Opinion
C/A No. 8:20-cv-2633-BHH-JDA
07-27-2020
Damio B. Andrews, Petitioner, v. South Carolina Department of Corrections, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Damio Bernard Andrews ("Petitioner"), proceeding pro se, brings this habeas corpus action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. [Doc. 1.] Petitioner is an inmate in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") and is presently incarcerated at the Butner II Federal Correctional Institution in Butner, North Carolina ("FCI Butner II"). [Id. at 1.] Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review such petitions for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Judge. For the reasons below, the undersigned recommends that the instant action be transferred to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina.
BACKGROUND
The Court has reviewed the Petition and exhibits filed in this case and the dockets in Petitioner's federal and state criminal actions.
The Court is permitted to take judicial notice of the records in Petitioner's cases. See Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (courts "may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record"); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) ("We note that 'the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'") (alteration omitted).
This case arises from Petitioner's conviction and sentence in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina and his subsequent conviction and sentence in the Court of General Sessions of Florence County, South Carolina. Specifically, on October 23, 2012, a grand jury sitting in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina issued an Indictment charging Petitioner with a number of crimes, including conspiracy to distribute narcotics. See United States v. Andrews, No. 4:12-cr-00817-TLW-2 (D.S.C. Oct. 23, 2012) ("Andrews"), Doc. 100. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner entered a plea of guilty on March 27, 2013, as to the lesser included offense at Count 1 of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine base, and the remaining Counts were dismissed. Id., Docs. 264; 265. On November 13, 2013, the Honorable Terry L. Wooten sentenced Petitioner to imprisonment for a term of 75 months, followed by supervised release for a term of 8 years. Id., Docs. 381; 396.
Petitioner's supervised release commenced on July 11, 2017. Id., Doc. 541 at 1-2. Petitioner was then arrested on January 3, 2019, and detained for an alleged violation of his supervised release. Id., Docs. 583; 585; 588; 590; 592. On March 26, 2019, Judge Wooten revoked Petitioner's supervised release and sentenced Petitioner to a term of imprisonment of 31 months, with no supervised release to follow. Id., Docs. 597; 599. The revocation of Petitioner's supervised release was based on his own use of illegal drugs and ten state court criminal charges in the Florence County Court of General Sessions at warrant numbers 2018A2120400451, 2018A2120400445, 2018A2120400452, 2018A2120400453, 2018A2110500107, 2018A2110500106, 2018A2110500105, 2018A2120400457, 2018A2120400456, and 2018A2120400544. Id., Docs. 599; 591 at 3-5.
On March 12, 2020, Petitioner pled guilty to the charges at case numbers 2018A2110500105, 2018A2120400451, and 2018A2120400453, and the remaining charges were nolle prossed. See State v. Damio Bernard Andrews, Nos. 2018A2110500105, 2018A2120400451, and 2018A2120400453, available at https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Florence/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (search by case numbers) (last visited Jul. 22, 2020). The Honorable Thomas A. Russo sentenced Petitioner to a term of imprisonment of 5 years, suspended to 3 years. Id.
Petitioner filed the instant action to challenge the computation of his sentence. He raises four grounds for relief in his Petition. First, Petitioner contends that he is eligible for certain good time credits, work credits, community supervision, work release, and educations credits, and probation under the Omnibus Crime Reduction and Sentencing Reform Act of 2010. [Id. at 6.] Second, Petitioner contends that he is being deprived of good time, work, and education credits, in violation of his due process rights. [Id.] Third, Petitioner seeks a reduction in his sentence due to his health conditions and the risk of COVID-19 infection. [Id.] Fourth, Petitioner seeks to be placed in a halfway house so that he can prepare to reenter society. [Id. at 7.]
For his relief, Petitioner asks that the Court grant him all of the good time credits he has earned and recalculate his sentence end date from October 30, 2020, to June 30, 2020; remove the detainer against him; and permit him to complete his sentence at home due to his health issues in light of COVID-19. [Id. at 7.]
DISCUSSION
This Court does not have jurisdiction over Petitioner's claims. A § 2241 habeas action generally challenges the execution or implementation of a federal prisoner's sentence, such as the BOP's administration of the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program, computation of sentence, prison disciplinary actions, and prison transfers. See Fontanez v. O'Brien, 807 F.3d 84, 87 (4th Cir. 2015). District courts are authorized to grant writs of habeas corpus "within their respective jurisdictions," 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), and such writs "shall be directed to the person having custody of the person detained," 28 U.S.C. § 2243. Therefore, the proper party respondent is the "person who has the immediate custody of the party detained, with the power to produce the body of such party before the court or judge." Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, because "the court issuing the writ [must] have jurisdiction over the custodian," in "habeas petitions challenging present physical confinement, jurisdiction lies in only one district: the district of confinement." Id. at 442-43 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, a petition under § 2241 must be brought against the warden of the facility where the prisoner is being held, and "in the district of confinement rather than in the sentencing court." 28 U.S.C. § 2242.
In this case, Petitioner appears to challenge the computation of his sentence. [Doc. 1 at 2.] As noted, Petitioner was sentenced in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. However, he is presently incarcerated at FCI Butner II in Butner, North Carolina. [Id.] Therefore, this Court is without territorial jurisdiction of the respondent. To the extent Petitioner attempts to file a § 2241 Petition for his current confinement in North Carolina, "[w]henever a § 2241 habeas petitioner seeks to challenge his present physical custody within the United States, he should name his warden as respondent and file the petition in the district of confinement." Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. at 447. This Court is not the district of confinement. "Congress intended to limit the jurisdiction of a district court to prisoners in custody within its territorial jurisdiction." Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 509 (1973).
Petitioner's current custodian, the Warden of FCI Butner II, is therefore the proper party respondent to Petitioner's § 2241 Petition. Further, FCI Butner II is located within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina and that court is the proper district of confinement. Accordingly, this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this Petition. See Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. at 445 ("[T]he custodian's absence from the territorial jurisdiction of the district court is fatal to habeas jurisdiction."); United States v. Morgan, 305 F. App'x 61, 62 (4th Cir. 2008) ("A § 2241 petition . . . must be brought in the district of incarceration."). Petitioner's § 2241 Petition should be transferred to the Eastern District of North Carolina for further consideration and proceedings. See Feller v. Brock, 802 F.2d 722, 729 n.7 (4th Cir. 1986) ("Although a motion by one of the parties is ordinarily required for transfer, the district court may consider the possibility of transfer sua sponte."); 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (noting a district court should transfer a habeas petition to the proper district court if such transfer would serve the interest of justice); Tairou v. Cannon, No. 1:19-cv-674-JFA-SVH, 2019 WL 1905859, at *1 (D.S.C. Apr. 5, 2019) (recommending transfer of § 2241 action to the appropriate district court with jurisdiction), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2019 WL 1900918 (D.S.C. Apr. 29, 2019).
RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, it is recommended that the § 2241 Petition filed in this case be transferred to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/ Jacquelyn D. Austin
United States Magistrate Judge July 27, 2020
Greenville, South Carolina
Petitioner's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street, Room 239
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).