Opinion
CR-21-0024
08-05-2022
A.P.S. v. State of Alabama
Appeal from Blount Juvenile Court (JU-18-7.01)
McCOOL, JUDGE
A.P.S. appeals an order of the Blount Juvenile Court transferring him to the Blount Circuit Court for prosecution as an adult on a charge of capital murder. For the reasons set forth herein, we reverse the transfer order and remand the case for further proceedings.
Facts and Procedural History
Around midnight on December 15, 2017, Ricardo Santiago Gonzalez and Adalberta Chavez Ruiz were murdered in their residence; the murder weapon was a handgun. In January 2018, Gonzalez and Ruiz's 17-year-old son Leo Chavez was charged with capital murder in connection with his parents' deaths. In a delinquency petition filed that same month, A.P.S., who was 14 years old when the murders occurred, was also charged with capital murder. The State subsequently filed a motion to transfer A.P.S. to the circuit court for prosecution as an adult. See § 12-15-203(a), Ala. Code 1975. Before the transfer hearing occurred, Chavez was convicted of capital murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
"This Court may take judicial notice of its own records." Doster v. State, [Ms. CR-20-0300, December 17, 2021]___So. 3d___,___n.1 (Ala.Crim.App.2021).
As with all transfer hearings, the transfer hearing in this case consisted of two phases: (1) a probable-cause phase, during which the juvenile court was required to determine "whether there is probable cause to believe that [A.P.S.] committed the alleged crime," and (2) a dispositional phase, during which the juvenile court was required to determine "whether it is in the best interest of [A.P.S.] or the public to transfer [A.P.S.] to the circuit court to stand trial as an adult." J.S.A. v. State, 615 So.2d 1288, 1290 (Ala.Crim.App.1993). The State's only witness at the probable-cause phase of the transfer hearing was Investigator Leonard Chambless of the Blount County Sheriff's Department, whose testimony provided the following facts.
On December 17, 2017, Inv. Chambless responded to Gonzalez and Ruiz's residence because members of Ruiz's family had found blood in the residence and had filed a missing-persons report. Upon entering the residence, Inv. Chambless found "a blood-soaked couch," "a chunk of hair and scalp on the top of the stove," and "bags of bloody rags and a bloody mop." (R. 27-28.) Neither Gonzalez nor Ruiz was in the residence, and two vehicles - a Chevrolet S-10 truck and a Cadillac Escalade sportutility vehicle - were missing from the property.
Two days later, law enforcement officers in Chattanooga, Tennessee, stopped Chavez while he was driving the Escalade and took him into custody, and the officers subsequently found the S-10 truck, which was also in Tennessee. After obtaining a search warrant, Inv. Chambless searched both vehicles and found blood in the bed of the S-10 truck and various receipts in both the truck and the Escalade; Chattanooga law enforcement officers had also found two handguns in the Escalade when they arrested Chavez. However, according to Inv. Chambless, at the time of the transfer hearing it was "undetermined" whether either of those handguns had been used to murder Gonzalez and Ruiz. (R. 94.)
Based on the receipts he found in the vehicles, Inv. Chambless obtained surveillance videos from a Mapco gasoline service station in Collinsville and a Cricket brand cellular-telephone store in Oneonta. The surveillance video from the Mapco service station reflects that, at some unspecified time on the morning of December 16, 2017 - after Gonzalez and Ruiz had been murdered - both the S-10 truck and the Escalade were at the service station, and A.P.S. can be seen on that video. (R. 37.) The surveillance video from the Cricket store reflects that Chavez, A.P.S., and Jose Villanueva were in the store on the morning of December 17, 2017, and that Chavez made a purchase with his father's credit card. (R. 3840.) However, the receipt for that purchase indicated that the purchase occurred on December 16, 2017, at 7:24 p.m. (R. 43-44.) No explanation was provided for the discrepancy between the time stamp on the surveillance video and the time stamp on the receipt.
As part of his investigation, Inv. Chambless spoke with Jose Valadez, and the State asked Inv. Chambless to testify to the substance of Valadez's out-of-court statement. A.P.S. objected to the admission of Valadez's statement on the grounds that the statement was hearsay and that the admission of the statement would violate his right to confront the witnesses against him. The juvenile court overruled that objection, and Inv. Chambless testified as follows regarding Valadez's statement:
(R. 85.) On cross-examination, Inv. Chambless testified that A.P.S.'s DNA was not on either of the handguns found in the Escalade and that there was no physical evidence that connected A.P.S. to the murders of Gonzalez and Ruiz. (R. 91, 95.)"[Valadez] said he went to Villanueva's house and picked up Villanueva and [A.P.S.] on or about the 15th of December. They went to [Chavez's] house sometime around midnight-ish. When they got to [Chavez's] house, [Valadez] stayed in the car. [A.P.S.] and Villanueva exited the vehicle and went in the house. [Valadez] heard gunshots. Then they came and got him and brought him into the house at which point he saw [Chavez's] mom and dad dead in the house. Dad was on the couch and mom on the floor. They cleaned up as best they could. They put the two bodies in a white S-10 pickup, took them out and buried them."
In February 2022, Valadez pleaded guilty to abuse of a corpse and was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment. (Supp. C. 6.)
Following Inv. Chambless's testimony, the juvenile court conducted the dispositional phase of the transfer hearing and, following that phase, took the matter under advisement. In an order issued on October 1, 2021, the juvenile court found that there was probable cause to believe A.P.S. had committed capital murder and transferred him to the circuit court for prosecution as an adult. A.P.S. filed a timely notice of appeal.
Discussion
On appeal, A.P.S. claims that the juvenile court's transfer order must be reversed because, he says, the court erred by allowing Inv. Chambless to testify to the substance of Valadez's out-of-court statement. In support of that claim, A.P.S. argues that Valadez's statement was hearsay and that the admission of the statement violated his right to confront the witnesses against him. See U.S. Const., Amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him."); and § 12-15-202(f)(3), Ala. Code 1975 (providing that, in a juvenile-transfer hearing, the accused "has the right to confront all witnesses against the child, subject to limitations recognized by the United States Supreme Court").
Before transferring an accused juvenile to the circuit court for prosecution as an adult, a juvenile court "'must determine that there is probable cause that the child committed the alleged offense.'" D.M. v. State, [Ms. CR-20-0261, Oct. 8, 2021]___So. 3d___,___(Ala.Crim.App.2021) (quoting J.F.B. v. State, 729 So.2d 355, 356 (Ala.Crim.App.1998)). See Duncan v. State, 394 So.2d 930, 932 (Ala. 1981) ("The finding of probable cause is an essential element of the decision to transfer."). "In a juvenile transfer hearing, hearsay evidence is admissible to show that there is probable cause that the accused committed the crime, but it cannot constitute the sole basis for a finding of probable cause." Q.J.S. v. State, 12 So.3d 164, 165 (Ala.Crim.App.2008). However, pursuant to § 12-15-202(f)(3), the Alabama Legislature has provided an accused juvenile with a statutory right to confront the witnesses against him in a transfer hearing. Thus, "'hearsay evidence that violates the child's right of confrontation may not even be admitted, much less constitute the sole basis for a finding of probable cause to transfer the child to circuit court.'" C.E.B. v. State, 661 So.2d 786, 787 (Ala.Crim.App.1994) (quoting O.M. v. State, 595 So.2d 514, 518 (Ala.Crim.App.1991)) (emphasis added). See also W.T.J. v. State, 665 So.2d 1019, 1022 (Ala.Crim.App.1995) ("'The Alabama Supreme Court has made it clear that evidence which could not be constitutionally admitted at a criminal trial should be excluded from a transfer hearing.'" (quoting O.M., 595 So .2d at 517) (citing Ex parte Whisenant, 466 So.2d 1006, 1008 (Ala. 1985)))).
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution "'prohibits the admission of ... testimonial hearsay [statements offered for the truth of the matter asserted],'" Turner v. State, 115 So.3d 939, 943 (Ala.Crim.App.2012) (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53 (2004)), "unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant." Ex parte Phillips, 287 So.3d 1179, 1207 (Ala. 2018) (citing Crawford, supra). Thus,
"'when offered for the truth of the matter asserted, a nontestifying codefendant's statement to police implicating the accused in the crime is inadmissible against the accused; it does not fall within any recognized exception to the hearsay rule and ... its introduction violates the accused's confrontation rights. See Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 106 S.Ct. 2056, 90 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968); R.L.B. v. State, 647 So.2d 803 (Ala.Crim.App.1994); Ephraim v. State, 627 So.2d 1102 (Ala.Crim.App.1993).'"C.L.H. v. State, 121 So.3d 403, 406 (Ala.Crim.App.2012) (quoting Jackson v. State, 791 So.2d 979, 1024 (Ala.Crim.App.2000)).
In this case, the State does not contend that Valadez was unavailable to testify at the transfer hearing; indeed, the State conceded during oral argument before this Court that Valadez "was apparently available for testimony." The State also conceded during oral argument that Valadez's out-of-court statement was testimonial hearsay, and it clearly was because it was offered for the truth of the matter asserted, i.e., that A.P.S. murdered Gonzalez and Ruiz or participated in the murders. Thus, Valadez's statement was inadmissible at the transfer hearing because its admission violated A.P.S.'s right to confront the witnesses against him. See C.E.B., 661 So.2d at 787 (holding that an investigator's testimony regarding "statements made by others implicating the appellant" was not admissible in a transfer hearing).
We recognize that this Court has previously acknowledged that "transfer hearings are 'analogous to preliminary hearings'" in that, in both hearings, the court must determine whether there is probable cause to believe the accused committed the crime with which he is charged. J.L. v. State, 826 So.2d 205, 207 (Ala.Crim.App.2001) (quoting O.M., 595 So.2d at 517). However, our decision in this case has no bearing on whether the right to confrontation is applicable in a preliminary hearing. As this Court noted in O.M., supra, "we need not decide whether or to what extent the rights of confrontation and cross-examination exist at a preliminary hearing because those rights apply to a juvenile transfer hearing in Alabama by virtue of ... statute." O.M., 595 So.2d at 517.
However, the fact that A.P.S. was denied his right to confrontation does not necessarily require reversal of the transfer order because "'[a] denial of the right of confrontation may, in some circumstances, result in harmless error.'" Floyd v. State, 289 So.3d 406 (Ala.Crim.App.2017) (quoting James v. State, 723 So.2d 776, 781 (Ala.Crim.App.1998)). See also Smith v. State, 898 So.2d 907, 917 (Ala.Crim.App.2004) ("[V]iolations of the Confrontation Clause are subject to harmless-error analysis."). In this case, the State suggests that the admission of Valadez's statement was harmless error because, according to the State, there was other evidence that tended to implicate A.P.S. in the murders of Gonzalez and Ruiz. Specifically, the State points to the surveillance videos from the Mapco service station and the Cricket store, which reflect that, after the murders occurred around midnight on December 15, A.P.S. was at the Mapco service station at some unspecified time on the morning of December 16 with Chavez, the S-10 truck, and the Escalade and was at the Cricket store with Chavez either later that day or the next day. Thus, the State argues, even if Valadez's statement is ignored, the evidence provided probable cause to believe that A.P.S. had committed capital murder.
Contrary to the State's argument, the dispositive question in our harmless-error analysis is not whether there was enough evidence, excluding Valadez's statement, to provide probable cause to believe that A.P.S. had committed capital murder. Rather, the dispositive question is whether there is a reasonable probability that Valadez's statement might have contributed to the juvenile court's probable-cause determination. As this Court has explained:
Capote v. State, 323 So.3d 104, 125 (Ala.Crim.App.2020) (quoting Floyd, 289 So.3d at 407) (emphasis added). See also James v. State, 723 So.2d 776, 784 (Ala.Crim.App.1998) ("'We are not concerned here with whether there was sufficient evidence on which the [appellant] could have been convicted without the complained of evidence[, which violated the appellant's right to confrontation]. The question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.'" (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86 (1963)))."'"[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Ex parte Baker, 906 So.2d 277, 287 (Ala. 2004) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)). .....The question is whether there is a reasonable probability that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the [outcome]."'" James [v. State], 723 So.2d [776,] 781 [(Ala.Crim.App.1998)] (quoting Chapman, 386 at 23, quoting in turn Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87, 84 S.Ct. 229, 11 L.Ed.2d 171 (1963)). In determining whether such an error is harmless, this Court must look at "the importance of the witness'[s] testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution's case." Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986).'"
In this case, we have no trouble concluding that there is a reasonable probability that Valadez's statement might have contributed to the juvenile court's probable-cause determination. Without Valadez's statement, the State's case was not as strong because there was no other evidence that directly implicated A.P.S. in the murders of Gonzalez and Ruiz. In fact, the only evidence that arguably connected A.P.S. to the murders, other than Valadez's statement, was the fact that A.P.S. was at a service station with Chavez, the S-10 truck, and the Escalade at some unspecified time in the 12-hour period after the murders occurred. Thus, Valadez's incredibly damning statement was crucial to the State's case and, insofar as it implicated A.P.S. in the murders, was not merely cumulative of other evidence. We also note that the juvenile court acknowledged that, in Valadez's two mental-competency evaluations, "neither evaluator ... had any reason to suspect that Valadez was being untruthful about the allegations" (R. 82-83), which suggests that the court might have given some credibility and weight to Valadez's statement. For those reasons, this Court cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Valadez's statement probably did not contribute to the juvenile court's probable-cause determination; in fact, given the facts of this case, we think it is apparent that the statement most likely did contribute to that determination. Accordingly, the error in admitting Valadez's statement was not harmless. See Ex parte Hutcherson, 677 So.2d 1205, 1209 (Ala. 1996) (holding that the erroneous admission of evidence was not harmless because the evidence "probably influenced the jury"); and McGahee v. State, 554 So.2d 454, 471 (Ala.Crim.App.1989) (holding that the erroneous admission of testimony was not harmless because this Court "[could not] say, with fair assurance, that . the jury's decision was not influenced by its admission").
A.P.S. also raises two other claims on appeal: (1) that the transfer order is deficient because it does not reflect that the juvenile court considered the six factors set forth in § 12-15-203(d), Ala. Code 1975, and (2) that the juvenile court's decision to transfer him to the circuit court for prosecution as an adult was not supported by clear and convincing evidence. See D.M.,___ So.3d at___ ("'[D]uring the dispositional phase, the court must determine by "clear and convincing" evidence whether a transfer is in the best interest of the child or the public.'" (quoting J.F.B. v. State, 729 So.2d 355, 356 (Ala.Crim.App.1998))). We need not address these claims because we have determined that the transfer order must be reversed based on the violation of A.P.S.'s right to confrontation. However, we take this opportunity to reiterate that, when a juvenile court transfers an accused juvenile to the circuit court for prosecution as an adult, the transfer order must reflect that the juvenile court considered each of the six factors in § 12-15-203(d). See Ex parte S.B., 650 So.2d 953, 955 (Ala. 1994) (Section 12-15-203(d) "'compels consideration of each of the six factors and that the transfer order reflect consideration thereof.'" (quoting Reeves v. State, 419 So.2d 217, 218 (Ala. 1982))).
Conclusion
The admission of Valadez's out-of-court statement violated A.P.S.'s right to confrontation, and this Court cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless. Thus, we reverse the transfer order and remand the case to the juvenile court for further proceedings. If the State still desires to prosecute A.P.S. as an adult, the juvenile court should hold another transfer hearing at which Valadez's out-of-court statement must not be admitted. See W.T.K. v. State, 598 So.2d 33, 35 (Ala.Crim.App.1992) ("'Jeopardy does not attach in a transfer hearing where there was no adjudicatory finding that the juvenile was delinquent or had actually violated a criminal law.'" (quoting Cruse v. State, 489 So.2d 694, 696 (Ala.Crim.App.1986))).
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Windom, P.J., and Kellum and Minor, JJ., concur.
Cole, J., concurs in the result.