Pursuant to CPLR 6513, "[a] notice of pendency shall be effective for a period of three years from the date of filing." While a notice of pendency " may be extended for additional three-year periods upon a showing of good cause," "[t]he extension ... must be requested prior to the expiration of the prior notice," and "[a] lapsed notice of pendency may not be revived" (Ampul Elec., Inc. v. Village of Port Chester, 96 A.D.3d 790, 791, 946 N.Y.S.2d 232 ; see Matter of Sakow, 97 N.Y.2d 436, 442, 741 N.Y.S.2d 175, 767 N.E.2d 666 ).

AMPUL ELECTRIC, INC., Appellant, v. VILLAGE OF PORT CHESTER, et al., Respondents.Reported below, 96 A.D.3d 790, 946 N.Y.S.2d 232. Motion for leave to appeal dismissed upon the ground that the order sought to be appealed from does not finally determine the action within the meaning of the Constitution.

Defendant argues that the statutory exception does not apply to a canceled notice of pendency. Assuming without deciding that this argument is correct, nothing in the record indicates that the notice of pendency in the BAC action was canceled as part of the order dismissing the complaint, or that the parties to that action moved for or stipulated to such a cancellation (see CPLR 6514 ; compare CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Lottridge, 143 A.D.3d 1093, 1093, 40 N.Y.S.3d 573 [2016] ; Ampul Elec., Inc. v. Village of Port Chester, 96 A.D.3d 790, 791, 946 N.Y.S.2d 232 [2012], lv. dismissed 19 N.Y.3d 1063, 955 N.Y.S.2d 540, 979 N.E.2d 799 [2012] ). Where, as here, a prior notice of pendency has expired, the governing statute allows the filing of a successive notice of pendency (see CPLR 6516[a] ; Sudit v. Labin, 148 A.D.3d 1077, 1078, 50 N.Y.S.3d 132 [2017] ).

The general rule is that the extension must be requested, and the extension order "filed, recorded and indexed," before expiration of the prior notice (CPLR 6513). " This is an exacting rule; a notice of pendency that has expired without extension is a nullity'" (Ampul Elec., Inc. v Village of Port Chester, 96 AD3d 790, 791, quoting Matter of Sakow, 97 NY2d 436, 442).

The failure to seek an extension of the notice of pendency prior to its expiration is fatal and precludes the extension of the notice (In re Sakow, 97 N.Y.2d 436, 439 [2002] ["Does CPLR 6513 permit a plaintiff to file a notice of pendency after a previously filed notice of pendency concerning the same causes of action or claims has expired without timely renewal? The statutory language of CPLR article 65, its legislative history and underlying policies all clearly indicate that the answer is no."]; Miller-Francis v Smith-Jackson, 113 A.D.3d 28, 37 [1st Dept 2013]; Ampul Elec., Inc. v Vil. of Port Chester, 96 A.D.3d 790, 791 [2d Dept 2012]). Good cause and a timely application are essential elements of any application seeking to extend a notice of pendency (Strong Is. Contr. Corp. v Padilla, 218 A.D.3d 820, 820 [2d Dept 2023] ["Here, the plaintiff timely requested and established good cause for extending the notice of pendency by demonstrating that the trial for the instant foreclosure action was delayed by the motion of the defendant's counsel to be relieved and the court closures due to the COVID-19 pandemic."]; SAI Contr. Corp. v 18 W. 16th St. Corp., 182 A.D.3d 438, 438 [1st Dept 2020] ["we find that good cause has been shown to extend the notice of pendency for an additional three years"]).

The general rule is that the extension must be requested, and the extension order "filed, recorded and indexed," before expiration of the prior notice (CPLR 6513; see also Sudit v Labin, 148 AD3d 1077, 1077 [2d Dept 2017]). "This is an exacting rule; a notice of pendency that has expired without extension is a nullity" (Ampul Elec., Inc. v Vil. of Port Chester, 96 AD3d 790, 791 [2d Dept 2012]).

Both parties agree that an extension of the notice of pendency must be executed prior to the expiration of the three year period and that "[a] lapsed notice of pendency may not be revived. Ampul Elec. Inc. V. Village of Port Chester , 96 AD3d 790, 791 (2d Dept. 2012). Alexander, Practice Commentaries, CPLR § 6513 at 512.

Here, the notice of pendency was filed on February 3, 2011 and no application was made to extend it. Therefore, the notice of pendency has expired and the branch of the cross-motion to cancel the notice of pendency is granted (see Ampul Elec. Inc v Village of Port Chester, 96 AD3d 790; Horowitz v Griggs, supra).

In view of the foregoing, plaintiff's motion to extend the duration of the First Notice of Pendency is DENIED. Defendants' cross-motion to vacate the First Notice of Pendency dated October 19, 2009 and filed in the Office of the Clerk of the County of Suffolk on October 22, 2009, and to vacate the Second Notice of Pendency dated September 4, 2012 and filed in the Office of the Clerk of the County of Suffolk on September 19, 2012, is GRANTEDto the extent that the First Notice of Pendency, which expired without extension, is hereby cancelled and deemed a nullity (see In re Sakow, 97 NY2d 436, supra; Ampul Elec., Inc. v Village of Port Chester, 96 AD3d 790 [2012]), and