But absent state legislation to the contrary, the delegation of authority to municipalities through the Home Rule Amendment empowers a municipality to levy and collect an income tax. Angell v. Toledo, 153 Ohio St. 179, 184, 91 N.E.2d 250 (1950).

to limit municipal taxation {¶ 4} Toledo enacted the first municipal income tax in Ohio in 1946, Ohio Legal Center Institute, Ohio Taxation, Chapter 17, at 316 (1967), and in upholding that tax as a valid exercise of home-rule authority, we specifically noted that the power of municipalities to tax is subject to preemption by the General Assembly, Angell v. Toledo, 153 Ohio St. 179, 91 N.E.2d 250 (1950), paragraph one of the syllabus. According to the Tax Foundation, 649 Ohio municipalities currently impose income taxes.

In one case, we implied that "field" might be defined by the types of taxes involved, i.e., excise as opposed to income taxes. Angell v. Toledo (1950), 153 Ohio St. 179, 41 O.O. 217, 91 N.E.2d 250. In Angell, we stated that "[i]n the interpretation of the Ohio Constitution an income tax is not to be treated as an excise tax."

1. A city may levy a tax on income earned within that city by a nonresident thereof. ( Angell v. City of Toledo, 153 Ohio St. 179, fallowed.) 2.

See Note, Municipal Personal Income Taxation of Nonresidents, supra, at 778-782, 786-798. See, also, Angell v. Toledo (1950), 153 Ohio St. 179, 41 O.O. 217, 91 N.E.2d 250, citing Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co. (1940), 311 U.S. 435, 61 S.Ct. 246, 85 L.Ed. 267; McConnell v. Columbus (1961), 172 Ohio St. 95, 99, 15 O.O.2d 168, 171, 173 N.E.2d 760, 763; Thompson v. Cincinnati (1965), 2 Ohio St.2d 292, 297, 31 O.O.2d 563, 566, 208 N.E.2d 747, 751; Columbus v. Firebaugh (1983), 8 Ohio App.3d 366, 367, 8 OBR 478, 479, 457 N.E.2d 367, 368. This latter point is ever the more significant in Ohio because of the passage of the 1957 Uniform Municipal Income Tax Act.

The General Assembly's power to legislate is limited solely by the state and federal Constitutions. State ex rel. Swetland v. Kinney (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 567, 573, 23 O.O. 3d 479. 483, 433 N.E.2d 217, 222; Angell v. Toledo (1950), 153 Ohio St. 179, 181, 41 O.O. 217. 218, 91 N.E.2d 250, 251. This plenary power includes the power to levy taxes.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1: The trial court erred by failing to apply the well-established due process requirements governing nonresident municipal income tax first set forth by the Ohio Supreme Court in Angell v. Toledo, 153 Ohio St. 179, 191 N.E.2d 250 (1950) and most recently articulated in Hillenmeyer v. Cleveland Bd. of Rev. (2015), 144 Ohio St.3d 165, 2015-Ohio-1623, 41 N.E.3d 1164 (2015) and Willacy v. Cleveland Bd. of Income Tax Rev. (2020), 159 Ohio St.3d 383, 2020-Ohio-314, 151 N.E.3d 561.

"A municipal corporation may levy a tax on wages resulting from work and labor performed within its boundaries by a nonresident of that municipal corporation." Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus, approved and followed, Angell v. City of Toledo (1950), 153 Ohio St. 179. There is no constitutional violation by a municipal corporation for taxing wages of its residents resulting from work and labor performed within or outside the municipality.

"Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws." Pursuant to the general grant of power found in Section 3, Article XVIII, of the Ohio Constitution, the city of Toledo enacted a municipal income tax ordinance and on March 8, 1950, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled on the validity of such an enactment in the case of Angell v. Toledo (1950), 153 Ohio St. 179, 41 O.O. 217, 91 N.E.2d 250. Paragraphs one and two of the syllabus read as follows: "1. Ohio municipalities have the power to levy and collect income taxes in the absence of the pre-emption by the General Assembly of the field of income taxation and subject to the power of the General Assembly to limit the power of municipalities to levy taxes under Section 13 of Article XVIII or Section 6 of Article XIII of the Ohio Constitution.

Indeed, the constitutionality of such taxes was established many years after the enactment of the preemption provision. See Angell v. Toledo, 153 Ohio St. 179, 91 N.E.2d 250 (1950), paragraph one of the syllabus. But CCA's argument lacks merit because R.C. 4921.25 by its terms does not limit its preclusive effect to taxes on the books on the date of its enactment; to the contrary, the statute broadly preempts without regard to when the municipality might choose to pass a new tax ordinance.