Opinion
19-P-149
08-12-2020
ANIMAL RESCUE LEAGUE OF BOSTON v. BOARD OF ASSESSORS OF BOURNE.
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]),), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The taxpayer, Animal Rescue League of Boston (ARLB), applied to the board of assessors of Bourne (assessors) for charitable tax exemptions on three parcels of land for fiscal years 2012-2015. See G. L. c. 59, § 5, Third. The assessors denied those applications, and ARLB appealed to the Appellate Tax Board (board). The board likewise denied ARLB's applications on the basis that, for fiscal years 2012-2015, ARLB did not occupy the parcels for the charitable purposes for which it was organized. ARLB now appeals from the decision of the board. We affirm.
General Laws c. 59, § 5, Third, provides an exemption, in relevant part, for "real estate owned by or held in trust for a charitable organization and occupied by it or its officers for the purposes for which it is organized."
Background. ARLB is an organization that was formed in 1899 for the charitable purposes of establishing "one or more refuges for and the rescue and relief of suffering or homeless animals and any other charitable or benevolent act for the welfare of animals." These purposes were later expanded to include holding land for "such purposes and trusts as may be expressed in any deed or instrument of conveyance or gift made to . . . [it]."
This case concerns ARLB's use of land located at 55 and 96 Megansett Road and 0 Lawrence Island. ARLB acquired these parcels outright in 1997, with the restriction that they be used "consistent with the charitable purposes manifested in the will and codicils of . . . Ester M. Baxendale." Pursuant to Baxendale's fifth codicil, some land located at 0 Lawrence Island is undevelopable and must exist as a bird sanctuary.
These parcels had previously been bequeathed to ARLB as successor trustee. In 1997, ARLB sought authority to transfer them to itself outright.
As found by the board, for many years, ARLB operated a summer camp at 55 and 96 Megansett Road and 0 Lawrence Island at which it taught the humane treatment of animals. ARLB ceased operation of the summer camp in 2008, however, due to financial reasons. After ARLB ceased operating the summer camp, its use of the parcels was limited to physical inspections and maintenance and to placing no trespassing signs on the parcels. The only evidence of any animal-related activity was of neighbors walking their dogs.
There was testimony, for example, that an ARLB employee visited the parcels once a month to ensure that the buildings were secure, to trim growth, and to replace railings and fence posts.
Discussion. We review the board's conclusions of law de novo. See Bridgewater State Univ. Found. v. Assessors of Bridgewater, 463 Mass. 154, 156 (2012). The charitable tax exemption under G. L. c. 59, § 5, Third, is available, in relevant part, to a charitable organization that owns the property in question and occupies it for the organization's charitable purposes. Id. at 157. In the context of the exemption, "occupancy means something more than that which results from simple ownership and possession. It signifies an active appropriation to the immediate uses of the charitable cause for which the owner was organized." Assessors of Boston v. Vincent Club, 351 Mass. 10, 14 (1966), quoting Babcock v. Leopold Morse Home for Infirm Hebrews & Orphanage, 225 Mass. 418, 421 (1917). The burden lies with the charitable organization seeking the exemption to demonstrate that the express terms of the statute, which are strictly construed, apply. See Animal Rescue League of Boston v. Assessors of Bourne, 310 Mass. 330, 332 (1941).
In this case, there is no dispute that ARLB is a charitable organization within the meaning of G. L. c. 59, § 5, Third, or that it owns the parcels. The dispute instead concerns whether ARLB occupied the land located at 55 and 96 Megansett Road and 0 Lawrence Island for its charitable purposes. ARLB focuses on the natural state of the parcels as benefiting animals and on its intent to reopen the summer camp. The board, however, responds that ARLB was not actively appropriating the parcels for its charitable purposes in fiscal years 2012-2015. We agree with the board.
Contrary to ARLB's contention, New England Forestry Found., Inc. v. Assessors of Hawley, 468 Mass. 138 (2014), does not support their position. New England Forestry Found., Inc. involved conservation land. The Supreme Judicial Court concluded that because many private individuals also hold land in an open state, a charitable organization seeking an exemption under G. L. c. 59, § 5, Third, for conservation land must "demonstrate that [the charitable organization] occupies the parcel at issue in a manner less like a private landowner and more like an entity seeking to further the public good." Id. at 156. Where the charitable organization in that case "[did] not exclude the public from its land and offered evidence demonstrating how [the charitable organization used] the land as a site on which it [carried] out sustainable forestry practices, the board erred in concluding that [the charitable organization] did not meet its burden to show that it occupied [the conservation land] within the meaning of [G. L. c. 59, § 5, Third]." Id. at 159.
In New England Forestry Found., Inc., 468 Mass. at 153, there was evidence that the charitable organization acquired forest lands to "[assist] the State in achieving its conservation policy goals" and was "committed to managing its forest lands according to many of the same principles the Department of Conservation and Recreation has set forth for the management of its own forest lands."
Unlike the charitable organization in New England Forestry Found., Inc., ARLB did not offer any evidence that it had been maintaining the parcels as conservation land or even as refuges for animals. The evidence, instead, was that ARLB only periodically addressed routine maintenance issues on the parcels and excluded the public through the use of no trespassing signs. This use did not further the charitable purposes for which ARLB was organized and was instead consistent with that of a private landowner.
Specifically with respect to the land located at 0 Lawrence Island, ARLB argues that it occupied this parcel as a bird sanctuary. As found by the board, however, ARLB "failed to offer evidence of any wildlife present on this parcel or any efforts on its part to encourage or foster a wildlife refuge." The board further found that "the record lacked any evidence that a single bird has ever sought refuge on the property or that [ARLB] made any effort to create or maintain a refuge there."
While excluding the public is not dispositive, a charitable organization that "takes affirmative steps to exclude the public from the land . . . faces a heightened burden to show that such exclusion of the public is necessary to enable it to achieve its charitable purpose." New England Forestry Found., Inc., 468 Mass. at 157. No such showing was made here.
ARLB next relies on Assessors of Hamilton v. Iron Rail Fund of Girls Clubs of Am., Inc., 367 Mass. 301 (1975), to argue that its mere intent to reopen the summer camp preserved its eligibility for the charitable tax exemption. This reliance is also misplaced. Iron Rail Fund of Girls Clubs of America, Inc. (Iron Rail), operated a summer camp through 1971. Id. at 303. Then, in February 1972, Iron Rail filed a petition for dissolution, and in July 1972, it conveyed its assets. Id. at 305. The assessment date, however, was January 1, 1972, before either of those actions took place. Id. at 304. As of that assessment date, Iron Rail's seasonal use of the property as a summer camp remained unbroken, and it was thus eligible for the charitable tax exemption. Id. at 305-306.
Here, however, by the assessment dates for fiscal years 2012-2015, years had passed during which ARLB did not operate the summer camp due to lack of funding. Unlike in Iron Rail Fund of Girls Clubs of Am., Inc., ARLB's seasonal use of the parcels had thus changed. Moreover, there was simply no evidence that ARLB was pursuing funding or taking any other steps, no matter how equivocal, to reopen the summer camp. See Iron Rail Fund of Girls Clubs of Am., Inc., 367 Mass. at 307 (acknowledging that "somewhat equivocal expressions of an intention to occupy property for a charitable purpose are entitled to more weight in the case of an organization which has so occupied the property annually for many years").
While there may be circumstances in which an organization remains eligible for the charitable tax exemption despite a temporary closure that spans beyond an assessment date, we agree with the board that the evidence here did not support that conclusion.
Decision of Appellate Tax Board affirmed.
By the Court (Maldonado, Singh & Englander, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
/s/
Clerk Entered: August 12, 2020.