Opinion
No. CV 05-4016000S
June 27, 2006
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE AND REQUEST TO ADD PARTY #101
The plaintiffs are Judicial Marshals, employed by the Connecticut Judicial Branch and members of Local 731 Union. The Connecticut Judicial Branch denied the plaintiffs' promotion to Judicial Marshal II and corresponding pay increase because of their inability to obtain a commercial driver's license ("CDL"), a requirement to achieve Judicial Marshal II status. The requirements considered for Judicial Marshal II promotion were negotiated between Local 731 Union and the State of Connecticut and were later memorialized by way of contract. Plaintiffs claim that their inability to obtain a CDL is based on a physical disability.
The plaintiffs filed a complaint against the defendant, Connecticut Judicial branch, seeking injunctive relief and damages for violation of the Connecticut Fair Employments Practices Act, General Statutes § 46a-58. The defendant filed a motion to strike for failure to name a necessary party. The defendant argues that Local 731 Union is a necessary party and needs to be joined as party defendant or the complaint be stricken. In the alternative, the defendant requests the court order the plaintiff revise the complaint, naming Local 731 Union as party defendant. The plaintiffs have objected.
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). "[T]he exclusive remedy for legal sufficiency of parties is by motion to strike . . . This exclusive remedy applies to nonjoinder of legal sufficiency parties." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) George v. St. Ann's Church, 182 Conn. 322, 325, CT Page 11908 438 A.2d 97 (1980). Practice Book § 10-39(a)(3) provides that, "a motion to strike on the ground of nonjoinder of a necessary party must give the name and residence of the missing or interested party or such information as the moving party has to the identity and residence of the missing party or interested person and must state the missing party's or interested person's interest in the cause of action." Additionally, "the court is permitted to look at facts outside the pleadings when the basis of a motion to strike is for nonjoinder." Covered Wagon, Inc. v. Roubos, Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. 318301 (May 21, 1996, Mihalakos, J.).
The defendant moves to strike the plaintiffs' complaint for failure to name Local 731 Union as party defendant. The defendant asserts that Local 731 Union is a necessary party because it negotiated the contract central to the complaint and is responsible for enforcing the contract on behalf of its members. Any change to the contract would affect the collective bargaining agreement between the Judicial Branch and the Union. Any decision requiring change, ordered by the court, would require a change in the terms of the labor contract. Such change would have a direct impact on the Union and its members, including members of the union that have not obtained a CDL. Additionally, any changes made to the contract cannot be unilaterally made, the Union and the judicial branch must agree on the changes. Lastly, the defendant contends that absent a court order, the union could refuse to negotiate any changes in the labor agreement.
Defendant's legal argument begins with Hilton v. City of New Haven, 233 Conn. 701, 722, 661 A.2d 973 (1995), where the Connecticut Supreme Court held that a court may refuse to proceed with litigation if a claim cannot be properly adjudicated without the presence of a necessary party. Hilton involved a group of homeless persons in the city of New Haven initiating a class action against the defendant city, seeking to enjoin it from closing an emergency shelter. The city claimed the plaintiffs' failure to join the state as an indispensable party implicated the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction and the court's subject matter over the appeal. The court defined an indispensable party as a party where "their interest in the controversy is such that a final decree cannot be made without affecting that interest or leaving the controversy in such condition that its final disposition may be inconsistent with equity and good conscience." Hilton, 233 at 722. Defendant relies on the proposition that a party is necessary when its rights will be affected by the outcome or that the outcome will leave "the controversy in such condition that the resolution may be inconsistent with equity and good conscience." Hilton at 722, citing Gaudio v. Gaudio, 23 Conn.App. 287, 305-06, cert. denied, 217 Conn. 803 (1990). The defendant also relies on Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177, 180-81, 8 FPE cases 705 (D.C. Cir. 1974), where the court recognized that the union was a necessary, interested party.
After the original complaint was filed in District Court against the Hotel, Joint Board, and Waitresses Local 507, the Hotel filed a motion to dismiss for failure to join indispensable parties, namely, the International and Waiters Local 781. The District Court granted the motion, without prejudice but thereafter vacated its order and allowed appellant Evans to file an amended complaint naming the two unions as parties defendant. In accordance with its constitution, International had chartered Waiters Local 781 and Waitresses Local 507, and by its constitution, only International had the power to alter, suspend or terminate operation of these locals. Although neither the by-laws of Waiters Local 781 nor Waitresses Local 507 specifically prohibited membership to persons of the opposite sex, as a matter of practice and as their respective names imply, only men were admitted to Waiters Local 781 and only women were admitted to Waitresses Local 507.
The plaintiffs claim the Union is not a necessary party to the action. The plaintiff admits that the union may be an interested party, but argues they are not "absolutely required as a party to this suit." The plaintiff argues that the Union's interest is separable from the claims before this court. Because the claim is based in employment discrimination and not breach of contract or challenge to the language of the labor contract, the union is not a necessary party. Plaintiff argues that if the court finds the provision in the contract discriminatory and thus unconstitutional, the contract will become void and the Union will have an opportunity to renegotiate that part of the contract with the State of Connecticut. "To hold that the Union is a necessary party-defendant simply based on the fact that the dispute involves an already existing contract which the Union participated in negotiating with the State of Connecticut on behalf of the plaintiffs would not then allow the court to properly adjudicate this action in the interest of justice."
Plaintiff's legal argument primarily relies on distinguishing Defendant's use of Evans. Plaintiff contends that Evans is not applicable because it involved a motion to dismiss and not a motion to strike; it did not involve a labor contract, but union practice; and the union was a necessary party because it "had the power to alter, suspend or terminate the operating of the locals." Evans, 503 at 183.
Plaintiff also relies on Beason v. United Technologies Corp., 337 F.3d 271 (Conn. 2003), Golnik v. Amato, 299 F.Sup.2d 8 (D.Conn. 2003), and Hernandez v. Conriv Realty Associates, 116 F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 1997), none of which provide authority on joining a necessary party.
"Practice Book § 10-39(a) provides in relevant part: Whenever any party wishes to contest . . . (3) the legal sufficiency of any such complaint, counterclaim or cross complaint, or any count thereof, because of the absence of any necessary party or, pursuant to Section 17-56(b), the failure to join or give notice to any interested person . . . that party may do so by filing a motion to strike the contested pleading or party thereof." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 37 Huntington Street, H., LLC v. Hartford, 62 Conn.App. 586, 591 n. 8, 772 A.2d 633, cert. denied, 256 Conn. 914, 772 A.2d 1127 (2001). "Practice Book § 9-18 provides: The judicial authority may determine the controversy as between the parties before it, if it can do so without prejudice to the rights of others; but, if a complete determination cannot be had without the presence of other parties, the judicial authority may direct that they be brought in. If a person not a party has an interest or title which the judgment will affect, the judicial authority, on its motion, shall direct that person to be made a party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pathways, Inc. v. Planning Zoning Commission, 259 Conn. 619, 622 n. 5, 793 A.2d 222 (2002). "Practice Book § 9-19 provides: Except as provided in Sections 10-44 and 11-3 no action shall be defeated by the nonjoinder or misjoinder of parties. New parties may be added and summoned in, and parties misjoined may be dropped, by order of the judicial authority, at any stage of the cause, as it deems the interests of justice require." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 622 n. 6.
"A party is necessary if its presence is absolutely required in order to assure a fair and equitable trial." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Biro v. Hill, 214 Conn. 1, 6, 570 A.2d 182 (1990). "Parties have been termed indispensable when their interest in the controversy is such that a final decree cannot be made without either affecting that interest or leaving the controversy in such condition that its final disposition may be inconsistent with equity and good conscience." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Eder Bros., Inc. v. Wine Merchants of Connecticut, Inc., 275 Conn. 363, 382 n. 10, 880 A.2d 138 (2005). "Joinder of indispensable parties is mandated because due process principles make it essential that [such parties] be given notice and an opportunity to protect [their] interests by making [them] a party to the [action]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hilton v. New Haven, 233 Conn. 701, 722-23, 661 A.2d 973 (1995). "The distinction between the `mandatory-indispensable' party whose absence requires the court to strike the complaint and the so-called `necessary' party is whether the action will prejudice that party's rights. If so, they are indispensable; if not, then not. The optional category of `other parties without whom a complete determination cannot be had' are those who have an interest in the case and whose presence is necessary to `do complete justice by adjusting all the rights involved,' but who are not indispensable because their absence will not prejudice their rights." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Torringford Farms Assn., Inc. v. Torrington, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV 99-0081120 (September 22, 2000, Frazzini, J.) ( 28 Conn. L. Rptr. 199, 201-02).
There is scant law on whether a union is an indispensable party in the context of an employment discrimination case where the complained of conduct arises out of a union negotiated contract. Applying the test that a party is not indispensable because its absence will not prejudice its rights, it appears that in the present case the union not need to be joined because any liability the defendant may owe to the plaintiffs is separable from the union's interest — whether that be injunctive relief or money damages. The union's interest is not indispensable because judgment can be rendered without its direct presence.
The defendant relies on the following federal cases: Hardy v. Buchyrus-Erie Co., 398 F.Sup. 64 (E.D.Wis.) 1975; Mills v. International Paper Co., 14 FPE Cases 296 (W.D.La.) 1976; and Banks v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 55 FEP Cases 151 (MD Fla.) 1988. The Defendant rightly contends that each case provides a challenge impacting labor agreements making the Union a "necessary" (albeit not necessarily necessary) party. Those cases are instructive but not congruent with the facts of each other or this case, and are, thus, not dispositive.
On the other hand, the union, as conceded by the plaintiff, does have an interest in this litigation. While that interest is not direct or immediate, the union (and through it, the union's members) has an interest which makes the union the type of party whose presence is necessary to "do complete justice by adjusting all the rights involved," particularly in light of the claim for injunctive relief. The plaintiff argues that the union's "interest" will be adequately represented by the employer-defendant, an argument that this court finds unpersuasive.
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to strike is denied. The request to add the union as a party is granted. The plaintiff is ordered to cite in as a party defendant, Local Union 731 within 30 days.