Opinion
No. 2-07-326-CR
DELIVERED: October 30, 2008. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Appealed from the 396th District Court of Tarrant County.
PANEL: CAYCE, C.J.; WALKER and MCCOY, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
Appellant David Asati Anunda appeals his conviction for felony driving while intoxicated. In two points he claims that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to uphold his conviction. We affirm. In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution in order to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. When reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we view all the evidence in a neutral light, favoring neither party. We then ask whether the evidence supporting the conviction, although legally sufficient, is nevertheless so weak that the factfinder's determination is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust or whether conflicting evidence so greatly outweighs the evidence supporting the conviction that the factfinder's determination is manifestly unjust. A person commits the offense of DWI if the person is intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place. A person is intoxicated if he does not have the normal use of mental or physical faculties by reason of the introduction of alcohol, or any other substance into the body. In this case, the record shows that Fort Worth Police Officer M.B. Reininger saw appellant run a stop sign when other cars were also at the stop sign. There was nothing in front of the stop sign that might have prevented appellant from seeing it. Officer Reininger observed that appellant did not use his brakes at any point until the officer pulled up behind appellant's vehicle and activated his emergency lights. As Officer Reininger was writing appellant's traffic citation, he noticed appellant swaying. When he handed the citation to appellant to sign, he noticed that appellant emitted a "very strong odor of an alcoholic beverage." Appellant's eyes were bloodshot and watery, and he spoke softly and slurred his speech. In light of these observations, the officer administered field sobriety tests, which appellant either failed or did not comply with. Appellant also refused to give a breath sample. Officer Reininger testified that he based his opinion that appellant was intoxicated upon the smell of alcohol coming from appellant's breath and person, his refusal to perform the horizontal-gaze-nystagmus test, and his failure in performing the walk-and-turn and one-leg stand tests. In Officer Reininger's opinion, appellant had "lost his abilities, both mental and physical faculties," as a result of having consumed alcohol. Additionally, Fort Worth Police Officer Jose Vasquez, Jr., who arrived on the scene as a back up officer, testified that appellant had bloodshot eyes, smelled of alcohol, and was not able to walk "correctly." From these observations, Officer Vasquez formed an opinion that appellant "could be possibly intoxicated." In addition, Officer Vasquez testified that, upon inventorying appellant's vehicle, he found a 24-ounce Schlitz malt liquor beer can underneath the passenger's seat and a Jack-In-The-Box cup that contained a liquid that smelled like liquor; he noticed that the floorboard and the passenger's seat were wet and smelled of alcohol. Officer Vasquez testified that this was "indicative of someone consuming alcohol in that vehicle." Appellant testified that he was not intoxicated and that he had consumed only one beer. Applying the appropriate standards of review, we hold that the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to prove that appellant was driving while intoxicated. We, therefore, overrule appellant's two points of error and affirm the trial court's judgment.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007).
Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 414 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006); Drichas v. State, 175 S.W.3d 795, 799 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005).
Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 414-15, 417; Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000).
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04(a) (Vernon 2003).
Id. § 49.01(2) (Vernon 2003).