Opinion
2012-01-17
In re DASHAWN W., and Others, Dependent Children Under the Age of Eighteen Years, etc.,Antoine N., Respondent–Appellant,Ronnelle B., Respondent,Administration for Children's Services, Petitioner–Respondent.
Elisa Barnes, New York, for appellant. Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York (Deborah A. Brenner of counsel), for Administration for Children's Services, respondent.
Elisa Barnes, New York, for appellant. Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York (Deborah A. Brenner of counsel), for Administration for Children's Services, respondent. Tamara A. Steckler, The Legal Aid Society, New York (Judith Stern of counsel), attorney for the children.TOM, J.P., CATTERSON, DeGRASSE, RICHTER, MANZANET–DANIELS, JJ.
Order, Family Court, New York County (Clark V. Richardson, J.), entered on or about October 4, 2010, which, upon a fact-finding determination that respondent father committed acts constituting severe abuse, found that petitioner Administration for Children's Services (ACS) is excused from making diligent efforts to reunite respondent father with his son, Jayquan N., unanimously affirmed, without costs.
Family Court properly determined, in light of this Court's prior determination that there was clear and convincing evidence that the child Jayquan N. was “severe[ly] abuse[d]” as that term is defined by Social Services Law § 384–b(8)(a)(i) ( see 73 A.D.3d 574, 902 N.Y.S.2d 516 [2010], lv. dismissed 16 N.Y.3d 767, 919 N.Y.S.2d 116, 944 N.E.2d 653 [2011] ), that such “aggravated circumstances” (Family Ct. Act § 1012[j] ) excused ACS from exercising diligent efforts to reunite the father with the child because such efforts would be detrimental to the best interests of the child and are unlikely to be successful in the foreseeable future (Family Court § 1039–b [b][1]; see Matter of Marino S., 100 N.Y.2d 361, 763 N.Y.S.2d 796, 795 N.E.2d 21 [2003]; Matter of Stephiana UU., 66 A.D.3d 1160, 1165, 887 N.Y.S.2d 699 [2009] ).
We reject the father's attempt to characterize the Family Court's proceedings conducted pursuant to this Court's remand as a wholly distinct and separate hearing. The Family Court's proceeding constituted a continuation of the prior fact-finding hearing in light of this Court's clarification on an issue of law ( see 73 A.D.3d at 575, 902 N.Y.S.2d 516). Moreover, the father's argument that Family Court exceeded its authority by failing to make a reasonable efforts finding simultaneously with a severe abuse finding is also unavailing and, in any event, is precluded under the law of the case doctrine since it was raised and rejected on the prior appeal.
We have considered the father's remaining contentions and find them unavailing.