Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:01-CV-120-C
August 4, 2003
ORDER
On this day the Court considered Petitioner Marlin Douglas Anderson's pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent Janie Cockrell has filed an Answer with Brief in Support, along with copies of Petitioner's relevant state court records. Petitioner did not file a response.
Respondent has lawful custody of Petitioner pursuant to a judgment and sentence of the 364th Judicial District Court of Lubbock County, Texas, in cause number 92-416,007, styled The State of Texas v. Marlin D. Anderson. On April 22, 1991, Petitioner was found guilty of the felony offense of aggravated sexual assault in cause number 89-410,290, and on April 26, 1991, the jury sentenced him to forty-five (45) years' incarceration in the Texas Department of Corrections, now known as the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division ("TDCJ-ID"). In an unpublished opinion issued on May 12, 1992, the Seventh Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. Less than six months later, on November 5, 1992, Petitioner was re-indicted for the felony offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child in cause number 92-416,007.
Petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense as charged in the indictment in cause number 92-416,007, but a jury found him guilty and on April 1, 1999, sentenced him to ninety-nine (99) years' incarceration in the TDCJ-ID. On direct appeal, Petitioner complained that he was denied a speedy trial in violation of the Texas Constitution and the United States Constitution and the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. The Seventh Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence in an opinion issued on December 1, 1999. Anderson v. State, 8 S.W.3d 387 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1999).
Petitioner re-urged his speedy trial claims in a petition for discretionary review, but the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals refused review on April 19, 2000. Although Petitioner contends that he filed a state application for writ of habeas corpus, the records do not reflect that an application was filed. Moreover, Respondent has filed an affidavit from the Deputy Clerk of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals stating that no such application was filed.
The Court understands Petitioner to raise only one ground for review in the instant federal petition: he complains that he was denied the right to a speedy trial in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
Petitioner filed the instant federal petition on April 17, 2001; therefore, his petition is subject to review under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA" or "the Act"). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997) (determining that AEDPA applies to noncapital habeas petitions filed after April 24, 1996, the effective date of the statute). Under § 2254(d), as amended by the AEDPA, a state prisoner may not obtain relief on any of his claims that were adjudicated on the merits in the state-court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claims —
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). "In the context of federal habeas proceedings, adjudication `on the merits' is a term of art that refers to whether a court's disposition of the case was substantive as opposed to procedural." Neal v. Puckett, 286 F.3d 230, 235 (5th Cir. 2002).
"[C]learly established federal law `refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.'" Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 946 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000)).
Furthermore, the AEDPA requires a federal habeas court "to presume state court findings of fact to be correct unless the petitioner rebuts that presumption by clear and convincing evidence." Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d at 947 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). See Jackson v. Anderson, 112 F.3d 823, 824 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting that the burden of rebutting the presumption was made more onerous by the AEDPA amendments to § 2254).
"Section 2254(d)(1) provides the standard of review for questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact." Woods v. Cockrell, 307 F.3d 353, 356 (5th Cir. 2002). Under § 2254(d)(1), "[a] state-court decision is `contrary to' . . . clearly established [Supreme Court] precedents if it `applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases' or if it `confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent.'" Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 123 S.Ct. 362, 365 (2002) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 362, 405-406). This standard does not require that the state court cite to Supreme Court cases "— indeed, it does not even require awareness of [the Supreme Court] cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them." Early v. Packer, 123 S.Ct. at 365 (emphasis in original).
A state court decision is an "unreasonable application" of clearly established Supreme Court law under § 2254(d)(1) "if the state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle from [Supreme Court] decisions but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular case." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 407-408). "The focus of the latter inquiry is on whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law is objectively unreasonable, and [the Supreme Court] stressed in Williams that an unreasonable application is different from an incorrect one." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. at 694 (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 409-410). "Distinguishing between an unreasonable and an incorrect application of federal law, [the Supreme Court has] clarified that even if the federal habeas court concludes that the state court decision applied clearly established federal law incorrectly, relief is appropriate only if that application is also objectively unreasonable." Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 793 (2001) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 410-411). See Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19,123 S.Ct. 357, 361 (2002) (holding that the "unreasonable application" clause "authorizes federal court intervention only when a state-court decision is objectively unreasonable"). Furthermore, when applying the "unreasonable application" test to a state court decision, the federal court's focus "should be on the ultimate legal conclusion that the state court reached and not on whether the state court considered and discussed every angle of the evidence." Neal v. Puckett, 286 F.3d at 246.
Finally, the Court notes that 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) requires federal courts to presume correct the factual findings of the state courts unless the petitioner "rebut[s] the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." This Court has examined Petitioner's pleadings, Respondent's answer and brief, and the state court records and finds that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the state court's denial of his complaint regarding a speedy trial was either "contrary to" or an "unreasonable application of" clearly established Federal law. The state court analyzed Petitioner's claim under the four-part test enunciated by the Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), and determined that Petitioner had demonstrated that the delay between indictment and trial in cause number 92-416,007 was presumptively prejudicial, Anderson v. State, 8 S.W.3d at 390, but that the reasons for the delay were neutral and weighed less heavily against the state because they were due to overcrowded state dockets; neither Petitioner nor his counsel invoked the right to a speedy trial until March of 1999 and Petitioner was tried within days of invoking the right; and Petitioner had failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the delay. Anderson v. State, 8 S.W.3d at 390-393. The state court decision was not an "objectively unreasonable" application of the Supreme Court law.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated in Respondent's Answer with Brief in Support, the Court finds that Petitioner Marlin Douglas Anderson's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be DENIED and dismissed with prejudice.
All relief not expressly granted is denied and any pending motions are denied.
SO ORDERED.