The court then proceeded to analyze whether the reclassification proceeding was adjudicative in nature, in which case the predicate for Rule 75 review would be satisfied, or quasi-legislative, in which case certiorari review, and by extension Rule 75 jurisdiction, would be precluded. The court looked to In re Stratton Corp., 157 Vt. 436, 600 A.2d 297 (1991), as the controlling decision in this area. Applying the factors identified in Stratton for assessing whether an agency action is rulemaking or adjudication, the court concluded that the WRB's administrative determination was not quasi-judicial, and therefore that an appeal in the nature of certiorari was unavailable.
Procedural due process requirements apply only with respect to governmental adjudicative decisions rather than legislative decisions. See In re Stratton Corp., 157 Vt. 436, 442, 600 A.2d 297, 300 (1991) ("Due process requirements apply to the procedures that must be used in reaching agency determinations only if they are adjudicative, rather than rulemaking or legislative, in nature." (citation omitted)).
First, the requirements of due process apply only to agency decisions that are adjudicative, not legislative. See In re Appeal of Stratton Corp., 157 Vt. 436, 442, 600 A.2d 297, 300 (1991). The decision whether to grant an encroachment permit does represent an adjudicative function, as plaintiffs claim, but the encroachment permit is not granted or denied at the public information meeting.
¶ 18. We have said that "[d]ue process requirements apply to the procedures that must be used in reaching agency determinations . . . if they are adjudicative . . . in nature." In re Stratton Corp., 157 Vt. 436, 442, 600 A.2d 297, 300 (1991); see also Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46 (1975) ("[D]ue process . . . applies to administrative agencies which adjudicate as well as to courts."
We have never explicitly addressed whether § 807 of VAPA provides the exclusive way to challenge an agency regulation. See Miller v. IBM, 163 Vt. 396, 398 n.2, 659 A.2d 1126, 1126 n.2 (1995) (declining to address defendant's arguments that exclusive way to challenge agency rule is "declaratory judgment under 3 V.S.A. § 807"); In re Stratton Corp., 157 Vt. 436, 440, 600 A.2d 297, 299 (1991) (declining to address Attorney General's argument that "the exclusive method to challenge the validity of a rule is by declaratory judgment action in Washington Superior Court as provided in 3 V.S.A. § 807"). However, the plain text of § 807, and our case law explaining why the Legislature created a declaratory-judgment remedy, indicate that § 807 of VAPA is not the exclusive way to challenge agency regulations.