Opinion
2018-14750 Index No. 705111/16
05-06-2020
BONG AN, Appellant, v. Javier E. VILLAS–FAMILIA, et al., Respondents.
Andrew Park, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Jusun Yook of counsel), for appellant. Malapero Prisco & Klauber, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Michael Driscoll of counsel), for respondents.
Andrew Park, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Jusun Yook of counsel), for appellant.
Malapero Prisco & Klauber, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Michael Driscoll of counsel), for respondents.
WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., MARK C. DILLON, LINDA CHRISTOPHER, PAUL WOOTEN, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Allan B. Weiss, J.), entered November 19, 2018. The order granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries that he allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident that occurred on April 21, 2016. The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the accident. The Supreme Court granted the defendants' motion, and the plaintiff appeals.
The defendants met their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the accident (see Toure v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 N.Y.2d 345, 746 N.Y.S.2d 865, 774 N.E.2d 1197 ; Gaddy v. Eyler, 79 N.Y.2d 955, 956–957, 582 N.Y.S.2d 990, 591 N.E.2d 1176 ). The defendants submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injury to the plaintiff's right knee did not constitute a serious injury under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Staff v. Yshua, 59 A.D.3d 614, 874 N.Y.S.2d 180 ). The defendants also demonstrated, prima facie, that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury under the 90/180–day category of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see John v. Linden, 124 A.D.3d 598, 599, 1 N.Y.S.3d 274 ; Marin v. Ieni, 108 A.D.3d 656, 657, 969 N.Y.S.2d 165 ; Richards v. Tyson, 64 A.D.3d 760, 761, 883 N.Y.S.2d 575 ). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Il Chung Lim v. Chrabaszcz, 95 A.D.3d 950, 951, 944 N.Y.S.2d 236 ; McLoud v. Reyes, 82 A.D.3d 848, 849, 919 N.Y.S.2d 32 ).
Accordingly, we agree with the Supreme Court's determination granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
MASTRO, J.P., DILLON, CHRISTOPHER and WOOTEN, JJ., concur.