Opinion
CASE NO. 1:14-CV-295
10-31-2016
PETER ANDA, LATRICIA BELL, JONATHAN ELSENBROEK, JACQUELYN JOHNSON, LESLIE PENEGOR and DONALD WALSTROM, for themselves and class members, Plaintiffs, v. ROOSEN VARCHETTI & OLIVIER, PLLC, RICHARD G. ROOSEN, PAUL E. VARCHETTI, LYNN M. OLIVIER, WEB EQUITY HOLDINGS, LLC, CAVALRY SPV I, LLC and MAIN STREET ACQUISITION CORP., Defendants.
ORDER ON MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification (ECF No. 147). This matter was submitted to the Court for consideration without oral argument. The Motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Generally, this case involves Plaintiffs who were indebted to service providers, banks, or credit card companies. The accounts went into default and the original creditors sold the debts to debt collectors-one group of Defendants in this case-who engaged attorneys-the other group of Defendants in this case-to help them collect on the accounts. The attorneys filed cases in state court and received judgments, usually by default. The attorneys then filed requests for writs of garnishment as a mechanism to collect on the judgments. In the applications, Defendants usually included costs of the current application in the total amount due. When previous writs of garnishment had been unsuccessful, those costs were often included in the total due in subsequent applications as well. Plaintiffs have filed this case to challenge the inclusion of the costs of applications for writs of garnishment as improper under Michigan law and the FDCPA.
On March 28, 2016, this Court issued its Order on Motions for Summary Judgment. In its Order, this Court found that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not deprive the Court of jurisdiction in this case. On the substance of the claims, this Court held that the Michigan garnishment process does not permit a judgment creditor to tax garnishment costs until the prevailing party status is settled on the garnishment itself. Further, claiming costs due that, in fact, are not due is a material misstatement for FDCPA purposes. Debt collectors who hire lawyers to assist in debt collection efforts can be held responsible for the collection activities of those lawyers, so non-attorney Defendants remain in the cases. Defendants retain the opportunity to attempt to establish the good faith defense set out in § 1692(k) of the FDCPA.
Plaintiffs have filed a renewed motion for class certification. Plaintiffs' proposed class definition is as follows:
A "General Class" comprised of all judgment debtors who were subject to a Michigan garnishment that: (1) was signed by Roosen, Varchetti & Olivier, PLLC; (2) was filed during the class period; and (3) had included in the amount of unsatisfied judgment then due (a) the costs of the garnishment, or (b) the costs of a prior garnishment before Roosen, Varchetti & Olivier, PLLC had received either (i) a disclosure for the prior garnishment indicating the garnishee owed money to, held property of, or employed the judgment debtor, or (ii) actual payment on the prior garnishment from the garnishee.
A "Web Equity Holdings, LLC Subclass" comprised of all judgment debtors who were subject to a Michigan garnishment that: (1) was signed by Roosen, Varchetti & Olivier, PLLC to collect a judgment
payable to Web Equity Holdings, LLC, (2) was filed during the class period; and (3) had included in the amount of the unsatisfied judgment then due (a) the costs of that garnishment, or (b) the costs of a prior garnishment before Roosen, Varchetti & Olivier, PLLC had received either (i) a disclosure for the prior garnishment indicating the garnishee owed money to, held property of, or employed the judgment debtor, or (ii) actual payment on the prior garnishment from the garnishee.
A "Cavalry SPV I, LLC Subclass" comprised of all judgment debtors who were subject to a Michigan garnishment that: (1) was signed by Roosen, Varchetti & Olivier, PLLC to collect a judgment payable to Cavalry SPV I, LLC, (2) was filed during the class period; and (3) had included in the amount of the unsatisfied judgment then due (a) the costs of that garnishment, or (b) the costs of a prior garnishment before Roosen, Varchetti & Olivier, PLLC had received either (i) a disclosure for the prior garnishment indicating the garnishee owed money to, held property of, or employed the judgment debtor, or (ii) actual payment on the prior garnishment from the garnishee.
A "Main Street Acquisition Corp. Subclass" comprised of all judgment debtors who were subject to a Michigan garnishment that: (1) was signed by Roosen, Varchetti & Olivier, PLLC to collect a judgment payable to Main Street Acquisition Corp., (2) was filed during the class period; and (3) had included in the amount of the unsatisfied judgment then due (a) the costs of that garnishment, or (b) the costs of a prior garnishment before Roosen, Varchetti & Olivier, PLLC had received either (i) a disclosure for the prior garnishment indicating the garnishee owed money to, held property of, or employed the judgment debtor, or (ii) actual payment on the prior garnishment from the garnishee.
To eliminate redundancies in the Plaintiff's proposed class definition, the Court will define the class as follows:
A "General Class" comprised of all judgment debtors who were subject to a Michigan garnishment that: (1) was signed by Roosen, Varchetti & Olivier, PLLC; (2) was filed during the class period; and (3) had included in the amount of unsatisfied judgment then due (a) the costs of the garnishment, or (b) the costs of a prior garnishment before Roosen, Varchetti & Olivier, PLLC had received either (i) a disclosure for the prior garnishment indicating the garnishee owed
money to, held property of, or employed the judgment debtor, or (ii) actual payment on the prior garnishment from the garnishee.
A "Web Equity Holdings, LLC Subclass" comprised of all members of the General Class in which the garnishment was to collect a judgment payable to Web Equity Holdings, LLC.
A "Cavalry SPV I, LLC Subclass" comprised of all members of the General Class in which the garnishment was to collect a judgment payable to Cavalry SPV I, LLC.
A "Main Street Acquisition Corp. Subclass" comprised of all members of the General Class in which the garnishment was to collect a judgment payable to Main Street Acquisition Corp.
DISCUSSION
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 governs class certification. A "trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to certify a class, but that discretion must be exercised within the framework of Rule 23." In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1079 (6th Cir. 1996). "Rule 23 does not set forth a mere pleading standard. A party seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate his compliance with the Rule-that is, he must be prepared to prove that there are in fact sufficiently numerous parties, common questions of law or fact, etc." Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011). Rule 23 provides that a class action may be maintained "if two conditions are met: The suit must satisfy the criteria set forth in subdivision (a) (i.e. numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation), and it also must fit into one of the three categories described in subdivision (b)." Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 398 (2010). The party seeking class certification bears the burden of proof. In re Am Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d at 1079. A class may be certified only if "the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied." Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350-51.
I. Rule 23(a) Requirements
Under Rule 23(a), the party seeking certification must first demonstrate that (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
A. Numerosity
"There is no strict numerical test for determining impracticability of joinder." In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d at 1079. "When class size reaches substantial proportions . . . the impracticability requirement is usually satisfied by the numbers alone." Id. Certification of the class does not require the plaintiff to produce the class members' identities at the time of certification. See Golden v. City of Columbus, 404 F.3d 950-66 (6th Cir. 2005); 32B Am. Jur. 2d, Federal Courts § 1614 (2012) ("The fact that the members of a proposed class are not specifically identifiable supports, rather than bars, the bringing of a class action, since joinder is impracticable and the requirement of Rule 23 would thus be fulfilled" (citing Doe v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 529 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1975)).
Here, Defendants do not contest that Plaintiffs' class definition comprises over one hundred members. In fact, in their discovery responses, Defendants admit that Plaintiffs' proposed class definition comprises over one hundred persons (ECF No. 167-1, PageID.2138-2139). Accordingly, Plaintiffs have established that the class in each case is "so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).
B. Commonality
Commonality does not require that all class members share identical claims and facts. Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1197 (6th Cir. 1988). Rather, to satisfy Rule 23(a)(2), a plaintiff seeking class certification must demonstrate the existence of at least "a single issue common to all members of the class." In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d at 1080. One question common to the class can satisfy the commonality requirement. Sprague v. Gen. Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388, 397 (6th Cir. 1997).
In this case, Plaintiffs assert that there are several common question of law and fact, including:
1) Whether Defendants filed and served garnishments representing that the judgment debtor owed an amount that included alleged post-judgment costs contrary to MCR 3.101(R);(ECF No. 148, PageID.1967-1968).
2) Whether Defendants were entitled to recover costs for unsuccessful writs for garnishments;
3) Whether Defendants filed and served garnishments that included in the amount of the unsatisfied judgment then due (a) the costs of that garnishment, or (b) the costs of a prior garnishment before Defendants had received either (i) a disclosure for the prior garnishment indicating the garnishee owed money to, held property of, or employed the judgment debtor, or (ii) actual payment on the prior garnishment from the garnishee.
4) Whether Defendants used false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt, in violation of the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e and 1692e(10);
5) Whether Defendants made false representations regarding the character, amount or legal status of debts, in violation of the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A);
6) Whether Defendants communicated credit information which Defendants knew or should have known was false, in violation of the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8); and
7) Whether Defendants used unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect amounts not expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law, in violation of the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1).
Defendants do not dispute the notion that Plaintiffs' claims give rise to these common questions of law and fact (ECF No. 158, PageID.2034-2036). In fact, the Court has resolved many of them in summary judgment already. Instead, Defendants' main argument is that the above common questions are not susceptible to class-wide proof. Id. Even assuming, however, that questions exist that are peculiar to some individual members of the proposed class, that is no bar to class certification. See Sterling, 855 F.2d at 1197 ("[T]he mere fact that questions peculiar to each individual member of the class remain after the common questions of the defendant's liability have been resolved does not dictate . . . that a class action is impermissible."). It is enough that liability is based on a single course of conduct, id., which Defendants do not dispute is the case here (ECF No. 158, PageID.2034-2036).
The most important remaining question is whether Defendants can establish a good faith defense to Plaintiffs' claims. This will be the key liability issue for trial, and it is common to the class. Accordingly, the commonality requirement is satisfied.
C. Typicality and Adequate Representation
The Sixth Circuit has observed that "[t]he adequate representation requirement overlaps with the typicality requirement because in the absence of typical claims, the class representative has no incentives to pursue the claim of the other class members." In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d at 1083. A claim meets the typicality requirement if "it arises from the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other class members, and if his or her claims are based on the same legal theory." Powers v. Hamilton Cnty. Pub. Defender Comm'n, 501 F.3d 592, 618 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations omitted).
The requirement that representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class "is essential to due process" and a class should not be certified where the interests of the members are antagonistic because the preclusive effect of the verdict may deprive unnamed class members of their right to be heard. In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d at 1083. "'Adequate representation' invokes two inquiries: (1) whether the class counsel are 'qualified, experienced, and generally able to conduct litigation" and (2) whether the named plaintiffs themselves are capable of advancing the class claims or have interests that are 'antagonistic' to the other class members." Hoving v. Lawyers Title Ins. Co., 256 F.R.D. 555, 565 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (quoting Stout v. J.D. Byrider, 228 F.3d 709, 717 (6th Cir. 2000)).
Here, Plaintiffs have provided sufficient evidence to establish that the typicality requirement is met. Plaintiffs' claims are based on the same facts and the same law as the claims of the members of each class. In fact, the claims of the members of each class are identical to Plaintiffs' claims. Defendants do not contest the general point, but again argue that Plaintiffs' claims are not susceptible to class-wide proof because class members will have to conduct a fact-intensive review of each particular request and writ of garnishment (ECF No. 158, PageID.2029-2034). Defendants' argument on this issue, however, misses the point of the typicality requirement and is best addressed under the requirements of Rule 23(b) instead. Therefore, Plaintiffs' claims are typical of those of the proposed class.
Defendants' Second Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Authority in Support of their Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification is GRANTED. Defendants' supplemental authority, however, does not change this Court's analysis and holding. Defendants cite to Harden v. Autovest, No. 1:15-CV-00034, 2016 WL 4408905 (W.D. Mich. August 19, 2016), to bolster their argument that alleged individualized defenses to the named Plaintiffs' claims defeat the commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements, precluding class certification. As discussed above, however, the mere presence of individualized defenses does not preclude certification. See Sterling, 855 F.2d at 1197. Moreover, Harden is distinguishable from this case. In Harden, the court distinguished its holding from other cases finding that individualized defenses do not render a class representative's claims atypical by pointing to the plaintiff's "unique position," namely his argument that he never incurred the debt but that it also was a consumer debt under the FDCPA. Harden, No. 1:15-CV-00034, 2016 WL 4408905, at *3. Unlike in Harden, where the plaintiff's "unique position" was the "primary focus of the litigation," id., here the existence of the debt itself is not disputed, much less the primary focus of the litigation. Therefore, the mere possibility that Defendants could raise individualized defenses against Plaintiffs' claims is insufficient reason for this Court to depart from the well-settled rule that potential individualized defenses do not preclude class certification. Young v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 693 F.3d 532, 537 (6th Cir. 2012); Sterling, 855 F.2d at 1197.
As to the adequacy requirement, there is no necessary antagonism in the proposed class, and certainly not enough to defeat certification of a class to test whether the Defendants qualify for the good faith defense under the FDCPA. Further, the Court sees no reason why Plaintiff or Plaintiffs' counsel would not be able to fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class. Counsel is seasoned in both FDCPA generally, as well as class actions under the FDCPA. Accordingly, the adequacy requirement is satisfied.
D. Ascertainability of the Proposed Class
Defendants also contest whether Plaintiffs' proposed class is ascertainable. "The existence of an ascertainable class of persons to be represented by the proposed class representatives is an implied prerequisite of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23." John v. Nat'l Sec. Fire & Cas. Co., 501 F.3d 443, 445 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing inter alia, Moore's Federal Practice § 23.21[1], at 23-47 (1997) ("Although the text of Rule 23(a) is silent on the matter, a class must not only exist, the class must be susceptible of precise definition. There can be no class action if the proposed class is 'amorphous' or 'imprecise.'"), cited approvingly in Romberio v. Unumprovident Corp., 385 F. App'x 423, 431 (6th Cir. 2009). The ascertainability prong requires that the court be able to determine the identity of class members through the use of objective criteria. McBean v. City of New York, 260 F.R.D. 120, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Additionally, an analysis of the objective criteria must be administratively feasible. 7A Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 1760 (3d ed. 2005); see also Young v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 693 F.3d 532, 537-38 (6th Cir. 2012). A case is administratively feasible if identifying class members is a manageable process that does not involve much, if any individual factual inquiry. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 693 F.3d at 539-40. "[T]he need to review individual files to identify [a class's] members are not reasons to deny class certification." Id. at 539.
Plaintiffs' position is that the proposed class is ascertainable because membership can be determined through analysis of objective criteria, namely Defendants' records (ECF No. 148, PageID.1963-64). Additionally, Plaintiffs assert that it is administratively feasible for the Court to ascertain class membership because this can be determined by simply reviewing Defendants' own records. Id. Defendants' records will contain the name and address of every person that was a defendant in a debt collection lawsuit filed in a Michigan court. Id. Moreover, Defendants' files will contain a copy of every related post-judgment request and writ for garnishment filed by Defendants and every garnishee disclosure served on Defendants in standardized forms. Id. Finally, Defendants' files will contain a ledger for every account, tracking all expenditures and receipts. Id. at PageID.1964.
Defendants do not dispute that their records are objective criteria (ECF No. 158, PageID.2029-2034). Rather, they argue that it is not administratively feasible to determine class membership because their records are inadequate to make that determination. Id. Importantly, Defendants do not contend that their records will not contain the information alleged by Plaintiffs. Rather, Defendants claim that information, assuming it is present, will not be sufficient to determine class membership. Id. Defendants argue that the presence of a positive garnishee disclosure or actual payment in their records is not sufficient to determine whether a judgment debtor is a class member because there could be several reasons why the disclosure is not present or is not sufficient. Id. Additionally, Defendants claim that Plaintiffs' class definition is over broad because it will include some persons who were not harmed by Defendants' alleged wrongful conduct (ECF No. 158, PageID.2030).
Defendants' brief cites to Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016), for the proposition that some of the Plaintiffs could lack standing to assert a FDCPA violation if they cannot show a concrete injury through out-of-pocket losses. Because of this, Defendants argue that the Court will have to make individualized inquiries to make this determination. Additionally, Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss Claims of Jonathan Elsenbroek (ECF No. 140), alleging that Plaintiff Elsenbroek's claims are precluded by the Supreme Court's holding in Spokeo because his claims only allege a procedural injury and not concrete damages. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is DENIED. Defendants overread Spokeo. The Supreme Court in Spokeo explicitly held that "the violation of a procedural right granted by statute can be sufficient in some circumstances to constitute injury in fact." Id. at 1549. Courts following Spokeo have held that the allegation of a failure to accurately disclose information required by the FDCPA is sufficient to confer standing. See Church v. Accretive Health, Inc., No. 15-15708, 2016 WL 3611543, at *8 (11th Cir. 2016); Sayles v. Advanced Recovery Systems, No. 3:14-cv-911CWR-FKB, 2016 WL 4522822, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 26, 2016); Dickens v. GC Servs. Ltd. P'ship, No. 8:16-cv-803-T-30TGW, 2016 WL 3917530, at *2 (M.D. Fla. July 20, 2016). Here, the Plaintiffs allege that Defendants used false and misleading information in connection with their attempts to collect debt. The FDCPA explicitly prohibits this practice. Thus, Plaintiffs have asserted a concrete injury sufficient to confer standing to assert a class action under the FDCPA. --------
Defendants' argument regarding administrative feasibility, however, misconstrues Plaintiffs' class definition. To determine the class membership of a judgment debtor, the Court will not have to determine the reason why a disclosure is not present in Defendants' records or the sufficiency of a disclosure that is present. All the Court will have to determine is the presence or absence of a positive disclosure or actual payment. The Court will readily be able to determine this information on the face of Defendants' records. Moreover, the mere fact that the Court may have to review Defendants' files and records individually for this information is no reason to deny class certification. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 693 F.3d at 539-40. Thus, the determination of class membership is administratively feasible.
Further, Defendants' argument that Plaintiffs' class definition is over broad also lacks merit. The fact that Defendants may not ultimately be liable to some of the members of Plaintiffs' class is a very common phenomenon in class actions and is no ground to preclude class certification. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 693 F.3d at 538. In fact, if Plaintiffs' class definition meant that Defendants would be liable to all class members, Plaintiffs' proposed class would be an impermissible fail-safe class. Id. ("[A] 'fail-safe' class is one that includes only those who are entitled to relief. Such a class is prohibited because it would allow putative class members to seek a remedy but not be bound by an adverse judgment . . . .") (emphasis in original). Therefore, Plaintiffs' class definition is not over broad and the members of Plaintiffs' proposed class are ascertainable.
II. Rule 23(b) Requirements
If a court determines that the party seeking certification has satisfied the requirements of Rule 23(a), then the court must also consider whether the party meets one of the three requirements of Rule 23(b). In this case, Plaintiffs seek certification under Rule 23(b)(3). Rule 23(b)(3) requires that the court find that:
[T]he questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. The matters pertinent to these findings include:
A. the class members' interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions;
B. the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members;Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
C. the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and
D. the likely difficulties in managing a class action.
A. Predominance
The first issue that the Court considers is whether common questions of law and fact predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. "Subdivision (b)(3) parallels subdivision (a)(2) in that both require that common questions exist, but subdivision (b)(3) contains the more stringent requirement that common issues 'predominate' over individual issues." In re Am Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d at 1084. "The commonality requirement is satisfied if there is a single factual or legal question common to the entire class. The predominance requirement is met if this common question is at the heart of the litigation." Powers, 501 F.3d at 619 (internal citation omitted).
Plaintiffs argue that the predominance requirement is met because central to the litigation is the common question of whether Defendants, in their requests and writs for garnishment, improperly added the costs of the writs for garnishment to the judgment balance contrary to MCR 3.101(R) and whether the filing and service of those writs violated the FDCPA. As in the ascertainability, commonality, and typicality discussions, Defendants again argue that individualized inquiries will be required.
The evidence on the class certification record suggests that the question can, and likely will, be resolved for hundreds of separate requests and writs for garnishment on a common factual platform. Individualized inquiries into the particulars of each request and writ will likely be limited in comparison to the common factual platform. The mere fact that individualized inquiries may potentially occur is not sufficient to defeat the predominance requirement. See Powers, 501 F.3d at 619. The class definition therefore satisfies the predominance requirement.
B. Superiority
Finally, a party seeking class certification must also demonstrate that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. Rule 23(b)(3) lists the following factors as pertinent to a finding of superiority:
A. the class members' interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions;Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 23(b)(3). "[C]ases alleging a single course of wrongful conduct are particularly well-suited to class certification." Powers, 501 F.3d at 619.
B. the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members;
C. the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and
D. the likely difficulties in managing a class action.
Here, Plaintiffs argue that these four factors are satisfied for the following reasons. First, class members have no interest in controlling individual actions because virtually identical relief is sought by all and the claims of the members are relatively small. Second, Plaintiffs are not aware of any past or current litigation filed against Defendants on behalf of the class concerning this controversy. Third, this Court is an appropriate forum because Defendants regularly attempt to collect debts from consumers located in this judicial district and regularly transact business here. Fourth, this case is manageable because Defendants' violations of the FDCPA are apparent from the face of Defendants' own records, each class member is easily identifiable from Defendants' own records, the legal claims asserted by each class member are identical, and each members' statutory and actual damages can be calculated from Defendants' records.
Defendants do not dispute that the first three factors are met in this case. With regard to the fourth factor concerning manageability of a class action, Defendants again rely on their assertion that individual inquiries predominate. For the same reasons discussed above, that argument is unavailing.
Plaintiffs have met their burden of proving that a class action is the superior method of adjudicating this dispute. The alleged garnishment cost overcharges in this case are relatively small for each potential class member. Further, most judgment debtors are likely not aware of the technical violations of the FDCPA. It is unlikely that many members of the class will bring individual lawsuits. Therefore, class litigation is the superior method of adjudicating Plaintiffs' claims. See Kinder v. Nw. Bank, 278 F.R.D. 176, 186 (W.D. Mich. 2011).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court will certify a class based on Plaintiffs' proposed class definition of its "General Class" and appoint Plaintiffs' counsel as class counsel.
Therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' motion for class certification (ECF No. 147) is GRANTED on the basis of the amended class definition and Plaintiffs' counsel is appointed as class counsel.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall submit a joint status report regarding class notice. This should include the parties' joint proposal for the form, content, timing, and logistics of service to class members. If the parties cannot agree, the report should include each party's separate proposals. The parties shall submit the report no later than November 30, 2016.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' second motion for leave to file supplemental authority (ECF No. 164) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction (ECF No. 140) is DENIED. DATED: October 31, 2016
/s/ Robert J. Jonker
ROBERT J. JONKER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE