Opinion
D072104
05-25-2017
ANDERSON & ANDERSON LLP et al., Petitioners, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY, Respondent; GUIDO DIMITRI et al., Real Parties in Interest.
Pettit Kohn Ingrassia & Lutz, Douglas A. Pettit and Jeffrey K. Miyamoto, for Petitioners. Yale & Baumgarten, Eugene P. Yale and David W. Baumgarten, for Real Parties in Interest.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (San Diego County Super. Ct. No. 37-2015-00014394-CU-PN-CTL) ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS in mandate after the superior court denied summary judgment. John S. Meyer, Judge. Petition granted in part and denied in part; request for immediate stay denied. Pettit Kohn Ingrassia & Lutz, Douglas A. Pettit and Jeffrey K. Miyamoto, for Petitioners. Yale & Baumgarten, Eugene P. Yale and David W. Baumgarten, for Real Parties in Interest.
Petitioners Anderson & Anderson LLP and Steven A. Micheli (collectively, Anderson) are defendants in a legal malpractice action. Real party in interest Guido DiMitri is Anderson's former client and one of the plaintiffs in the underlying action. DiMitri's wife is also a plaintiff, but her cause of action is not at issue in this proceeding. We will therefore omit further reference to her.
Anderson filed a motion for summary judgment on DiMitri's cause of action for legal malpractice, which the trial court denied. In its petition, Anderson argues the court erred by (1) failing to adequately state its reasons for denying the motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (g), and (2) denying the motion on its merits. (All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.) Anderson seeks a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order denying the motion and enter an order granting the motion or, in the alternative, enter an order that complies with section 437c, subdivision (g).
We agree the court did not comply with section 437c, subdivision (g), and will therefore grant Anderson's petition to the extent it seeks compliance with that statute. The remainder of Anderson's petition is denied.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Anderson represented DiMitri and others in business litigation arising from a real estate venture in Fallbrook, California. DiMitri suffered an adverse jury verdict in that litigation, which the trial court partially vacated in a post-trial order. On appeal, as relevant here, this court reversed the trial court's post-trial order and reinstated the jury verdict. (Kirk v. DiMitri (Nov. 13, 2013, D058758, D059539) [nonpub. opn.].) While the appeal was pending, Anderson withdrew as DiMitri's counsel.
In the subsequent legal malpractice action, DiMitri contends Anderson's errors led to the appellate reversal, and he seeks damages based on the reinstated portions of the jury verdict. Anderson filed a motion for summary judgment on DiMitri's sole cause of action for legal malpractice. Anderson asserted two independent grounds for summary judgment: (1) that the applicable statute of limitations barred DiMitri's cause of action and (2) that DiMitri could not prove causation. DiMitri opposed.
In a written tentative ruling, the trial court comprehensively analyzed both grounds asserted by Anderson. It found that the statute of limitations did not bar DiMitri's cause of action, but that DiMitri could not prove causation. The tentative ruling was therefore to grant Anderson's motion for summary judgment on causation grounds only.
At oral argument, the parties argued both potential grounds for summary judgment. The trial court took the matter under submission without making any further tentative findings.
Four days later, the trial court issued a minute order denying Anderson's motion for summary judgment. The minute order adopted the tentative ruling to the extent it discussed the statute of limitations, but it rejected the tentative ruling's discussion of causation. The trial court wrote, "After considering the arguments made at the hearing, the Court determines that there are triable issues of material fact as to the issue of causation."
Anderson filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the trial court's order and requesting an immediate stay. We directed the clerk to provide notice that we were considering issuing a peremptory writ in the first instance regarding compliance with section 437c, subdivision (g), and to request an informal response from the real parties in interest. (See Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 178.) DiMitri, along with his wife, provided an informal response.
DISCUSSION
Section 437c, subdivision (g), provides in relevant part as follows: "Upon the denial of a motion for summary judgment on the ground that there is a triable issue as to one or more material facts, the court shall, by written or oral order, specify one or more material facts raised by the motion that the court has determined there exists a triable controversy. This determination shall specifically refer to the evidence proffered in support of and in opposition to the motion that indicates that a triable controversy exists."
"The value of [section 437c,] subdivision (g) is that it encourages the parties and the court to analyze the law before reaching the conclusion that disputed factual issues exist. In the course of identifying the disputed facts and specifying the conflicting evidence, the court may discover, for example, that the facts are not in conflict and that the motion should be either granted or denied on a point of law." (Continental Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 1069, 1072 (Continental).) "By requiring the court to specify one or more material facts in controversy and to specifically refer to the evidence proffered in support of and in opposition to the motion, the Legislature has forced the court to focus its attention upon where the legal issues leave off and the factual issues begin." (Ibid.)
The trial court's minute order here did not comply with the statute. Although it adopted the tentative ruling's comprehensive discussion of the statute of limitations, it did discuss any facts or refer to any evidence on the issue of causation. Because Anderson asserted causation as a separate and independent ground for summary judgment, the statute required the trial court to explain why Anderson was not entitled to summary judgment on that ground. The trial court did not do so.
The DiMitris' informal response argues that "a fair reading of the minute order is that the respondent court agreed with the arguments made by DiMitri's counsel at oral argument, and concluded that there are triable issues of material fact on the issue of causation for the reasons discussed at oral argument." We disagree. While it is possible the trial court fully agreed with DiMitri's counsel, it is possible it did not. And, in any event, a trial court's general reference to the arguments and papers of the prevailing party is insufficient to comply with the statute. (See Payless Drug Store v. Superior Court (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 277, 279 [rejecting as insufficient the court's reference to "[t]he opposition papers"]; see also Continental, supra, 165 Cal.App.3d at p. 1071 [rejecting as insufficient a minute order listing "various documents in the file, including the complaint, the insurance policy, seven letters, a deposition excerpt, a request for judicial notice, and another document"].)
Assuming the procedural and substantive prerequisites are satisfied, a peremptory writ of mandate in the first instance may properly be issued to compel compliance with section 437c, subdivision (g). (Payless Drug Store v. Superior Court, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at p. 279; Greater Irvine Credit Union v. Superior Court (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1189, 1192; Beatrice Cos. v. Superior Court (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 525, 528; Tera Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Superior Court (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 530, 533; Continental, supra, 165 Cal.App.3d at p. 1072.) We will do so here.
DISPOSITION
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing the superior court to vacate its April 3, 2017, order to the extent it denies Anderson's motion for summary judgment and to issue a new order that complies with Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (g). Anderson's petition is denied in all other respects, including its request for an immediate stay. This opinion will be final as to this court 10 days from its filing. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.490(b)(2)(A).) In the interests of justice, the parties shall bear their own costs in this proceeding. (Id., rule 8.493(a)(1)(B).)
NARES, J. WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
DATO, J.