Opinion
21-CV-0971 (SRN/DTS) 21-CV-0972 (SRN/DTS) 21-CV-1022 (SRN/DTS) 21-CV-1023 (SRN/DTS) 21-CV-1076 (SRN/DTS) 21-CV-1126 (SRN/DTS) 21-CV-1127 (SRN/DTS) 21-CV-1128 (SRN/DTS) 21-CV-1150 (SRN/DTS) 21-CV-1151 (SRN/DTS) 21-CV-1152 (SRN/DTS)
06-01-2021
Juan V. Anderson, Plaintiff, v. Morris Police Department and Doe x50, Defendants. Juan V. Anderson, Plaintiff, v. James Casson, Lawyer; Alex Butts, Officer; and Randi Yednak, Defendants. Juan V. Anderson, Plaintiff, v. Tim Henson and Doe x50, Defendants. Juan V. Anderson, Plaintiff, v. B. Krewer; Alex Butts, and Doe x50, Defendants. Juan V. Anderson, Plaintiff, v. Mike Rigner, Assistant Prosecutor; Catherine Hart; and Doe x50, Defendants. Juan V. Anderson, Plaintiff, v. Henry Police Department and Doe x50, Defendants. Juan V. Anderson, Plaintiff, v. Michael Regnier; Randy Yedinak; and Doe x50, Defendants. Juan V. Anderson, Plaintiff, v. Erick Mund; Bill Comet; and Doe x20, Defendants. Juan V. Anderson, Plaintiff, v. Randy Yedinak; Michael Regnier; and Doe x50, Defendants. Juan V. Anderson, Plaintiff, v. Bill Betram (William); Randy Yedinak; Michael Regnier; and Doe x50, Defendants. Juan V. Anderson, Plaintiff, v. Tim Henson; Village of Dwight; and Doe x50, Defendants.
ORDER
SUSAN RICHARD NELSON, United States District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on plaintiff Juan V. Anderson's application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) on appeal in each of these eleven proceedings. See Anderson v. Morris Police Department, No. 21-CV-0971, Doc. No. 12. The IFP application is denied for two reasons.
First, Anderson has not established his financial eligibility for IFP status. Although the appellate IFP application submitted by Anderson states that he has absolutely no assets or income, this information differs substantially from the IFP applications submitted by Anderson upon initiating these proceedings only a few weeks ago, which stated that Anderson earned an income of as much as $300,000 per year and had $8,000 in checking or savings accounts from which to pay the filing fee for these matters. See Anderson v. Casson, No. 21-CV-0972, Doc. No. 2 (IFP application). And, in fact, Anderson paid the filing fee owed in three of these eleven actions. Without further explanation regarding why Anderson's financial status changed so drastically that, in a matter of weeks, Anderson's financial situation has changed such that he is now unable to pay the appellate filing fees, the IFP application cannot be granted.
Second, Anderson's appeals are not brought in good faith. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3). Anderson was offered an opportunity to establish why this District was a proper venue for this litigation and responded to those orders not with a reasoned explanation but with one pleading after another - fourteen in total - raising allegations concerning events that occurred outside of this District and against defendants who reside outside of this District. At no point did Anderson offer the Court a good explanation why Minnesota is an appropriate venue for this litigation. It is too late for Anderson to begin offering those explanations on appeal. See Erwin v. City of Paragould, Ark., 806 Fed.Appx. 498, 499 (8th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (citing Wever v. Lincoln County, Nebraska, 388 F.3d 601, 608 (8th Cir. 2004)). Accordingly, even if Anderson did qualify financially for IFP status on appeal, his IFP application would nevertheless be denied.
ORDER
Based on the submissions and the entire file and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the application to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal of plaintiff Juan V. Anderson [No. 21-CV-0971, Doc. No. 12] is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.