Further, Florida case law acknowledges the general principle of agency law that knowledge of, or notice to an agent or employee is imputed to the principal when it is received by the employee within the scope of her employment, and when it is in reference to matters over which the employee's authority extends. Anderson v. Walthal, 468 So.2d 291 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). See generally 2 Fla.Jur.2d Agency and Employment ยง 94 (1977).
Citing no authority for his proposition that a principal cannot sue its agent for negligent (or fraudulent) misrepresentations, Nizri relies on the rule "that knowledge of, or notice to, an agent is imputed to the principal when it is received by the agent while acting within the course and scope of his employment, and when it is in reference to matters over which the agent's authority extends." Anderson v. Walthal, 468 So. 2d 291, 294 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). The purpose of this imputed-knowledge rule, however, is to protect third parties who deal with the principal through its agent.
Dulac's knowledge is appropriately imputed to Isaacman. See generally, Anderson v. Walthal, 468 So. 2d 291, 294 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (noting it is settled law that knowledge of an agent "while acting within the course and scope of his employment, and when it is in reference to matters over which the agent's authority extends," is imputed to the principal). JDI argues that the emails from Watkins, asking Kerr to hold off on showing the buyer (Isaacman) the December 16 discrepancy list, coupled with the fact that Isaacman did not receive the final December 28 list prior to closing, indicate that Jet exercised some measure of control over Kerr. This is sheer speculation on JDI's part. Isaacman signed the acceptance form on December 19, making the deposit nonrefundable, at the urging of his attorney, Dulac, not Kerr. Isaacman additionally admitted that he saw the intermediate discrepancy list showing all of the problems with the airplane but said he did not see the final list noting that some items were deferred instead of repaired.
It is well settled in New Jersey that knowledge obtained by "an agent is imputed to the principal when it is received by the agent while acting within the course and scope of his employment, and when it is in reference to matters over which the agent's authority extends." Benjamin v. Corcoran, 268 N.J. Super. 517, 529, 634 A.2d 108 (1993) (quoting Anderson v. Walthal, 468 So.2d 291, 294 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1985); see also Handleman v. Cox, 39 N.J. 95, 104, 187 A.2d 708 (1963) (holding that "it is well settled that a principal is charged with the knowledge of his agent or servant respecting matters lying within the scope of the duties, activities, and responsibilities entrusted to him by the principal") (citations omitted). The agency agreement between Title USA and Eastern authorized Eastern to "search . . . all relevant public records . . . relating to deeds, mortgages, taxes, assessments [and other instruments of record.]"
15. Alaskan Village v. Smalley, 720 P.2d 945,947 (Alaska 1986) 16. Anderson v. Walthal, 468 So.2d 291, 293(Fla. 1st DCA 1985) 17. Barton v. State, 253 Ga. 478, 322 S.E.2d 54, 55 (1984)
As landowner, the United States "had a duty to invitees, . . . to `use ordinary care to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition for use in a manner consistent with the invitation and to warn, of latent perils which are known or should be known to the owner but which are not known to the invitee or which, by the exercise of due care, could not be known to him.'" Palaidis, 564 F. Supp. at 1401 (quoting Rice v. Florida Power Light, 363 So.2d 834, 839 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 373 So.2d 460 (Fla. 1979) (emphasis in original)); see Ashcroft v. Calder Race Course, Inc., 492 So.2d 1309, 1311-12 (Fla. 1986); Spaulding v. City of Melbourne, 473 So.2d 226, 227 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); Anderson v. Walthal, 468 So.2d 291, 294 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Pedreira v. Silva, 468 So.2d 1073, 1074 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). It is at this juncture that the court's analysis of the premises liability theory departs from plaintiffs' position. Plaintiffs argue that summary judgment is inappropriate because there are fact questions as to why the accident happened.
The Florida courts have on several occasions considered the issue of the landlord's liability in such cases. In Anderson v. Walthal, 468 So.2d 291 (Fla.App. 1985), the defendant owned an industrial park which the plaintiff had entered to inquire about leasing a miniwarehouse for storage. The plaintiff was attacked by a pit bull dog owned by one of the defendant's tenants. The court held that if the jury concluded that the agent and manager of the industrial park, to whom the defendant delegated authority for the day-to-day operations of the business, had actual knowledge of the dog and its vicious propensities, the defendant was liable.
490 So.2d at 31-32 (emphasis added). See also Giaculli v. Bright, 584 So.2d 187 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1991) (action against a landlord based on an attack by a dog in the common backyard of an apartment complex involved triable issues as to the extent of the landlord's notice of the dog's vicious propensity and the landlord's opportunity to remedy the condition); Anderson v. Walthal, 468 So.2d 291 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (commercial property manager's knowledge of dog's vicious propensity may be imputed to the property owner). In this case, Pine Valley has cited no authority contrary to the rule expressed in the New York, New Jersey, and Florida cases, and we have found no such authority.
But see, O'Steen v. Kemmerer, 344 So.2d 313 (Fla. App. 1977) (in which the court refused to extend Christie to a situation in which the plaintiff was injured on her own property by wild animals kept on the landowner's adjacent property by his employee, absent any interest in or use of the animals by the landowner); Allen v. Enslow, 423 So.2d 616 (Fla. App. 1982) (in which the court refused to extend Christie to hold a landlord liable to one injured on the street by a tenant's dog). In Anderson v. Walthal, 468 So.2d 291 (Fla. App. 1985), the court held that under the particular facts of the case, the defendant did not need to have actual knowledge of the dog to be held liable. However, that case is distinguishable from the instant case on the facts.
Even if we were to assume that Five Fran knew about the dogs, and erected an inadequate fence (which is not established by the proffered or record evidence), there is nothing to show that Five Fran knew the dog was dangerous or that Five Fran's conduct was otherwise so "reckless or wanting in care that it constituted a conscious disregard or indifference to the life, safety, or rights of persons exposed to such conduct." ยง 768.72(2)(b)), Fla. Stat. See Auto Safety Serv., Inc. v. Martein, 362 So.2d 455 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (wherein our sister court rejected an award of punitive damages, even though the dog owner knew the dog had previously bitten someone); Anderson v. Walthal, 468 So.2d 291 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).