we are not any further along for [S.’s] benefit – and [S.] is 11 years old now and does need permanency and stability in her life.” The court also adopted the recommendations set forth in the Agency’s disposition report. A section 366.26 hearing to determine a permanent plan for S. was set on November 9, 2007.
We observe that the record includes a written jurisdictional order filed July 13, 2007, while the dispositional order is included in the minute order of July 12, 2007.
On October 9, 2007, mother filed a petition for extraordinary writ challenging the jurisdictional and dispositional orders. Mother also requested a stay of the November 9, 2007 hearing. We granted the request and issued a temporary stay order on October 29, 2007.
III. DISCUSSION
Mother challenges the jurisdictional and dispositional orders on several grounds, including her contention that the defective and untimely notice of the July 12, 2007 jurisdictional and dispositional hearing violated her due process rights. We will address the notice issue first because we find that issue to be dispositive.
A. The Parties’ Contentions
Mother asserts that the Agency had an obligation to give her notice of the continued hearing date of July 12, 2007, by a method reasonably calculated to reach her because she was not present at the June 28, 2007 hearing where the continued hearing date of July 12, 2007, was set, based on case law and section 291. She argues that the notice of the July 12, 2007 hearing that Agency served by mail on July 9, 2007 was not reasonably calculated to reach her in a timely fashion. Further, mother argues that the untimely notice was prejudicial because, even if she had received the notice prior to the July 12, 2007 hearing, there would not have been enough time to prepare her defense.
Section 291 provides in pertinent part, “After the initial petition hearing, the clerk of the court shall cause the notice to be served in the following manner: [¶] (a) Notice of the hearing shall be given to the following persons: [¶] (1) The mother. [¶] (2) The father or fathers, presumed and alleged. [¶] (3) The legal guardian or guardians. [¶] (4) The child, if the child is 10 years of age or older. [¶] (5) Any known sibling of the child who is the subject of the hearing if that sibling either is the subject of a dependency proceeding or has been adjudged to be a dependent child of the juvenile court. If the sibling is 10 years of age or older, the sibling, the sibling’s caregiver, and the sibling’s attorney. If the sibling is under 10 years of age, the sibling’s caregiver and the sibling’s attorney. However, notice is not required to be given to any sibling whose matter is calendared in the same court on the same day. [¶] (6) Each attorney of record unless counsel of record is present in court when the hearing is scheduled, then no further notice need be given. [¶] . . . [¶] (c) Notice shall be served as follows: [¶] (1) If the child is detained, the notice shall be given to the persons required to be noticed as soon as possible, and at least five days before the hearing, unless the hearing is set less than five days and then at least 24 hours prior to the hearing. [¶] (2) If the child is not detained, the notice shall be given to those persons required to be noticed at least 10 days prior to the date of the hearing. [¶] (d) The notice shall include all of the following: [¶] (1) The name and address of the person notified. [¶] (2) The nature of the hearing. [¶] (3) Each section and subdivision under which the proceeding has been initiated. [¶] (4) The date, time, and place of the hearing. [¶] (5) The name of the child upon whose behalf the petition has been brought. [¶] (6) A statement that: [¶] (A) If they fail to appear, the court may proceed without them. [¶] (B) The child, parent, guardian, Indian custodian, or adult relative to whom notice is required to be given is entitled to have an attorney present at the hearing. [¶] (C) If the parent, guardian, Indian custodian, or adult relative is indigent and cannot afford an attorney, and desires to be represented by an attorney, the parent, guardian, Indian custodian, or adult relative shall promptly notify the clerk of the juvenile court. [¶] (D) If an attorney is appointed to represent the parent, guardian, Indian custodian, or adult relative, the represented person shall be liable for all or a portion of the costs to the extent of his or her ability to pay. [¶] (E) The parent, guardian, Indian custodian, or adult relative may be liable for the costs of support of the child in any out-of-home placement. [¶] (7) A copy of the petition. [¶] (e) Service of the notice of the hearing shall be given in the following manner: [¶] (1) If the child is detained and the persons required to be noticed are not present at the initial petition hearing, they shall be noticed by personal service or by certified mail, return receipt requested. [¶] (2) If the child is detained and the persons required to be noticed are present at the initial petition hearing, they shall be noticed by personal service or by first-class mail. [¶] (3) If the child is not detained, the persons required to be noticed shall be noticed by personal service or by first-class mail, unless the person to be served is known to reside outside the county, in which case service shall be by first-class mail.”
Mother also asserts that the July 9, 2007 notice of the July 12, 2007 hearing violated her due process rights because the notice was prejudicially defective. She contends that notice should have been provided in Spanish, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 5.667, because she does not speak English. Since the notice was written in English, mother maintains that she was not advised that bypass of reunification services was a potential consequence of the July 12, 2007 hearing. Further, because the notice stated that the social worker did not recommend any changes in orders, services, placement, custody or status, mother argues that the notice indicated that the status quo would not be changed as a consequence of the July 12, 2007 hearing. The notice was also deficient, according to mother, because it did not advise her that if she failed to attend the July 12, 2007 hearing she risked a bypass of reunification services and an order setting a section 366.26 hearing to determine a permanent plan for S.
California Rules of Court, rule 5.667 states, “(a) In court order of notice (§ 296) The court may order the child, or any parent or guardian or Indian custodian of the child who is present in court, to appear again before the court, social worker, probation officer, or county financial officer at a specified time and place as stated in the order. [¶] (b) Language of notice If it appears that the parent or guardian does not read English, the social worker must provide notice in the language believed to be spoken by the parent or guardian.”
Mother disputes county counsel’s argument at the July 12, 2007 hearing that she received adequate notice of the possible consequences of the July 12, 2007 hearing because the disposition report, which recommended denial of reunification services, was mailed to her on June 22, 2007. She asserts that the disposition report did not notify her of the change in recommendation because it was written entirely in English. Mother also emphasizes the fact that the disposition report was followed by the July 9, 2007 notice, which confusingly stated that the Agency’s recommendations did not call for a change in orders, services, placement, custody, or status. She therefore claims that the defects in the notice were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and constituted a due process violation.
The Agency responds that mother forfeited her claim that the July 9, 2007 notice was defective because she failed to object to any notice defects at the time of the July 12, 2007 hearing. Relying on Code of Civil Procedure section 185, the Agency also argues that there is no requirement that notices in juvenile dependency cases be translated into Spanish.
Code of Civil Procedure section 185 provides in pertinent part, “(a) Every written proceeding in a court of justice in this state shall be in the English language, and judicial proceedings shall be conducted, preserved, and published in no other. Nothing in this section shall prohibit a court from providing an unofficial translation of a court order issued pursuant to Section 527.6 or 527.8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or Part 1 (commencing with Section 6200) of Division 10 of the Family Code, or Section 136.2 of the Penal Code, in a language other than English.”
As to mother’s contention that the July 9, 2007 notice violated her due process rights because the notice was untimely, the Agency asserts that mother had prior notice that bypass of reunification services was recommended because the dispositional report containing that recommendation was mailed to her on June 22, 2007, “so there was no last minute surprise, had she chosen to attend the dispositional hearing on July 12.”
B. Analysis
We will begin our analysis with an overview of the statutory notice requirements for a jurisdictional and dispositional hearing. “After a petition is filed seeking to have a child declared a dependent of the court, the juvenile court must set a jurisdictional hearing within a specified period. (§ 334 [jurisdictional hearing must be set within 30 days of filing of petition if children are not detained; if detained, within 15 court days of the date of the judicial order directing the children be detained]; Cal. Rules of Court, [former] rule 1442(f) [now rule 5.670(f)].) Once the jurisdictional hearing has been set, notice must be given to the appropriate parties (§ 291, subd. (a)) and must include, among other things, the date, time and place of the proceeding and a statement of the ‘nature of the hearing.’ (§ 291, subd. (d)(1)-(5).)” (In re Wilford J. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 742, 749.) Section 291 implicitly requires the nature of the hearing (whether pretrial, jurisdictional or dispositional) to be specified on the notice. (Id. at p. 751.)
A parent also has a due process right to notice of the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing. The California Supreme Court has instructed that “[s]ince the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his [or her] children is a compelling one, ranked among the most basic of civil rights [citations], the state, before depriving a parent of this interest, must afford him [or her] adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard.” (In re B.G. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 679, 688.) To satisfy due process, the notice must be “ ‘reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.’ [Citation.]” (In re Claudia S. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 236, 247.) The lack of a due process notice “is a ‘fatal defect’ in the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
Thus, “[s]ocial service agencies, invested with a public trust and acting as temporary custodians of dependent minors, are bound by law to make every reasonable effort in attempting to inform parents of all hearings.” (In re DeJohn B. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 100, 102.) In short, “ ‘[u]ntil parental rights have been terminated, both parents must be given notice at each step of the proceedings. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 106.)
However, an error in the notice of a jurisdictional and dispositional hearing does not require reversal absent a showing of prejudice. (In re Angela C. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 389, 393-394; In re Melinda J. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1413, 1419.) Prejudice is established unless the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (In re Daniel S., supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 912-913.)
In the present case, we find that the Agency had an obligation to provide notice to mother of the July 12, 2007 jurisdictional hearing, because mother was not present at the June 28, 2007 hearing where the hearing date of July 12, 2007, was set and the juvenile court made a finding that the court had not given proper notice of a courtroom change. We also observe that the record does not reflect that mother’s attorney gave mother any notice of the hearing date of July 12, 2007.
We further find that the notice of the July 12, 2007 hearing that was mailed to mother on July 9, 2007, was defective on its face. The notice did not correctly advise mother of the nature of the hearing that was set for July 12, 2007. The notice was captioned “Notice of Review Hearing” and had a check mark on the box indicating that the social worker recommended “No change in orders, services, placement, custody or status.” Therefore, it cannot be disputed that the July 9, 2007 notice did not indicate that the nature of the hearing to be held on July 12, 2007, was a jurisdictional and dispositional hearing.
Moreover, the documents attached to the July 9, 2007 notice did not clarify the nature of the hearing because they conflicted with the recommendation on the July 9, 2007 notice that there would be no change in “placement, custody or status.” We agree with mother that the attached documents, including the Agency’s disposition report dated June 28, 2007, the Agency’s initial case plan dated June 21, 2007, and the prior case plans from Monterey County, instead added to the potential confusion regarding the nature of the July 12, 2007 hearing. Therefore, even assuming that mother could have read the English-language notice of July 9, 2007, the notice was inadequate to inform her that a jurisdictional and dispositional hearing would be held on July 12, 2007.
We also determine that the July 9, 2007 notice was defective because it was untimely. The notice was served by mail on July 9, 2007 and therefore it could not have been received by mother any earlier than July 10, 2007, only two days before the July 12, 2007 jurisdictional and dispositional hearing. The Agency does not explain how two days notice was sufficient to allow mother an opportunity to prepare for and attend the July 12, 2007 hearing. Moreover, section 291, subdivision (c)(1) provides that where, as here, the child is in custody and the jurisdictional hearing is set more than five days away, notice must be given at least five days before the hearing.
We further determine that the defective notice of July 9, 2007, was prejudicial because the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The July 9, 2007 notice did not correctly inform mother of the nature of the hearing to be held on July 12, 2007, and, because the notice was untimely, mother was not provided with an opportunity to be heard.
The agency’s argument that mother forfeited her claim that the notice of July 9, 2007, was defective by failing to object to the notice at the time of the hearing held on July 12, 2007, lacks merit. The record reflects that mother’s attorney objected that mother had not been properly notified that bypass of reunification services was a potential consequence of the July 12, 2007 hearing, because “the dispositional report dated June 28, 2007 is extremely misleading. The dispositional recommendation has changed from family reunification to bypass. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . So if she were to just get this report, she would be under the impression that services were still being offered to her.”
There is also no merit in Agency’s contention that its mailing on June 22, 2007, of the June 28, 2007 dispositional report containing the recommendation for bypass of reunification adequately notified mother, since the June 22, 2007 report did not indicate that the issue of reunification services would be determined at the July 12, 2007 hearing. Further, while the June 28, 2007 dispositional report was mailed to mother, it was followed by the contradictory July 9, 2007 notice that stated it was a notice of an “other” review hearing.
For these reasons, we agree with mother that the July 9, 2007 notice did not satisfy her statutory and constitutional right to notice of the continued jurisdictional and dispositional hearing of July 12, 2007. Having reached this conclusion, we need not address mother’s remaining contentions. We will vacate the jurisdictional and dispositional orders and direct the juvenile court to hold a new jurisdictional and dispositional hearing upon notice of the hearing to mother that comports with the requirements of due process.
IV. DISPOSITION
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing the superior court to vacate its jurisdictional order of July 13, 2007, and its dispositional order of July 12, 2007, and to set a new jurisdictional and dispositional hearing upon notice of the hearing to mother that comports with the requirements of due process. The temporary stay order issued October 29, 2007, is vacated. The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied as moot. This opinion is made final as to this court seven days from the date of filing. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.264(b)(3).)
WE CONCUR: MIHARA, J., MCADAMS, J.
Section 296 provides, “Upon any hearing or rehearing under this article, the court may order the child or any parent or guardian, or Indian custodian of the child who is present in court, to again appear before the court, before the social worker or probation officer, or before the county financial officer at a time and place specified in the order.”