Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:04-CV-0187-J.
October 12, 2004
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff John Anstett sues numerous Defendants alleging various causes of action growing out of the investigation and arrest of Paul Wooley, which commenced on May 17, 2002, and Wooley's suicide over 18 months later. Plaintiff sues The City of Amarillo and Amarillo Chief of Police, Jerry H. Neal, in his individual and official capacities.
The following defendants were dismissed by order of the Court: La Quinta Corporation and La Quinta Motels, Inc. The following defendants were dismissed pursuant to an agreed motion: The City of Allen, Allen Police Department, William S. Rushing, Individually and in his Official Capacity as Chief of Police, and Northwest Texas Hospital, Inc. The following defendants were dismissed pursuant to Plaintiff's request for non-suit in his response to defendants' motions for summary judgment: Amarillo Police Department and McKinney Police Department.
Before the Court is Defendant Jerry H. Neal's Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendant City of Amarillo's Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff Anstett filed a response with a voluminous appendix setting forth the facts relied upon in detail. The official capacity claims against Defendant Neal are duplicative of those alleged against Defendant City of Amarillo. Additionally, Texas Tort Act provides immunity for suits against governmental entities and their employees except when a government employee negligently uses motor-driven vehicle or equipment, or real or personal tangible and that use proximately causes injury or death. TEX.CIV.PRAC.REM. CODE § 101.021(1), (2). No such use was asserted by the Plaintiff in this case.
For the following reasons, Defendants' motions for summary judgment are GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Anstett brings suit against Neal in his individual and his official capacity as Chief of Police of Amarillo Police Department and against the City of Amarillo pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a deprivation under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and various state torts. Plaintiff alleges that various Defendants in McKinney, Texas investigated the murder of Amy Wingfield, which occurred on May 16, 2002 in McKinney, Texas, and that in the course of this homicide investigation, Paul Wooley became a suspect in the crime.
Plaintiff alleges that on the evening of May 17, 2002, the hotel desk clerk employed by La Quinta Motels, Inc., and La Quinta Corporation (now dismissed Defendants) contacted the Amarillo Police Department instead of a priest as requested by Wooley at check-in. The hotel clerk told the Amarillo Police Department that Wooley may be suicidal. Two Amarillo Police Department officers were dispatched and met Wooley outside of his room. After further inquiry, the police officers learned that Wooley had legal possession of several weapons. Wooley informed the police officers that he suffered from Bi-Polar Disorder, but that he was not suicidal. The officers persuaded Wooley to voluntarily check into a local hospital for observation. The officers agreed to hold Wooley's weapons as personal property to be returned after he spoke with the mental health counselor. Wooley drove his own vehicle to the hospital.
In early evening of May 17, 2002, Wooley checked himself into Northwest Texas Hospital (a now dismissed Defendant). At check-in Wooley provided his medical background, including his Bi-Polar medical condition, recent bouts with depression, and mental health treatment, which included psychiatric consultation and medication. Wooley expressed that he was very tired, and that he had called several preachers and asked them "theological questions" about suicide. Shortly after Wooley checked himself into the hospital he desired to leave, but the hospital placed Wooley on temporary commitment for suicide risk and risk to others due to his history of mental illness. Plaintiff alleges that at the direction of the Amarillo Police Department the hospital kept Wooley after he expressed a desire to leave.
After Wooley was admitted into the hospital, the McKinney Police Department notified the Amarillo Police Department that Wooley was a suspect in a murder investigation. Plaintiff asserts that while at the hospital officers of the Amarillo Police Department informed Wooley that he was being detained but not under arrest. On May 18, 2002, Wooley was later arrested by officers of the Amarillo Police Department pursuant to an arrest warrant issued by the McKinney Police Department and taken into custody until Defendant Randall VanDertuin of the McKinney Police Department transported Wooley to McKinney on May 20, 2002. Plaintiff contends that at no time between May 17, 2002 and May 20, 2002 did Amarillo Police Department have any probable cause to arrest Wooley. Plaintiff contends that Defendants Neal in his individual and in his official capacity and the City of Amarillo failed to supervise and train officers of the Amarillo Police Department.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit set forth the standard for summary judgment in Hibernia National Bank v. Carner, 997 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1993). In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court must ask whether,
the pleading, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In making this determination, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment. Reid v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 784 F.2d 577, 578 (5th Cir. 1986).
To defeat a motion for summary judgment, Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires the non-moving party to set forth specific facts sufficient to establish that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, (1986). While the mere allegation of the existence of a dispute over material facts is not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment, if the evidence shows that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party, the dispute is genuine. Id. at 247-48.
On the other hand, if a rational trier of fact, based upon the record as a whole, could not find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial. Amoco Production Co. v. Horwell Energy, Inc., 969 F.2d 146, 147-48 (5th Cir. 1992). Such a finding may be supported by the absence of evidence necessary to establish an essential element of the non-moving party's case. See Celotex Corp. v. Cartrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Topalian v. Ehrman, 954 F.2d 1125, 1131 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 825 (1992); International Ass'n of Machinists Aerospace Workers, Lodge No. 2504 v. Intercontinental Mfg. Co., 812 F.2d 219, 222 (5th Cir. 1987).Hibernia Nat'l Bank v. Carner, 997 F.2d 94, 97-98 (5th Cir. 1993).
III. DISCUSSION A. Custom or Usage
In order to maintain a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show two essential elements: (1) that defendants deprived them of a right secured by the United States Constitution, and (2) that this deprivation occurred while defendants were acting under color of state law. Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corporation, 613 F.2d 507, 510 (5th Cir. 1980). A local government entity is liable where official policy or governmental custom is responsible for a deprivation of rights protected by the constitution. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Where a municipality or other governmental entity is the defendant, additional elements required are proof of: (1) the existence of an unconstitutional policy, custom or practice of the municipality, that (2) caused the deprivation of rights complained of, and (3) that the acts complained of were authorized or ratified by a policy maker with final policymaking authority, or were taken pursuant to this unconstitutional policy, custom or practice. Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 770 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1016 (1985).
The burden of proving an unconstitutional policy or established custom is on the plaintiff. St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 128 (1988). Where a plaintiff claims that the government entity has not directly inflicted an injury, but nonetheless has caused an employee to do so, rigorous standards of culpability and causation are required to ensure that a government entity is not held liable solely for the actions of an employee. Board of County Commissioners of Bryan County, Oklahoma v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1987). It is not enough for a plaintiff merely to identify conduct properly attributable to the government entity against which the action is brought. Id. The plaintiff must also demonstrate that through its deliberate conduct, the government entity was the "moving force" behind the injury alleged. Id. That is, a plaintiff must show that the government entity's action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link between the government entity's action and the deprivation of federal rights. Id.
Where the non-moving party has presented evidence to support the essential elements of its claims but that evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment is appropriate. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986). Legal conclusions and general allegations do not satisfy this burden. Id. at 250. Anstett provides no evidence of any actual involvement of Neal with Wooley. Anstett produces no competent summary judgment evidence of any policy, practice or custom of the Amarillo Police Department of arresting individuals without probable cause. Nor does Anstett produce any evidence that Neal had actual or constructive knowledge or was aware of any custom or practice among the Amarillo Police Department employees of arresting individuals without probable cause.
B. Failure to Supervise or Train
Anstett alleges that the City of Amarillo and Neal failed to adequately supervise or train Amarillo police officers and that Plaintiff is therefore entitled to damages. A local government may be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when a supervisory official "breaches a duty imposed by state or local law, and this breach causes plaintiff's constitutional injury." Smith v. Brenoettsy, 158 F.3d 908, 911 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Sims v. Adams, 537 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1976)). For liability, a plaintiff must show: (1) the supervisor either failed to supervise or train the subordinate official; (2) a causal link exists between the failure to train or supervise and the violation of the plaintiff's rights; and (3) the failure to train or supervise amount to deliberate indifference. Brenoettsy at 911.
A plaintiff cannot show deliberate indifference by merely alleging that an existing supervision or training program represents a policy for which the city is liable or that the incident could have been avoided had the officer received more or better supervision or training. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). The focus must be on the adequacy of the supervision or training in relation to the task the particular officer must perform. Id. at 390. Further, the deficiency must have actually caused the officer to violate another's constitutional right. Id. at 391.
City of Amarillo and Neal present competent summary judgment evidence that Amarillo's Police Department employees are trained pursuant to the Texas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards and Education. This training includes procedures relating to complying with an arrest warrant issued from another jurisdiction. Anstett presents no evidence concerning the level of training or supervision that the staff possessed, the additional training or supervision they lacked, or why it would be obvious that a constitutional violation would result from the absence of the latter. Therefore, there is not a genuine fact question concerning inadequate training or supervision. See Rhyne v. Henderson County, 973 F.2d 386, 392 (5th Cir. 1992). Nor is there a genuine fact question concerning the existence of a deliberately indifferent policy. Benevidez v. County of Wilson, 955 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding no evidence of a deliberately indifferent policy where the county and sheriff established compliance with state requirements and plaintiff produced only conclusory statements that these standards were inadequate) cert. denied 506 U.S. 824 (1992).
IV. CONCLUSION
Anstett fails to raise material issues of fact to overcome the Defendants' properly supported summary judgment motion. Even if Wooley's treatment had been unconstitutional, Neal and the City of Amarillo would not be subject to liability because Anstett has failed to show that the actions taken were the result of an official custom, practice or policy of Amarillo Police Department and the City of Amarillo. Thus, as a matter of law, Defendants Neal and the City of Amarillo are entitled to summary judgment. Accordingly, Defendants' motions for summary judgment are GRANTED.
It is SO ORDERED.