Opinion
C. A. 7:23-cv-06289-TMC-JDA
01-11-2024
Braxton D. Andrews, Plaintiff, v. P.M.I. Southern States; Judge James D. Willingham, III; Amy W. Cox, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Jacquelyn D. Austin United States Magistrate Judge
Braxton D. Andrews (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in form pauperis, brings this action against the above-named Defendants. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C., the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the Complaint and make a recommendation to the District Court. Having reviewed the Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the undersigned finds that this case should be summarily dismissed without issuance and service of process for the reasons explained below.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a handwritten document [Doc. 1] along with certain exhibits [Doc. 1-1]. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a complaint on the standard form. [Doc. 1-2.] The Court construes both the handwritten document and the standard form together as the Complaint filed in this matter.
Plaintiff purports to bring this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [Id. at 3.] Plaintiff contends his rights have been violated in that he has been denied the “[b]eneficial right to use of assets held in trust” in violation of South Carolina Code § 16-13-230. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that a rule to vacate or show cause was served on him by Defendant P.M.I. Southern States. [Id. at 4.] Thereafter, Defendant Judge Willingham disposed of the case in favor of Defendant P.M.I. Southern States and issued a writ of ejectment. [Id.] The writ was executed and “they did a set out after Spartanburg County confirmed on [December 6, 2023,] that there was not a current writ being that it had been cancelled the week prior.” [Id.]
Although Plaintiff checked the box on the Complaint form indicating he brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [Doc. 1-2 at 3], the Complaint does not identify any federal right that was purportedly violated.
For his injuries, Plaintiff contends that he was “set out and displaced from the property held in trust”; that some of his “belongings were damaged during the set-out and withheld inside the home which [he] no longer had access to”; and that Defendants violated South Carolina Code § 16-13-230. [Id. at 5.]
For his relief, Plaintiff requests that the Court “[d]ismiss any and all cases and claims in regards to this matter”; issue an order of protection to prevent the actions taken against him from happening again; issue an order for a refund from Defendant P.M.I. Southern States for all money paid to them by Plaintiff; and issue an order requiring an accounting related to any and all lease agreements with Defendant P.M.I Southern States. [Id.]
APPLICABLE LAW
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint. Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Further, this Court would possess the inherent authority to review the pro se Complaint to ensure that subject matter jurisdiction exists and that the case is not frivolous, even if the Complaint were not subject to the prescreening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915. See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 307S08 (1989) (“Section 1915(d) . . . authorizes courts to dismiss a ‘frivolous or malicious' action, but there is little doubt they would have power to do so even in the absence of this statutory provision.”); Ross v. Baron, 493 Fed.Appx. 405, 406 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[F]rivolous complaints are subject to dismissal pursuant to the inherent authority of the court, even when the filing fee has been paid . . . [and] because a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an obviously frivolous complaint, dismissal prior to service of process is permitted.”) (citations omitted); see also Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 364 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[D]istrict courts may dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte even when the plaintiff has paid the required filing fee[.]”); Ricketts v. Midwest Nat'l Bank, 874 F.2d 1177, 1181 (7th Cir. 1989) (“[A] district court's obligation to review its own jurisdiction is a matter that must be raised sua sponte, and it exists independent of the ‘defenses' a party might either make or waive under the Federal Rules.”); Franklin v. State of Or., State Welfare Div., 662 F.2d 1337, 1342 (9th Cir. 1981) (providing a judge may dismiss an action sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction without issuing a summons or following other procedural requirements).
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, even under this less stringent standard, Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se Complaint and Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in his pleadings, the Complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when her complaint is justified by both law and fact). “A claim has ‘facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014).
DISCUSSION
The undersigned finds that this action should be summarily dismissed for the reasons below.
Jurisdiction
First, the undersigned concludes that the Court lacks jurisdiction. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, “constrained to exercise only the authority conferred by Article III of the Constitution and affirmatively granted by federal statute.” In re Bulldog Trucking, Inc., 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, a federal court is required, sua sponte, to determine if a valid basis for its jurisdiction exists, “and to dismiss the action if no such ground appears.” Id. at 352; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). Although the absence of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time during the case, determining jurisdiction at the outset of the litigation is the most efficient procedure. Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 1999). There is no presumption that a federal court has jurisdiction over a case, Pinkley, Inc. v. City of Frederick, 191 F.3d 394, 399 (4th Cir. 1999), and a litigant must allege facts essential to show jurisdiction in his pleadings. McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936); see also Dracos v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 762 F.2d 348, 350 (4th Cir. 1985) (“[P]laintiffs must affirmatively plead the jurisdiction of the federal court.”). As such, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(1) requires that the complaint provide “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction.”
Generally, federal district courts have original jurisdiction over two types of cases, referred to as (1) federal question cases, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and (2) diversity cases, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. As discussed below, the allegations contained in Plaintiff's Complaint do not fall within the scope of either form of this Court's limited jurisdiction.
Federal Question Jurisdiction
First, this Court does not have federal question jurisdiction over his claims. Federal question jurisdiction arises from 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides that the “district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. To determine whether a plaintiff's claims “arise under” the laws of the United States, courts typically use the “well-pleaded complaint rule,” which focuses on the allegations of the complaint. Prince v. Sears Holdings Corp., 848 F.3d 173, 177 (4th Cir. 2017). “In other words, federal question jurisdiction exists ‘only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly-pleaded complaint.'” Burbage v. Richburg, 417 F.Supp.2d 746, 749 (D.S.C. 2006).
In the Complaint, Plaintiff indicates that he brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which would be premised on federal question jurisdiction. [Doc. 1-2 at 3.] However, Plaintiff has not identified the “deprivation of any rights, privilege, or immunities secured by the Constitution and [federal laws]” for which he could bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Instead Plaintiff references a state statute-S.C. Code § 16-13-230-apparently to assert a claim for breach of trust. [Id.] Additionally, Plaintiff does not identify any other federal statute or constitutional provision that would support a federal question claim and, instead, asserts only state law tort claims. [Id.] The Complaint contains no facts from which this Court can find any basis for federal question jurisdiction. Accordingly, federal question jurisdiction does not exist in this case.
Diversity Jurisdiction
Plaintiff's claims appear to arise under state tort law. Specifically, Plaintiff appears to assert claims related to a state court eviction action and, allegedly, for breach of trust. [ Id. at 3-5.] Such claims could be brought in this Court only if the requirements for diversity jurisdiction are satisfied. However, Plaintiff has failed to plead facts to satisfy the diversity statute's requirements.
The diversity statute imposes two requirements-complete diversity between the parties and an amount in controversy in excess of $75,000.00. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) ; Anderson v. Caldwell, No. 3:10-cv-1906-CMC-JRM, 2010 WL 3724752, at *4 (D.S.C. Aug. 18, 2010), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2010 WL 3724671 (D.S.C. Sept. 15, 2010). Complete diversity of the parties means that no party on one side may be a citizen of the same state as any party on the other side. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372-74 (1978). Further, dismissal of a diversity action for want of jurisdiction is justified where it appears to a legal certainty that the plaintiff cannot recover the jurisdictional amount. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938).
Here, Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing that the amount in controversy requirement is met under the statute. Indeed, Plaintiff does not identify any specific monetary award that he seeks. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Complaint fails to satisfy the amount in controversy requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Additionally, all of the parties appear to be citizens of South Carolina and complete diversity therefore does not exist. [Doc. 1-2 at 2-3.]
Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to establish that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over his claims under either federal question or diversity grounds. Therefore, the Complaint should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Younger Abstention
Alternatively, the undersigned concludes that this Court should abstain from deciding the merits of Plaintiff's claims. The crux of this action appears to be Plaintiff's attempt to challenge a pending state court eviction proceeding. And, critically, for his relief, Plaintiff requests that this Court “[d]ismiss any and all cases and claims in regards to this matter.” [Doc. 1-3 at 5.] Nevertheless, this Court cannot grant the requested relief under the Younger abstention doctrine.
The Court takes judicial notice of Plaintiff's state court eviction action. See Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record”); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'”). In the attachments to the Complaint, Plaintiff notes that this action arises from a state court action at number 2023cv4210108126 in the Spartanburg County Court of Common Pleas. [See, e.g., Doc. 1-1 at 2.]
In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a federal court should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings “except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances.” Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Fourth Circuit has held that the Younger abstention doctrine applies “to noncriminal judicial proceedings when important state interests are involved,” Harper v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of W.Va., 396 F.3d 348, 351 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted), and district courts have held that abstention under Younger is appropriate when there are pending state court eviction proceedings such as the one in this case, see, e.g., Mutzig v. North Carolina, No. 3:17-cv-146-RJC, 2017 WL 1754774, at *2 (W.D. N.C. May 3, 2017).
Abstention under Younger is appropriate when the following three-part test is met: “[1] there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; [2] the proceedings implicate important state interests; and [3] there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings.” Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Hum. Rels., 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). Here, Petitioner is involved in ongoing state court eviction proceedings, and he asks this Court to interfere with those proceedings; thus, the first element is satisfied. See Davis v. Morris, No. 3:15-cv-80-RJC-DSC, 2015 WL 11111354, at *2 (W.D. N.C. Mar. 3, 2015) (“Under the principles announced in [Younger], this federal court declines to interfere with an ongoing, tenant eviction action in Mississippi state court.”), aff'd, 622 Fed.Appx. 257 (4th Cir. 2015). The second element is also satisfied as it is well settled in this District that eviction “proceedings involve questions concerning the parties' landlord and tenant relationship, and those types of questions have been found to involve ‘important state interests.'” Setliff v. Fountain, No. 4:14-cv-2583-RMG, 2014 WL 4825623, at *3 (D.S.C. Sept. 24, 2014). Finally, the third element is satisfied, as Petitioner can raise his constitutional claims in the state court. Id.
Because all three of the elements are met, even if this Court possessed subject matter jurisdiction, the Court would be obligated to abstain from deciding Plaintiff's injunctive relief claims and to dismiss this case on abstention grounds pursuant to Younger. See Nivens v. Gilchrist, 444 F.3d 237, 247 (4th Cir. 2006) (explaining that “when a district court abstains from a case based on Younger, it should typically dismiss the case with prejudice; not on the merits”).
42 U.S.C. § 1983Finally, to the extent this action should be construed as bringing a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, any such claim is subject to dismissal for failing to state a claim for relief. As noted, Plaintiff purports to assert his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [Doc. 1-2 at 3.] This statute “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Here, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the named Defendants are not subject to suit under the statute.
Defendant P.M.I. Southern States
Defendant P.M.I. Southern States is entitled to summary dismissal as it is not a state actor who may be sued under § 1983. Defendant P.M.I. Southern States appears to be a private property management company, and not a public entity.
To state a § 1983 claim, Plaintiff must allege that he was deprived of a constitutional right by a person acting under the color of state law. Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1998). Stated differently, “[i]n order to be a proper party defendant in a § 1983 action, the defendant must be, or step into the role of, a public actor.” Palmore v. Wal-Mart, No. 9:08-cv-2484-GRA-BM, 2009 WL 1457136, at *3 (D.S.C. May 22, 2009), aff'd, 332 Fed.Appx. 863 (4th Cir. 2009). “Hence, as a private entity, [P.M.I. Southern States] may only act under color of state law for purposes of a § 1983 claim if it was a wilful participant in joint action with the State or with an agent of the State.” Id. “[T]he under-color-of-state-law element of § 1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing that Defendant P.M.I. Southern States is a state actor. Further, Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing that this Defendant was a wilful participant in joint action with a state actor such that it is subject to liability under § 1983. See Palmore, 2009 WL 1457136, at *4. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims against Defendant P.M.I. Southern States is subject to dismissal because this Defendant is not a state actor.
Defendant Willingham
Defendant Willingham is a state judge [Doc. 1-2 at 2] and has absolute judicial immunity from a § 1983 action and should be dismissed from this case. It is well settled that judges have absolute immunity from damages claims arising out of their judicial actions, unless they acted in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978); see also Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1985) (explaining that, even if a challenged judicial act was unauthorized by law, the judge still has immunity from a suit seeking damages). Whether an act is judicial or non-judicial relates to the nature of the act, such as whether it is a function normally performed by a judge and whether the parties dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12. Immunity applies even when the judge's acts were in error, malicious, or in excess of his authority. Id. at 12-13. Immunity presents a threshold question. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Absolute immunity is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (emphasis in original). Here, Plaintiff makes various allegations against Defendant Willingham concerning his conduct and rulings related to Plaintiff's state court eviction case, but these allegations all relate to judicial actions. Thus, because all of the alleged misconduct of Defendant Willingham arose out of his judicial actions, judicial immunity squarely applies and should bar this lawsuit against him.
Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to summary dismissal to the extent this action should be construed as a § 1983 action.
Defendant Cox
Similarly, Defendant Cox, who is the Spartanburg County Clerk of Court [Doc. 1-2 at 3], has absolute immunity from suit. Although Plaintiff makes no specific allegations against Defendant Cox, the Complaint implicitly alleges that Defendant Cox did not properly conduct her duties in the role as the Clerk of Court. However, like judges, who have absolute immunity from a claim for damages arising out of their judicial actions, clerks of court and other court support personnel are entitled to immunity similar to judges when performing their quasi-judicial duties. See Jarvis v. Chasanow, 448 Fed.Appx. 406 (4th Cir. 2011); Stevens v. Spartanburg Cnty. Probation, Parole, and Pardon Serv., No. 6:09-cv-795-HMH-WMC, 2010 WL 678953, at *7 (D.S.C. Feb. 23, 2010). “Absolute immunity ‘applies to all acts of auxiliary court personnel that are basic and integral part[s] of the judicial function.'” Jackson v. Houck, 181 Fed.Appx. 372, 373 (4th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Here, the alleged wrongful acts, or failures to act, were part of the Clerk of Court's alleged quasi-judicial functions, and Defendant Cox therefore has absolute quasijudicial immunity from this lawsuit. See Baccus v. Wickensimer, No. 9:13-cv-1977-DCN-BM, 2013 WL 6019469, at *2-3 (D.S.C. Nov. 13, 2013).
Because Plaintiff fails to allege any specific facts against Defendant Cox, she is also subject to dismissal on that basis as a plaintiff must allege specific facts as to each defendant in a § 1983 action. Thus, Plaintiff's failure to allege specific facts as to Defendant Cox would subject her to summary dismissal, even if she were not otherwise entitled to immunity from suit. See McCoy v. Berkeley Cnty. Clerk of Ct., No. 8:17-cv-3323-JFA-JDA, 2018 WL 8335332, at *3 n.5 (D.S.C. Sept. 21, 2018), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2019 WL 2177418 (D.S.C. May 20, 2019).
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons explained above, it is recommended that the Complaint be summarily DISMISSED without leave to amend and without issuance and service of process.
The undersigned finds that, for the reasons stated herein, it would be futile for Plaintiff to amend his Complaint and therefore recommends that the Court decline to give Plaintiff leave to amend. See Workman v. Kernell, No. 6:18-cv-00355-RBH-KFM, 2018 WL 4826535, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 2, 2018), aff'd, 766 Fed.Appx. 1 (4th Cir. 2019).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court 250 East North Street, Suite 2300 Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).