Thus, a claimant may not receive benefits if the severity of his/her total impairments is less than that of any single impairment described in the listings. Id. Accord Anderson v. Apfel, 996 F. Supp. 869, 872 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (stating that an impairment that manifests only some of a listing's medical criteria, no matter how severely, does not qualify a claim). When deciding whether an individual is disabled at step three, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has determined "that an ALJ must clearly set forth the reasons for his decision."
A few courts have stated that an IQ within the numerical range might not automatically satisfy prong one of the adult analog 12.05C if the number is inconsistent with other evidence in the record. See Lowery v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 835, 837-39 (11th Cir. 1992); Anderson v. Apfel, 996 F. Supp. 869, 872 (E.D. Ark. 1998). However, most courts assume that a valid IQ result in the numerical range satisfies the first prong of 12.05C, and no additional inquiry is appropriate.
Hence the ALJ was entitled to discount the importance of the December 1994 score. Anderson v. Apfel, 996 F. Supp. 869, 873 (E.D.Ark. 1998) (focus on subtest scores is necessary especially where there is a discrepancy between various IQ scores). The ALJ was not required to base a finding of disability on either the December 1994 or the March 1995 IQ evaluations, where both of these reports were more than two years old at the time of the May 20, 1997 hearing. Under the regulations, both reports no longer met the requirement for being current.
The text of the regulation supports the Commissioner's interpretation, see 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 112.00, and the Commissioner cites Acquiescence Ruling 98-2(8), 63 Fed. Reg. 36, 9279, 9280, which suggests the same three-part test. See also Anderson v. Apfel, 996 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (holding that IQ score of 60 to 70 does not automatically satisfy the first prong of 12.05C). While not explicitly addressing whether a two or three part test should be used, the case law in the Seventh Circuit, as well as many other circuits, applies a two-part test.
The text of the regulation supports the Commissioner's interpretation, see 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 112.00, and the Commissioner cites Acquiescence Ruling 98-2(8), 63 Fed.Reg. 36, 9279, 9280, which suggests the same three-part test. See also Anderson v. Apfel, 996 F. Supp. 869 (E.D.Ark. 1998) (holding that IQ score of 60 to 70 does not automatically satisfy the first prong of 12.05C). While not explicitly addressing whether a two or three part test should be used, the case law in the Seventh Circuit, as well as many other circuits, applies a two-part test.
When there is a marked discrepancy across verbal and performance scores, averaging to obtain a full-scale IQ can be misleading." Anderson v. Apfel, 996 F. Sup. 869, 873 (E.D.Ark. 1998). Accordingly, the court finds that it was proper for the DMR to look at the individual scores rather than rely on the full scale I.Q. because of the discrepancy between the plaintiff's verbal I.Q. and performance I.Q.