Opinion
2020–03998 Index No. 609120/18
12-14-2022
Marie ANTOINE, appellant, v. Jose VIERA–SANCHEZ, et al., respondents.
Kujawski & Kujawski, Deer Park, NY (Jennifer Spellman of counsel), for appellant. Kelly, Rode & Kelly, LLP, Mineola, NY (Eric P. Tosca of counsel), for respondents.
Kujawski & Kujawski, Deer Park, NY (Jennifer Spellman of counsel), for appellant.
Kelly, Rode & Kelly, LLP, Mineola, NY (Eric P. Tosca of counsel), for respondents.
FRANCESCA E. CONNOLLY, J.P., ANGELA G. IANNACCI, WILLIAM G. FORD, HELEN VOUTSINAS, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (John H. Rouse, J.), dated May 4, 2020. The order granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries that she allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident that occurred on October 30, 2017. The defendants moved, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident. In an order dated May 4, 2020, the Supreme Court granted that branch of the defendants’ motion. The plaintiff appeals.
The defendants met their prima facie burden of demonstrating that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 98 N.Y.2d 345, 746 N.Y.S.2d 865, 774 N.E.2d 1197 ; Gaddy v. Eyler, 79 N.Y.2d 955, 956–957, 582 N.Y.S.2d 990, 591 N.E.2d 1176 ). The defendants submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injuries to the cervical and lumbar regions of the plaintiff's spine, and to the plaintiff's left shoulder and knees, did not constitute serious injuries under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Staff v. Yshua, 59 A.D.3d 614, 874 N.Y.S.2d 180 ). The defendants also demonstrated, prima facie, that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury under the 90/180–day category of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see John v. Linden, 124 A.D.3d 598, 599, 1 N.Y.S.3d 274 ; Marin v. Ieni, 108 A.D.3d 656, 657, 969 N.Y.S.2d 165 ; Richards v. Tyson, 64 A.D.3d 760, 761, 883 N.Y.S.2d 575 ). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident. The defendants’ remaining contention has been rendered academic in light of our determination.
CONNOLLY, J.P., IANNACCI, FORD and VOUTSINAS, JJ., concur.