Opinion
# 2014-041-038 Claim No. 122778 Motion No. M-84693 Cross-Motion No. CM-84846
06-26-2014
VINCENT AMATO v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK
VINCENT AMATO Pro Se HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN Attorney General of the State of New York By: Anthony Rotondi, Esq. Assistant Attorney General
Synopsis
Claimant's motion for summary judgment in wrongful confinement action based upon disciplinary determination which was annulled in claimant's Article 78 proceeding is denied where claimant fails to show, as a matter of law, that defendant's quasi-judicial hearing immunity is abrogated by defendant's violation of disciplinary hearing regulation; defendant's cross-motion to dismiss for failure of notice of intention to adequately state claim as required by Court of Claims Act 11 (b) is denied.
Case information
| UID: | 2014-041-038 |
| Claimant(s): | VINCENT AMATO |
| Claimant short name: | AMATO |
| Footnote (claimant name) : | |
| Defendant(s): | THE STATE OF NEW YORK |
| Footnote (defendant name) : | |
| Third-party claimant(s): | |
| Third-party defendant(s): | |
| Claim number(s): | 122778 |
| Motion number(s): | M-84693 |
| Cross-motion number(s): | CM-84846 |
| Judge: | FRANK P. MILANO |
| Claimant's attorney: | VINCENT AMATO Pro Se |
| Defendant's attorney: | HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN Attorney General of the State of New York By: Anthony Rotondi, Esq. Assistant Attorney General |
| Third-party defendant's attorney: | |
| Signature date: | June 26, 2014 |
| City: | Albany |
| Comments: | |
| Official citation: | |
| Appellate results: | |
| See also (multicaptioned case) |
Decision
Claimant, currently an inmate at Great Meadow Correctional Facility, moves pursuant to CPLR 3212 for summary judgment as to defendant's liability for wrongfully confining claimant at Clinton Correctional Facility (CCF) as a result of an inmate disciplinary proceeding. Defendant opposes the motion and cross-moves to dismiss the claim for lack of jurisdiction.
Claimant's affidavit supporting his summary judgment motion, and his claim, essentially allege that claimant was wrongfully confined to keeplock at CCF as a consequence of a guilty determination issued after a prison disciplinary hearing held on July 13 and 23, 2012. The disciplinary determination found claimant guilty of violating a facility disciplinary rule related to claimant having allegedly possessed alcohol. Claimant was sentenced to six (6) months keeplock, among other penalties. Claimant was released from keeplock on January 18, 2013.
At the disciplinary hearing, claimant requested that three fellow inmates testify in claimant's behalf but, without explanation in the record, two of the requested witnesses were not called to testify at the disciplinary hearing. One requested witness declined to testify.
The disciplinary determination was later annulled and expunged by an Albany County Supreme Court Decision and Order (Supreme Court Order), issued on February 15, 2013, in a CPLR Article 78 proceeding brought by claimant against defendant. Defendant did not appeal the Supreme Court Order.
According to the Supreme Court Order:
"The rules of the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision expressly provide that inmates have a conditional right to call witnesses at Tier III hearings . . .
And it is clear that 'a Hearing Officer's actual outright denial of a witness without a stated good faith reason, or lack of any effort to obtain a requested witness's testimony, constitutes a clear constitutional violation.' Matter of Benito v. Calero, 102 AD3d 78 [2d Dept. 2013] citing Matter of Alvarez v. Goord, 30 AD3d 118, 121 [3d Dept. 2006].
Although a Hearing Officer does not violate an inmate's due process rights by precluding testimony that is redundant or irrelevant or that which jeopardizes institutional safety, here the Hearing Officer could not have known whether the proposed witnesses' testimony would have been irrelevant, redundant or jeopardizing to institutional safety. The record neither contains a request by the Hearing Officer for an explanation as to why these witnesses' testimony would be relevant, nor required findings or documentation that witnesses refused to testify or that there was any reason for denying the testimony. See, 7 NYCRR 254.5 (a) . . .
Further, the record contains no indication the that the Hearing Officer ever interviewed the witnesses . . . ."
Claimant served a notice of intention to file a claim on March 26, 2013 and filed his claim on May 28, 2013.
The standard for review of the motion is well-established. "A motion for summary judgment should be entertained only after the moving party has established, by competent admissible evidence, that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. . . . If the movant meets this initial burden, the opposing party is required to submit evidence which raises a material issue of fact to preclude an award of summary judgment" (Ware v Baxter Health Care Corp., 25 AD3d 863, 864 [3d Dept 2006]).
Once the moving party has satisfied this obligation, the burden shifts and the party opposing the motion must demonstrate by admissible evidence the existence of a factual issue (Svoboda v Our Lady of Lourdes Mem. Hosp., Inc., 31 AD3d 877 [3d Dept 2006]).
Summary judgment is "a drastic remedy" (Lebanon Vall. Landscaping v Town of Moriah, 258 AD2d 732, 733 [3d Dept 1999]). It "is the procedural equivalent of a trial . . . and should be granted only when it has been established that there is no triable issue of material fact" (Harris v State of New York, 187 Misc 2d 512, 517 [Ct Cl 2001]; see Paulin v Needham, 28 AD3d 531 [2d Dept 2006]).
To establish that he was wrongfully confined, claimant must prove that "(1) the defendant intended to confine him, (2) the [claimant] was conscious of the confinement, (3) the [claimant] did not consent to the confinement and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged" (Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d 451, 456 [1975], cert denied sub nom. Schanbarger v Kellogg, 423 US 929 [1975]; Krzyzak v Schaefer, 52 AD3d 979 [3d Dept 2008]).
With respect to whether a confinement is privileged, Holmberg v County of Albany (291 AD2d 610, 612 [3d Dept 2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 604 [2002]), instructs that: "Generally, where a facially valid order issued by a court with proper jurisdiction directs confinement, that confinement is privileged . . . and everyone connected with the matter is protected from liability for false imprisonment."
In the context of confinement pursuant to a prison disciplinary proceeding, such confinement is "privileged to the extent that it was under color of law or regulation, specifically in accordance with [inmate misbehavior] regulations" (Gittens v State of New York, 132 Misc 2d 399, 402 [Ct Cl 1986]).
The Court finds that claimant has met his initial burden to present a prima facie case of wrongful confinement based upon the defendant's demonstrated failure to follow its own rules and regulations in conducting the disciplinary hearing to allow claimant to call non-cumulative or non-redundant witnesses on his behalf.
In opposition to claimant's motion, defendant argues that claimant "has made no attempt to establish he was not guilty of the charges. Claimant has offered no evidence as to what the inmate witnesses would have said or how that testimony would have altered the outcome of the hearing."
Defendant relies upon the quasi-judicial governmental immunity defense set forth in its answer.
That defense provides that where employees of the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, in commencing and conducting formal inmate disciplinary proceedings, "act under the authority of and in full compliance with the governing statutes and regulations . . . their actions constitute discretionary conduct of a quasi-judicial nature for which the State has absolute immunity" (Arteaga v State of New York, 72 NY2d 212, 214 [1988]; Varela v State of New York, 283 AD2d 841 [3d Dept 2001]). This immunity attaches even if the conviction is later reversed administratively or as the result of a successful CPLR Article 78 proceeding (see Arteaga, 72 NY2d at 215).
If, however, prison officials fail to comply with a rule or regulation governing such disciplinary hearings, absolute immunity may be lost and liability for money damages may be imposed if it is proven that the regulatory violation caused actual prejudice or injury to the inmate (see Davidson v State of New York, 66 AD3d 1089, 1089 [3d Dept 2009]; Vasquez v State of New York, 10 AD3d 825 [3d Dept 2004]).
Importantly, not all disciplinary hearing procedural rules and regulations, if violated, form a basis to abrogate the immunity afforded to employees of the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision in commencing and conducting formal inmate disciplinary proceedings. The rule or regulation must implicate minimal due process protections:
"Notably, there is no right to counsel or to confrontation at prison disciplinary hearings. . . Nevertheless, an inmate is entitled to advance written notice of the charges against him; a hearing affording him a reasonable opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence; a fair and impartial hearing officer; and a written statement of the disposition, including the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary actions taken" (Sira v Morton, 380 F3d 57, 69 [2d Cir 2004]).
Here, the regulation violated by defendant (failing to produce witnesses requested by claimant) implicated minimal due process protections but claimant's motion papers fail to prove, as a matter of law, that the failure to produce the requested witnesses caused actual prejudice or injury to claimant at the disciplinary hearing.
Accordingly, the Court finds that while defendant violated the minimal due process requirement to provide a fair disciplinary hearing, claimant has failed to demonstrate, as a matter of law, that he was wrongfully confined and entitled to money damages by reason of the defendant's violation.
Claimant's motion for summary judgment is denied.
Defendant's cross-motion to dismiss the claim is also denied.
Defendant argues that claimant's notice of intention failed to adequately state the time and place where the claim arose and failed to adequately state the nature of the claim (Court of Claims Act 11 [b]). Defendant argues that the notice of intention thus failed to extend claimant's time to serve and file the claim and the claim is therefore untimely (see Court of Claims Act 10 [3] and [3-b]).
The standard of review in assessing whether a claim or notice of intention to file a claim complies with section 11 (b) as to adequately stating the nature of the claim is well settled:
"What is required is not absolute exactness, but simply a statement made with sufficient definiteness to enable the State to be able to investigate the claim promptly and to ascertain its liability under the circumstances. The statement must be specific enough so as not to mislead, deceive or prejudice the rights of the State. In short, substantial compliance with section 11 is what is required . . . . Conclusory or general allegations of negligence that fail to adduce the manner in which the claimant was injured and how the State was negligent do not meet its requirements" (Heisler v State of State of New York, 78 AD2d 767, 768 [4th Dept 1980]; see Cendales v State of New York, 2 AD3d 1165, 1167 [3d Dept 2003]; Sega v State of New York, 246 AD2d 753, 755 [3d Dept 1998], lv denied 92 NY2d 805 [1998]).
The Court has carefully reviewed the notice of intention to file a claim and finds that claimant substantially complied with the substantive pleading requirements of section 11 (b) of the Court of Claims Act.
In particular, the notice of intention states, among other things, that the claimant was confined as a result of a "Superintendent's Hearing on July 23, 2012" at Clinton Correctional Facility and that claimant "filed an Article 78 proceeding to challenge the determination of the Tier III disciplinary hearing. The petition was granted by the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Albany County (Richard Mott, J.S.C.) on February 8, 2013, thereby annulling the determination of July 23, 2012."
The Court finds that the notice of intention was sufficiently definite to enable the defendant to investigate the claim promptly and to ascertain its liability under the circumstances. The facts alleged were specific enough so as not to mislead, deceive or prejudice the rights of the defendant.
The claimant's purported failure to state an accrual date is not dispositive. Section 11 (b) requires that the claim state when "the claim arose." Accrual of a claim for wrongful confinement is a legal issue determined by relevant case law (Santiago v City of Rochester, 19 AD3d 1061, 1062 [4th Dept 2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 710 [2005]) and stating an "accrual date" (as opposed to alleging facts as to when the "claim arose") is not expressly required by section 11 (b).
Claimant's motion for summary judgment is denied.
Defendant's cross-motion to dismiss the claim is denied.
June 26, 2014
Albany, New York
FRANK P. MILANO
Judge of the Court of Claims
Papers Considered:
1. Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment, filed February 26, 2014;
2. Affidavit of Vincent Amato, sworn to February 13, 2014, and annexed exhibits;
3. Notice of Cross-Motion, filed March 26, 2014;
4. Affirmation of Anthony Rotondi, dated March 25, 2014, and annexed exhibits;
5. Reply Affirmation of Vincent Amato, affirmed under penalty of perjury on March 27, 2014.