Opinion
Civil Action 21-1294 Re. ECF 9
11-10-2021
BRIAN L. ANDERSON, Plaintiff, v. GUARD COVINE, CORRECTIONS-DHU; GUARD CAMPBELL, CORRECTIONS-DHU; SERGEANT COULTER; SERGEANT GANDZARSKI; CAPT. EDWARDS; CAPT. PIENDEL; MR. ORLANDO HARPER, WARDEN; and ALLEGHENY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT JAIL INVESTIGATIONS SECTION, Defendants.
David S. Cercone, District Judge.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MAUREEN P. KELLY, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
I. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that the Complaint, ECF No. 9, be dismissed sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, as follows:
• Plaintiff's federal lost property claim should be dismissed without leave to amend in this Court, but without prejudice to filing a state law claim in state court, if appropriate;
• To the extent that he attempts to raise one, Plaintiff's claim of denial of access to the courts should be dismissed with leave to file an amended complaint with respect to that claim only;
• Plaintiff's claims regarding his jail grievances and attempts to initiate a criminal investigation regarding his lost property should be dismissed with prejudice; and
• Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Harper and Fitzgerald should be dismissed with prejudice.
II. REPORT
A. Factual and Procedural Background
Brian L. Anderson (“Plaintiff”) filed the present case as a pretrial detainee confined at the Allegheny County Jail (“ACJ”) in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. On September 28, 2021, this Court received Plaintiff's Complaint, as well as a Motion and Declaration in Support of Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (“IFP Motion”). ECF No. 1. This Court identified deficiencies in the IFP Motion on October 12, 2021, ECF No. 4, which Plaintiff corrected on October 22, 2021. ECF Nos. 5 and 6. Plaintiff was granted leave to proceed IFP on October 29, 2021. ECF No. 8.
Plaintiff brings this lawsuit pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1871. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 et seq. In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on April 5 and 27, 2021, jail “personnel mishandled [his] belongings previously purchased [and] refused to provide inventory papers.” ECF No. 9 at 7. While it is not explicitly stated in the Complaint, it appears that some items of Plaintiff's property were confiscated, lost, or destroyed.
The Complaint lacks much in the way of specific factual allegations. However, it is possible to glean from the exhibits that Defendant Covine allegedly refused to provide Plaintiff with his hygiene products, legal work, or an inventory of Plaintiff's property on April 27, 2021. ECF No. 9-1 at 1. Defendant Campbell allegedly signed off on an inventory sheet related to the April 27 incident. Id. at 2; see also ECF No. 9 at 7 and 8.
Plaintiff attempted to grieve this matter through the ACJ grievance system, and to initiate criminal proceedings through Defendant Allegheny County Police Department, but was unsuccessful. ECF No. 9 at 9; ECF No. 9-1 at 8-9.
B. Legal Standard
28 U.S.C. § 1915 establishes the criteria for allowing an action to proceed IFP. Section 1915(e) requires the federal courts to review complaints filed by persons that are proceeding in forma pauperis and to dismiss, at any time, any action that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Thus, a court must dismiss, sua sponte, a complaint that lacks arguable merit in fact or law. Stackhouse v. Crocker, 266 Fed.Appx. 189, 190 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989)).
The standard for reviewing a complaint under this section 1915(e)(2)(B) is the same as that for determining a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Banks v. Mozingo, No. 08-004, 2009 WL 497572, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 2009). Under that Rule, dismissal is appropriate if, reading the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and accepting all factual allegations as true, no relief could be granted under any “reasonable reading of the complaint” Phillips v. Cnty of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008). A complaint must be dismissed even if the claim to relief is “conceivable, ” because a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
A court must employ less stringent standards when considering pro se pleadings than when judging the work product of an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). In a Section 1983 action, a court must liberally construe a pro se litigant's pleadings and “‘apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether a pro se litigant has mentioned it by name.'” Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Holley v. Dep't of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 247-48 (3d Cir. 1999)). “‘Since this is a § 1983 action, the [pro se] plaintiffs are entitled to relief if their complaint sufficiently alleges deprivation of any right secured by the Constitution.'” Higgins, 293 F.3d at 688 (quoting Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996)). That said, it is not proper for a court to assume that “the [plaintiff] can prove facts which [he or she] has not alleged, or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged.” Assoc.'d Gen. Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). A court further need not accept inferences drawn by a plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as set forth in the complaint. See California Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys. v. Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 and 157-58 (3d Cir. 2004).
Finally, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that, in civil rights cases, a court must give a plaintiff the opportunity to amend a deficient complaint - regardless of whether the plaintiff requests to do so - when dismissing a case for failure to state a claim, unless doing so would be inequitable or futile. See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007)
C. Legal Analysis
1. Lost property claims
Plaintiff's property claims arise under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, such claims necessarily fail “if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy is available for the loss.” Hudson v. Farmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). This applies to pre-trial detainees as well as convicted prisoners. See Shareef v. Moore, No. 18-1494, 2020 WL 1445878, at *3-4 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 2020), aff'd, 844 Fed.Appx. 487 (3d Cir. 2021) (dismissing due process claims of pre-trial detainee for property confiscated by prison staff).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that a prison's grievance procedure provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy. See, e.g., Tillman v. Lebanon County Corr. Fac., 221 F.3d 410, 422 (3d Cir. 2000). This is true even if plaintiff ultimately is dissatisfied with the outcome of the grievance process. Iseley v. Horn, No. 96-5385, 1996 WL 510090, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 3, 1996). Further, it is well-recognized that an adequate post-deprivation remedy exists in Pennsylvania through a tort lawsuit in state court. Ray v. Rogers, No. 12-985, 2014 WL 1235905, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 2014).
As such, in the instant case, Plaintiff's allegations related to his personal property are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Section 1983, and should be dismissed. Additionally, as it appears that he cannot prevail, dismissal of his federal claim for lost property should be with prejudice to amendment in this Court; however, dismissal should be without prejudice to refiling in state court under state law, if appropriate.
2. Access to the courts
While the Complaint is unclear, it is possible that Plaintiff's allegations that Defendant Covine refused to provide Plaintiff with his legal work might be an attempt to state a claim for denial of his right to access the courts under the First Amendment. ECF No. 9-1 at 1. Out of an abundance of caution, the standard for raising such a claim is addressed below.
In Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403 (2002), the United States Supreme Court set forth specific criteria that a court must consider when determining whether a plaintiff has alleged a viable claim of denial of the First Amendment right to access the courts. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that a party must identify all of the following in the complaint: (1) a non-frivolous, underlying claim; (2) the official acts frustrating the litigation; and (3) a remedy that may be awarded as recompense but that is not otherwise available in a future suit. Id. at 415; see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350-53 (1996).
The Supreme Court explained that the first requirement mandated that the plaintiff specifically state in the complaint the underlying claim in accordance with the requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to the same degree as if the underlying claim were being pursued independently. Christopher, 536 U.S. at 417. In this regard, the statement must be sufficiently specific to ensure that the district court can ascertain that the claim is not frivolous and that “the ‘arguable' nature of the underlying claim is more than hope.” Id. The second requirement mandates that a plaintiff allege clearly in the complaint the official acts that frustrated the underlying litigation. Third, a plaintiff must specifically identify a remedy that may be awarded as recompense in a denial-of-access case that would not be available in any other future litigation. Id. at 414. This final requirement is important in order “to hedge against the risk that an access claim be tried all the way through, only to find that the court can award no remedy that the plaintiff could not have been awarded on a presently existing claim.” Id. at 416.
Plaintiff has failed to plead any sort of facts that would allow this Court to determine whether his legal paperwork was related to an arguably-meritorious legal case. He also has not indicated how the alleged loss of his legal papers precluded him from prosecuting his case, nor what remedy, if any, would be unavailable in future litigation. To the extent that he attempts to assert one, Plaintiff's access to the courts claim with respect to his lost property clearly does not meet the pleading standard articulated in Christopher. This claim should be dismissed. However, as it would not necessarily be futile to do so, Plaintiff should be granted leave file an amended complaint with factual allegations supporting such a claim, if appropriate.
3. Grievances and criminal investigation
Plaintiff's allegations in the Complaint with respect to Defendants Coulter, Gandzarski, Edwards, and Piendel relate to their involvement in the jail grievance system. ECF No. 9-1 at 3-6. Similarly, Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Allegheny County Police Department relate to its alleged failure to properly investigate and bring charges based on his lost property. Id. at 8-9.
To the extent that Plaintiff attempts to state a claim for a constitutional deprivation based on any Defendant's alleged mishandling of his grievances, the same should be dismissed. It is well-established that inmates have no constitutional right to an effective grievance system. See, e.g., Pittman v. Corbett, No. 14-231, 2014 WL 783498, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 2014) (“[T]o the extent plaintiff's claims are based on the defendant's denials of grievances and/or inadequacies in and dissatisfaction with the grievance process, he has not stated a constitutional claim.”); Robinson v. Prison Health Services, Inc., No. 10-7165, 2014 WL 2452132, at *7 (E.D. Pa. June 2, 2014) (dismissing a plaintiff s due process claims because claims based on dissatisfaction with the grievance process fail as inmate does not have a constitutionally protected right to a grievance procedure); Robinson v. Varner, No. 12-6359, 2012 WL 6628108, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 19, 2012) (“[P]laintiff cannot state a constitutional claim based on his dissatisfaction with the grievance process.”).
“[B]ecause a prisoner has no free-standing constitutional right to an effective grievance process [citation omitted], a prisoner cannot maintain a constitutional claim ... based upon [the prisoner's] perception that [the recipient of the grievances] ignored and/or failed to properly investigate his grievances.” Woods v. First Corr. Med. Inc., 446 F. App'x. 400, 403 (3d Cir. 2011).
Similarly, Plaintiff has no right to have Defendant Allegheny County Police Department to investigate his claims adequately, or to bring criminal charges on his behalf. See, e.g., Boseski v. N. Arlington Municipality, 621 Fed.Appx. 131, 135 (3d Cir. 2015) “[Plaintiff] has no cognizable claim against a government entity for its failure to investigate or bring criminal charges against another individual.” See also Mitchell v. McNeil, 487 F.3d 374, 378 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[t]here is no statutory or common law right, much less a constitutional right, to an [adequate police] investigation.”).
Accordingly, any claims arising from the alleged mishandling of Plaintiff's grievances, or the allegedly inadequate investigation by Defendant Allegheny County Police Department, should be dismissed. Dismissal should be with prejudice, as it is apparent that amendment would be futile.
4. Personal involvement
In order for Section 1983 liability to attach, a plaintiff must show that a defendant was personally involved in the deprivation of his or her federal rights. Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005). It is well established that no liability exists under Section 1983 solely based on a theory of vicarious liability or respondeat superior. Shaw v. Stackhouse, 920 F.2d 1135, 1147 (3d Cir. 1990).
In situations where a supervising official knowingly permits a continuing custom or policy that results in harm to a plaintiff, Section 1983 liability may attach. See Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 838 F.2d 663, 673 (3d Cir. 1988) (overruled in part on other grounds by Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993)). But at a minimum, liability in such a case is appropriate “‘only where there are both (1) contemporaneous knowledge of the offending incident or knowledge of a prior pattern of similar incidents, and (2) circumstances under which the supervisor's inaction could be found to have communicated a message of approval to the offending subordinate.'” Colburn, 838 F.2d at 673 (quoting Chinchello v. Fenton, 805 F.2d 126, 133 (3d Cir. 1986)).
Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Harper and Fitzgerald are based explicitly on their supervisory roles and not on their personal involvement in any alleged constitutional deprivation. ECF Nos. 7 and 10. Accordingly, amendment with respect to those claims would be futile, and these Defendants should be dismissed with prejudice
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Complaint, ECF No. 9, be dismissed sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, as follows:
• Plaintiff's federal lost property claim should be dismissed without leave to amend in this Court, but without prejudice to filing a state law claim in state court, if appropriate;
• To the extent that he attempts to raise one, Plaintiff's claim of denial of access to the courts should be dismissed with leave to file an amended complaint;
• Plaintiff's claims regarding his jail grievances and attempts to initiate a criminal investigation regarding his lost property should be dismissed with prejudice; and
• Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Harper and Fitzgerald, which explicitly are based on their supervisory roles, should be dismissed with prejudice.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Rule 72.D.2, the parties are permitted to file written objections in accordance with the schedule established in the docket entry reflecting the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Objections are to be submitted to the Clerk of Court, United States District Court, 700 Grant Street, Room 3110, Pittsburgh, PA 15219.
Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011). Any party opposing objections may file their response to the objections within fourteen days thereafter in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72.D.2.