Anderson v. Carlson

4 Citing cases

  1. Moore-McCormack Lines v. McMahon

    235 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1956)   Cited 23 times

    " (Emphasis added.) Thus, some courts have allowed the assertion of a counterclaim by and against a trustee in his representative capacity where it appears that he is the sole beneficiary and all of the creditors of the estate have been paid off. Anderson v. Carlson, 201 App. Div. 260, 194 N.Y.S. 112; Blood v. Kane, 130 N.Y. 514, 29 N.E. 994, 15 L.R.A. 490; Cf. Chicago, R.I. P. Ry. Co. v. Schendel, 270 U.S. 611, 617-622, 46 S.Ct. 420, 70 L.Ed. 757; Vaughn's Adm'r v. Louisville N.R. Co., 297 Ky. 309, 179 S.W.2d 441, 152 A.L.R. 1060. Of course, without resort to a cross-libel, appellant can set up as a defense to each appellee's claim, or in reduction of that claim, the negligence of that appellee's decedent.

  2. Gensinger v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

    208 F.2d 576 (9th Cir. 1953)   Cited 26 times

    In re Grant, D.C.N.Y., 198 F. 708, 709, 710, affirmed without discussion of this point, Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74, 33 S.Ct. 190, 57 L.Ed. 423. This holding was based, by way of analogy, on the New York rule as to distributions by an executor of an estate who is also sole legatee. This rule, in turn, appears to be founded on the proposition that when all debts of the estate are paid, the legal title of such person to the property of the estate, as executor, and his equitable title, as legatee, are merged, so that the executor-legatee need only show that he accepts the legacy to become absolute owner. Blood v. Kane, 130 N.Y. 514, 29 N.E. 994; In re Mullon's Estate, 145 N.Y. 98, 39 N.E. 821; Anderson v. Carlson, 201 App. Div. 260, 194 N.Y.S. 112; In re Annunziato's Estate, 201 Misc. 971, 108 N.Y.S.2d 101. This reasoning may be inapplicable here, for it is doubtful that a trustee in dissolution under the Washington statute holds legal title to the corporate assets. It may be that he has only the possession of the assets with such power to deal with them as the statute gives him.

  3. Conant v. Schnall

    33 A.D.2d 326 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970)   Cited 29 times   2 Legal Analyses

    (See Craven v. Gazza, 36 Misc.2d 493, mod. on other grounds 19 A.D.2d 646, app. dsmd. 14 N.Y.2d 542. ) This limitation, however, breaks down when the representative is also the real party in interest. Thus, where an administrator, who is also the sole heir, brings an action in his representative capacity, he is subject to individual counterclaims ( Anderson v. Carlson, 201 App. Div. 260). The theory of such a result is that his two capacities merged. (See Cutler v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 22 N.Y.2d 245; Geer, Jr. Co. v. Fagan, 255 App. Div. 253.)

  4. Matter of Blumengarten

    4 A.D.2d 954 (N.Y. App. Div. 1957)

    A coexecutor who is willing to perform his statutory duties is entitled to participate in the administration and cannot be deprived of his right to earn his commissions by the acts of his cofiduciary who was responsible for his inability to render services to the estate ( Matter of Purdy, 129 Misc. 297; Taylor v. Taylor, 223 Ky. 799). A person named and appointed as a sole executor who is also the sole legatee under the will may obtain legal title without a formal transfer from himself as executor if there are no debts or if all the debts have been paid ( Matter of Mullon, 145 N.Y. 98, 104; Gensinger v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 208 F.2d 576, 582). Appellant, a sole legatee, was not a sole fiduciary and may not deprive respondent of his right to earn his statutory commissions. There was not such a merger of the appellant's rights as a fiduciary with her beneficial right to ownership as an individual as would vest title in her individually and completely (cf. Anderson v. Carlson, 201 App. Div. 260) and deprive respondent of his right to partake in the administration of the estate and earn his commissions (see e.g., Matter of Bushe, 227 N.Y. 85, 89). Nolan, P.J., Wenzel, Beldock, Ughetta and Kleinfeld, JJ., concur.