American National Bank v. Richoz

11 Citing cases

  1. Comdisco Disaster Recovery v. Money Mgt.

    789 F. Supp. 48 (D. Mass. 1992)   Cited 6 times
    Applying Illinois law

    Leonard v. Autocar Sales Service Co., 392 Ill. 182, 187, 64 N.E.2d 477, 479 (1945). See also American National Bank v. Richoz, 189 Ill.App.3d 775, 136 Ill.Dec. 1026, 1029, 545 N.E.2d 550, 553 (1989); Mouhelis v. Thomas, 95 Ill.App.3d 181, 183, 50 Ill.Dec. 688, 419 N.E.2d 956 (1981). An exception to this general rule is the affirmative defense of impossibility, where "the continued existence of a particular person or thing is so necessary to the performance of a contract that, by law, it is implied as a condition of the contract that the death of that person or thing shall excuse performance."

  2. First Health Grp. Corp. v. Med. Mut. of Ohio

    1:22-cv-02090 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 11, 2024)

    Am. Nat'l Bank v. Richoz, 545 N.E.2d 550, 553 (Ill.App.Ct. 1989). Illinois courts apply a rigorous two-part test that requires a party to show: (1) the frustrating event was not reasonably foreseeable; and (2) the value of counter performance has been totally or nearly totally destroyed by the frustrating event.

  3. WEC 98C-3 LLC v. Saks Inc.

    20 C 4356 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 16, 2022)

    These are all affirmative defenses. See Am. Nat'l Bank v. Richoz, 545 N.E.2d 550, 552 (Ill.App.Ct. 1989) (referring to both frustration of purpose and impossibility as affirmative defenses); R & B Kapital Dev., LLC v. N. Shore Cmty. Bank & Tr. Co., 832 N.E.2d 246, 255 (Ill.App.Ct. 2005) (“Waiver [is an] affirmative defense[] and under Illinois law must be affirmatively pled or [it is] waived.”); Takiff Props. Grp. Ltd. #2 v. GTI Life, Inc., ¶ 23, 124 N.E.3d 11, 17 (Ill.App.Ct. 2018) (“[M]itigation concerns the measure of damages, not the legal right to recover damages.”); Danada Square, LLC v. KFC Nat'l Mgmt. Co., 913 N.E.2d 33, 43 (Ill.App.Ct. 2009) (holding that mitigation affects the measure of damages, not the right to recovery).

  4. Gherasim v. Cusniriuc

    2025 Ill. App. 232160 (Ill. App. Ct. 2025)

    The doctrine "should not be applied liberally." American National Bank v. Richoz, 189 Ill.App.3d 775, 780 (1989). ¶ 39 Initially, we note that defendants did not raise in the circuit court the argument that their performance is excused under the doctrine of frustration.

  5. Mufaddal Real Estate Fund, LLC v. Vara Sch. Prof'ls

    2024 Ill. App. 3d 220499 (Ill. App. Ct. 2024)   Cited 1 times

    . Courts do not apply these doctrines liberally, as" 'the purpose of contract law is to allocate the risks that might affect performance and that performance should be excused only in extreme circumstances.'" Id. at 6 (quoting Kel Kim Corp. v. Central Markets, Inc., 519 N.E.2d 295, 296 (N.Y. 1987)); see Rosenberger v. United Community Bancshares, Inc., 2017 IL App (1st) 161102, ¶ 24 (impossibility doctrine is "narrowly applied"); American National Bank v. Richoz, 189 Ill.App.3d 775, 780 (1989) (commercial frustration doctrine "should not be applied liberally"). ¶ 33 Common to both the commercial frustration and impossibility affirmative defenses is the requirement that the event underlying either defense not be foreseeable.

  6. 55 Jackson Acquisition, LLC v. Roti Rests.

    2022 Ill. App. 210138 (Ill. App. Ct. 2022)   Cited 3 times

    ¶ 56 The doctrine of commercial frustration is an affirmative defense to the enforcement of a contract but "should not be applied liberally." American National Bank v. Richoz, 189 Ill.App.3d 775, 780 (1989). The doctrine of frustration rests on the proposition that if, from the nature of the contract and the surrounding circumstances, the parties when entering into the contract must have known that it could not be performed unless some particular condition or circumstance would continue to exist, the parties must be deemed to have entered into the contract on the basis that the condition or circumstance would continue to exist, so that the contract is construed to be subject to an implied condition that the parties shall be excused if performance becomes impossible from such condition or circumstance ceasing to exist.

  7. Downs v. Rosenthal Collins Grp., L.L.C.

    2011 Ill. App. 90970 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012)   Cited 14 times
    Finding that where the parties included an integration clause in the employment agreement, such that it superseded any and all prior contracts, oral or written, and any changes to the agreements or waivers thereof had to be in writing, plaintiff's testimony regarding the negotiations of the terms of his employment was extrinsic evidence with no relevance

    Rather, as previously discussed, it was within plaintiff's power to ascertain the “book value” for his equity interest; plaintiff contributed to his failure to execute the note by not attempting to do so beyond merely mentioning on three occasions that he had an open obligation. See American National Bank in DeKalb v. Richoz, 189 Ill.App.3d 775, 779–80, 136 Ill.Dec. 1026, 545 N.E.2d 550 (1989) (although the defendants were prevented from selling the property on which they held four outstanding notes to the plaintiff because the plaintiff had changed the locks to the property, the doctrine of impossibility did not excuse the defendants from performing their obligation to repay the notes because the property was not an essential element to the parties' contract). This was not a situation where Collins prevented plaintiff from executing the requisite note or refused to accept a tendered note.

  8. Downs v. Rosenthal Collins Grp., L.L.C.

    2011 Ill. App. 90970 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011)

    Rather, as previously discussed, it was within plaintiff's power to ascertain the "book value" for his equity interest; plaintiff contributed to his failure to execute the note by not attempting to do so beyond merely mentioning on three occasions that he had an open obligation. See American National Bank in De Kalb v. Richoz, 189 Ill. App. 3d 775, 779-80, 545 N.E.2d 550 (1989) (although the defendants were prevented from selling the property on which they held four outstanding notes to the plaintiff because the plaintiff had changed the locks to the property, the doctrine of impossibility did not excuse the defendants from performing their obligation to repay the notes because the property was not an essential element to the parties' contract). This was not a situation where Collins prevented plaintiff from executing the requisite note or refused to accept a tendered note.

  9. Mt. Mansfield Ins. v. American Int'l Group

    865 N.E.2d 524 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007)   Cited 11 times
    Rejecting the argument that "merely coordinating information with counsel in an effort to protect Mount Mansfield's interests would establish privity."

    "To maintain a suit on behalf of a corporation, a shareholder must allege and prove an equitable basis for such intervention, and a shareholder is no more entitled to challenge a decision by the board of directors not to sue through a derivative action than to challenge any other board decision." American National Bank in Dekalb v. Richoz, 189 Ill. App. 3d 775, 782, 545 N.E.2d 550, 554-55 (1989). Thus, in the Aldworth action, MMIG, as the sole shareholder of Mount Mansfield, had no right to represent the interests of its subsidiary unless it was able to pursue a derivative action on its behalf.

  10. Illinois-American Water v. City of Peoria

    332 Ill. App. 3d 1098 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002)   Cited 36 times
    Rejecting impossibility defense where party failed to "show that performance, even if difficult, is impossible"

    Although the company asserts that the value of the city's performance under the agreement was destroyed by subsequent changes in the law, we have previously determined that the Public Utilities Act did not render the purchase option void. See American National Bank in De Kalb v. Richoz, 189 Ill. App. 3d 775, 545 N.E.2d 550 (1989) (finding that the doctrine of commercial frustration is not to be applied liberally). We also do not agree with the company's claim that the doctrine of impossibility of performance should apply.