Opinion
Case Number: 15-24687-CIV-MARTINEZ-GOODMAN
08-31-2016
Julio AMAT, and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. REY PIZZA CORP., d/b/a Rey's Pizza, a Florida profit corporation, and Arch Resources Group, LLC, a foreign limited liability company, Defendants.
Carmen Maria Rodriguez, Law Offices of Carmen Rodriguez, P.A., Miami, FL, for Plaintiff. Rene J. Gonzalez-Llorens, Shutts & Bowen LLP, Ana Maria Barton, Edward Maurice Mullins, Astigarraga Davis Mullins & Grossman, Miami, FL, Michael E. Chase, Boutin Jones, Inc., Sacramento, CA, for Defendants.
Carmen Maria Rodriguez, Law Offices of Carmen Rodriguez, P.A., Miami, FL, for Plaintiff.
Rene J. Gonzalez-Llorens, Shutts & Bowen LLP, Ana Maria Barton, Edward Maurice Mullins, Astigarraga Davis Mullins & Grossman, Miami, FL, Michael E. Chase, Boutin Jones, Inc., Sacramento, CA, for Defendants.
ORDER ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE GOODMAN'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
JOSE E. MARTINEZ, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
THE MATTER was referred to the Honorable Jonathan Goodman, United States Magistrate Judge, for a Report and Recommendation on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint and Compel Arbitration (the "Motion") [ECF Nos. 53, 57]. Magistrate Judge Goodman filed a Report and Recommendation [ECF No. 64], recommending that this Court grant the Motion, compel arbitration, and dismiss the case. The Court has reviewed the entire file and record and has made a de novo review of the issues that the objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation present [ECF No. 67]. The Court has also reviewed Defendants' corresponding response to the objections [ECF Nos. 69, 70]. After careful consideration, it is hereby:
ADJUDGED that United States Magistrate Judge Goodman's Report and Recommendation [ECF No. 64] is AFFIRMED and ADOPTED .
Accordingly, it is ADJUDGED that:
1. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint and Compel Arbitration [ECF Nos. 53, 57] is GRANTED .
2. Plaintiff's claims shall be submitted to arbitration as required by the Arbitration Agreement, dated December 10, 2014, and signed by Plaintiff, Julio Amat.
3. This Court retains jurisdiction to enforce the arbitral award, if appropriate.
4. All pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT . This case is CLOSED .
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this 31 day of August, 2016.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS THE AMENDED COMPLAINT AND MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION
Jonathan Goodman, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Defendant Rey Pizza Corp. filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint and Motion to Compel Arbitration ("Motion"). [ECF No. 53]. Defendant Arch Resources Group, LLC filed a Notice of Joinder to Defendant Rey Pizza's Motion. [ECF No. 57]. Plaintiff Julio Amat filed a response in opposition. [ECF No. 60]. Defendant Rey Pizza filed a reply [ECF No. 61], and Defendant Arch Resources filed a Notice of Joinder to Defendant Rey Pizza's reply [ECF No. 62].
United States District Judge Jose E. Martinez referred the Motion to the Undersigned. [ECF No. 58]. For the reasons outlined below, the Undersigned respectfully recommends that the District Court grant the Motion, compel arbitration, and dismiss the case.
Background
Plaintiff filed, as a proposed collective action, a complaint alleging one claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") for overtime wage violations. [ECF No. 1]. Defendant then filed a motion to compel arbitration and stay the case. [ECF No. 21].
While the Motion was pending, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint [ECF No. 43], and Judge Martinez granted the motion [ECF No. 49]. In the amended complaint, Plaintiff again alleged an overtime wage violations claim and added a claim for retaliation against Defendants, jointly and severally. [ECF No. 42].
Because the complaint was replaced by the amended complaint, the Undersigned denied as moot Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings. [ECF No. 55].
Rey Pizza filed the instant Motion, requesting that the Court direct Plaintiff to arbitrate the claims raised in his amended complaint and either dismiss or stay all proceedings in this matter. Rey Pizza asserts that Plaintiff signed an arbitration provision, as part of his employee application package, which requires him to arbitrate all employment-related claims against Defendants. It alleges that the provision's language is clear and unambiguous. Rey Pizza attached the arbitration agreement to the Motion.
Plaintiff's response contends that the arbitration agreement is "a fraud and a sham" because the agreement only binds Arch and not Rey Pizza; requires Plaintiff to appear in Florida's capital or largest city while Arch can appear by telephone; and provides, in violation of the FLSA, that Arch cannot be required to pay more than minimum wage to Plaintiff.
Additionally, Plaintiff contends that a genuine dispute exists over the making of the arbitration agreement and whether it is enforceable because Mr. Colagrande (the chief operating officer) and Mr. Gutierrez (legal counsel) do not have personal knowledge as to whether Plaintiff was given an opportunity to review and consider the agreement; includes illegal provisions; the second page, which contains the arbitration provision, is in English although business is conducted in Spanish and the first page of the agreement is in Spanish; the arbitration provision is "buried in the middle of the second page," and it is ambiguous and misleading.
In its reply, Rey Pizza refutes each of Plaintiff's arguments and reasserts its position that the Court should compel arbitration in this case.
Magistrate Judge Jurisdiction
By federal statute, magistrate judges may not issue an order deciding or determining a motion dismiss. Instead, a magistrate judge is authorized to issue a report and recommendations. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B). The jurisdictional statute does not expressly mention whether orders compelling arbitration are dispositive of a claim or defense before the court (thereby precluding a magistrate judge from entering an order, and thus requiring a report and recommendations).
Here, Rey Pizza entitled its filing as a "Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint and Motion to Compel Arbitration." [ECF No. 53 (emphasis added) ]. Although partially labeled a motion to dismiss, the motion predominately seeks to compel arbitration and to either stay or dismiss the claims so that the parties can arbitrate them first.
Concerning the request to compel arbitration, two circuit courts—the First and the Third—have ruled that motions to compel arbitration are not case-dispositive motions, which means a magistrate judge has the authority to issue a final order compelling arbitration without the parties' consent. See, e.g., Next Step Med. Co., Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson Int'l, 619 F.3d 67, 69 n. 2 (1st Cir.2010) (citing Power S hare, Inc. v. Syntel, Inc., 597 F.3d 10, 14 (1st Cir.2010) ("In this circuit, motions to compel arbitration are non-dispositive motions."); Virgin Islands Water & Power Auth. v. Gen. Elec. Int'l, Inc., 561 Fed.Appx. 131, 133–34 (3d Cir.2014) ("We agree with the First Circuit. A ruling on a motion to compel arbitration does not dispose of the case, or any claim or defense found therein.").
Although circuit courts have found that motions to compel arbitration are non-dispositive, the Eleventh Circuit has still not ruled on this issue. Therefore, in an abundance of caution, particularly because I am recommending that the District Court simultaneously dismiss the case, I am adopting the prudent procedural approach and entering a report and recommendations (instead of an order). See Wilder v. Midland Management Credit, 1:09–CV–2039, 2010 WL 2499701, *1 n. 1 (N.D.Ga. May 20, 2010) ("given the split of opinion between the courts that have addressed the issue, and without direction from the Eleventh Circuit, the undersigned concludes that caution is required before expanding magistrate judge jurisdiction absent a clear(er) mandate.").
Applicable Legal Principles and Analysis
Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") to "declare ‘a national policy favoring arbitration of claims that parties contract to settle in that manner.’ " Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 58, 129 S.Ct. 1262, 173 L.Ed.2d 206 (2009) (quoting Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 353, 128 S.Ct. 978, 169 L.Ed.2d 917 (2008) ); CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 132 S.Ct. 665, 669, 181 L.Ed.2d 586 (2012) (internal citation and quotation omitted) (noting that the Federal Arbitration Act reflects a "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration."). The Supreme Court has interpreted this to mean that courts must "rigorously enforce" arbitration agreements. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219, 105 S.Ct. 1238, 84 L.Ed.2d 158 (1985). "By its terms, the [FAA] leaves no room for the exercise of discretion by a district court, but instead mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been signed." Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 470 U.S. at 213, 105 S.Ct. 1238 (emphasis in original).
Section 4 of the FAA provides that a party aggrieved by the failure of another to arbitrate may file a motion to compel arbitration with a district court. See 9 U.S.C. § 4 ; Vaden, 556 U.S. at 62, 129 S.Ct. 1262. Additionally, the FAA requires courts to stay proceedings if the parties have agreed to arbitrate an issue underlying the district court proceeding. 9 U.S.C. § 3 ("If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court ... shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with terms of the agreement[.]")
Defendants have filed such a motion here, seeking arbitration of the claims and a dismissal or stay of Plaintiffs' lawsuit. Plaintiff opposes the motion and contends that the arbitration agreement is a "sham" and that a genuine dispute exists as to how the agreement was made and whether it is enforceable.
A determination of whether parties have agreed to submit a dispute to arbitration is an issue of law subject to judicial resolution, rather than resolution via arbitration. See Granite Rock Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 296, 130 S.Ct. 2847, 177 L.Ed.2d 567 (2010). Under the FAA, an arbitration agreement is "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2.
"In determining whether a binding agreement arose between the parties, courts apply the contract law of the particular state that governs the formation of contracts." Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1368 (11th Cir.2005). Here, Florida state law contract principles govern the enforceability of this arbitration agreement."Under Florida law, ‘in order to invalidate an arbitration clause, the court must find that it is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable.’ " Curbelo v. Autonation Ben. Co., No. 14–CIV–62736, 2015 WL 667655, at *3 (S.D.Fla. Feb. 17, 2015) (quoting Lyalls v. Kauff's, Inc., 2007 WL 2320590, at *1 (S.D.Fla. Aug. 10, 2007) ); Golden v. Mobil Oil Corp., 882 F.2d 490, 493 (11th Cir.1989) ; Murphy v. Courtesy Ford LLC, 944 So.2d 1131, 1134 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006).
Procedural unconscionability " ‘relates to the manner in which the contract was entered and it involves consideration of such issues as the relative bargaining power of the parties and their ability to know and understand the disputed contract terms.’ " Voice S tream Wireless Corp. v. U.S. Commc'ns, Inc., 912 So.2d 34, 39 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (quoting Powertel Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So.2d 570, 574 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) ).
A contract is substantively unconscionable if its terms "are so ‘outrageously unfair’ as to ‘shock the judicial conscience.’ " Voicestream Wireless, 912 So.2d at 40 (quoting Gainesville Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Weston, 857 So.2d 278, 285 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) ). In determining whether an arbitration clause is substantively unconscionable, courts have considered the cost of arbitration and whether the clause requires one party to give up or waive any significant legal remedies. Sims v. Clarendon Nat. Ins. Co., 336 F.Supp.2d 1311, 1321 (S.D.Fla.2004).
In relevant part, the arbitration agreement at issue provides:
The organization for which you perform services (Company) has contracted for ARCH Resources Group to provide services under which you will be paid through ARCH Resources Group for work you perform for and under the direction of Company[.] ... Any dispute involving ARCH Resources Group, Company, or any benefit plan, insurer, employee, officer, or director of Arch Resources Group or Company (all of which are Beneficiaries of these Acknowledgments) arising from or relating to my employment, application for employment, or termination from employment will be resolved exclusively through binding arbitration before a neutral arbitrator in the capital or largest city of the state in which I work or another mutually agreed location (ARCH Resources Group may appear by phone).
[ECF No. 53-1, p. 6].
Plaintiff first contends that the arbitration agreement is a fraud and a sham because it does not bind or require Rey Pizza to appear or participate in arbitration. However, Rey Pizza is identified on the first page of the agreement, it is the "Company" referred to throughout the second page of the agreement, and one of its representatives signed the first page of the agreement. [ECF No. 53-1, pp. 5-6].
Even if Rey Pizza were a non-signatory to the agreement, it would still be entitled to compel Plaintiff to arbitrate in accordance with the agreement as a beneficiary. The Eleventh Circuit recognizes that non-signatories can be bound to arbitrate under several theories arising from the common law principles of contract and agency law. See Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Bright Metal Specialt ie s, 251 F.3d 1316, 1323 (11th Cir.2001). These theories include incorporation by reference, assumption, agency, veil-piercing/alter ego, estoppel, and third-party beneficiary. See id. ; MS Dealer Service Corp. v. Franklin, 177 F.3d 942, 947 (11th Cir.1999) (abrogated on other grounds). Cf. Continental Cas. Co. v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 417 F.3d 727, 735 (7th Cir.2005) (holding non-signatory could enforce arbitration under third-party beneficiary theory). See also Regent Seven Seas Cruises, Inc. v. Rolls Royce, PLC, Nos. 06–22347–CIV, 2007 WL 601992, *7 (S.D.Fla. Feb. 21, 2007) (citing the Seventh Circuit case, Continental Cas. Co., 417 F.3d at 735 ) (also stating that "this Court recognized three exceptions that allow nonsignatories to a contract to compel arbitration: (1) equitable estoppel; (2) a sufficiently close relationship between the signatory and nonsignatory defendants; and (3) third-party beneficiary status."); NRP Group, Inc. v. Hydropress, LLC, No. 06–60593–CIV–MORENO, 2007 WL 201259 (S.D.Fla. Jan. 24, 2007) (relying on Seventh Circuit case, Continental Cas. Co., 417 F.3d at 735, to support conclusion that a non-signatory could enforce arbitration under third-party beneficiary theory); Bolamos v. Globe Airport Security Servs., Inc., No. 02–21005–CIV–MORENO, 2002 WL 1839210, *2 (S.D.Fla. May 21, 2002) (finding non-signatory defendant could enforce arbitration provision under agency theory).
In addition, Florida state courts have also used a third-party beneficiary theory to include non-signatories in the ambit of an arbitration provision. See, e.g., Raffa Associates, Inc. v. Boca Raton Resort & Club, 616 So.2d 1096, 1097 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) ("ordinarily a third-party beneficiary of a contract is bound by an arbitration clause in that contract"); Zac Smith & Co. v. Moonspinner Condominium Ass'n, 472 So.2d 1324, 1325 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (finding that an arbitration clause is binding on a third-party beneficiary). Accordingly, the Undersigned finds that Rey Pizza may also enforce the agreement under a third-party beneficiary theory.
As a separate challenge, Plaintiff contends that the arbitration agreement is wholly unconscionable because the terms unreasonably favor another party. As an example, Plaintiff contends that he is required to incur additional arbitration expenses by having to travel to northern Florida (because the agreement provides that he must appear before an arbitrator in the capital of or largest city in Florida, while Arch can appear telephonically). Although the arbitration provides that the arbitration may take place in the capital—which would be in northern Florida as the capital is Tallahassee—Plaintiff fails to consider that Miami is the largest city in Florida, which is in the southern portion of the state and where Plaintiff worked. Moreover, the agreement also provides "another mutually agreed location" as an additional alternative.
Defendants have unequivocally agreed that any arbitration will occur in Miami-Dade County. [ECF Nos. 61, p. 2; 62, p. 1].
Plaintiff further argues that Arch's ability to appear by telephone is another example of how the agreement is favorable to the other party. However, the arbitration agreement does not preclude Plaintiff from appearing telephonically. It merely preemptively allows Arch to appear telephonically. Moreover, Defendants have unequivocally represented that Plaintiff may also participate in an arbitration by telephone if he wishes. [ECF Nos. 61, p. 2; 62, p. 1].
Additionally, Florida law does not require reciprocal mutual obligation to validate an arbitration provision and "instead considers mutuality of obligation to be met if each side gives some consideration." Smith v. Beverly Hills Club Apartments, LLC , No. 1:15–cv–23450–KMM, 2016 WL 344975, *8 (S.D.Fla. Jan. 28, 2016). "Courts, including the Supreme Court of the United States, have held that employment applications ... have sufficient consideration to constitute binding contracts. Id. (citing E . E . O . C . v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279, 282–83, 122 S.Ct. 754, 151 L.Ed.2d 755 (2002) ).
Next, Plaintiff challenges the arbitration agreement's enforceability by focusing on the contractual limitation of his recovery to minimum wage, which he contends is an FLSA violation which means it therefore contains unlawful provisions. He relies on Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., for the proposition that the presence of the unlawful provision renders their entire agreement unenforceable. 134 F.3d 1054, 1058 (11th Cir.1998) ("the presence of an unlawful provision in an arbitration agreement may serve to taint the entire arbitration agreement, rendering the agreement completely enforceable, not just subject to judicial reformation.").
However, Plaintiff fails to consider the severability of any unlawful provision. Under Florida law, "[a]s a general rule, contractual provisions are severable, where the illegal portion of the contract does not go to its essence, and, with the illegal portion eliminated, there remain valid legal obligations." Fonte v. AT & T Wireless Servs., Inc., 903 So.2d 1019, 1024 (2015). The Eleventh Circuit has held that invalid clauses which limit remedies in arbitration agreements may be severed. Anders v. Hometown Mortgage Servs., Inc. , 346 F.3d 1024 (11th Cir.2003). Moreover, the arbitrator, not the Court, should decide the appropriateness of the arbitration agreement's limitation provision. Id.
Notably, a significant difference between Paladino and this case (as was similarly highlighted in Anders ) is that the invalid remedial restrictions in Paladino were not severable from the remainder of the arbitration agreement. "[T]he arbitration agreement [here, like in Anders ,] contains a severability provision that evidences the parties' intention to enforce the remainder of the agreement in the event any portion of it is deemed invalid." Id. at 1031. Here, the agreement clearly provides that "[i]f any part is unenforceable, the rest will still be enforceable."
Plaintiff also contends that there is a genuine dispute over the making of the agreement and its enforceability because Mr. Colagrande's and Mr. Gutierrez' supporting declarations do not show personal knowledge as to whether Plaintiff had an opportunity to review and consider the agreement. The declarations state that "pursuant to the business records" Plaintiff was given the arbitration agreement to review and consider as a condition of his employment.
Ultimately, Plaintiff does not dispute that he was in fact provided with the opportunity to review and consider the arbitration agreement and signed it. Instead, he merely attempts to highlight the declarants' lack of personal knowledge. If Plaintiff wanted to effectively pursue the theory that Defendants denied him the opportunity to review and consider the arbitration agreement, then he needed to submit a declaration, affidavit, or other evidence supporting his assertion. See Herrera Cedeno v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC, 154 F.Supp.3d 1318, 1323–24 (S.D.Fla.2016) ("The party opposing a motion to compel arbitration or to stay litigation pending arbitration has the affirmative duty of coming forward by way of affidavit or allegation of fact to show cause why the court should not compel arbitration."). Plaintiff has not submitted any declaration, affidavit, or other evidence to support the possible allegation that he was unable to review and consider the arbitration agreement.
Of course, the Undersigned does not even know if Plaintiff intended to assert that fact-based attack because he has not actually alleged that he was denied the chance to review the agreement before signing it.
Further, this Court has found that an employee's failure to review and consider an arbitration agreement does not invalidate the provision or make it procedurally unconscionable. See Smith, 2016 WL 344975, at *8 (citing Pendergast v. Sprin t Nextel Corp., 592 F.3d 1119, 1135 (11th Cir.2010) ).
In another attempt to invalidate the arbitration agreement, Plaintiff asserts that the arbitration agreement is questionable because the second page is in English and Plaintiff conducts business with Rey Pizza in Spanish. Additionally, he highlights that, even though the second page is in English, the first page of the agreement is entirely in Spanish. Plaintiff states that it is unclear why Defendants would provide Plaintiff with an English version when business is conducted in Spanish and a Spanish version of the agreement exists. However, the agreement being partially in English is inconsequential, as Plaintiff never asserts that he cannot speak or read English.
Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that the arbitration provision is "buried in the middle of the second page" and that the "first sentence of the [arbitration provision] is ambiguous and misleading where it vaguely states that the agreement will not apply ‘if arbitration agreements are forbidden by law’ and gives an example." However, Plaintiff has not sufficiently demonstrated that the terms are ambiguous. See Herrera Cedeno, 154 F.Supp.3d at 1326 ("Plaintiff provides no support for this argument other than blanket allegations that these terms are ambiguous. ‘[I]t is a fundamental tenet of contract law that a phrase in a contract is ‘ambiguous' only when it is of uncertain meaning, and may be fairly understood in more ways than one.’ "). Accordingly, because Plaintiff has failed to prove otherwise, the Undersigned finds that this provision is not ambiguous.
In sum, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the Court should not enforce the arbitration agreement. As such, the Undersigned respectfully recommends that the District Court grant the motion and compel the parties to arbitrate the claims raised in the amended complaint.
Request to stay or dismiss the case
Defendants request that the Court either stay or dismiss the case. Courts in this district have taken both approaches. Compare Olsher Metals Corp. v. Olsher, No. 01–3212–CIV–JORDAN, 2003 WL 25600635, at *9 (S.D.Fla. Mar. 26, 2003) (dismissing arbitrable claims) with Albert v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 874 F.Supp. 1328 (S.D.Fla.1994) (staying arbitrable claims).
The FAA provides, in pertinent part, that a court compelling arbitration "shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement." 9 U.S.C. § 3 (emphasis added). There is no statutory reference to dismissal.
The Eleventh Circuit, at one point, suggested that only a stay of litigation is appropriate. See Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698 (11th Cir.1992) (reversing dismissal of arbitrable claims, remanding with instructions to enter stay, and stating that "[u]pon finding that a claim is subject to an arbitration agreement, the court should order that the action be stayed pending arbitration"). However, more recently, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed dismissal when all claims were subject to arbitration. Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 333 F.Supp.2d 1367 (N.D.Ga.2004) (compelling arbitration and dismissing the case), aff'd 428 F.3d 1359 (11th Cir.2005). Other circuit courts have reached the same result. See, e.g., Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc. v. BSR Tropicana Resort, Inc., 252 F.3d 707, 709–10 (4th Cir.2001) (dicta); Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch., Inc., 133 F.3d 141, 156 n. 21 (1st Cir.1998) ; Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 975 F.2d 1161, 1164 (5th Cir.1992).
Here, the Undersigned respectfully recommends that the District Court dismiss Plaintiff's claims. This case is similar to those where an action was dismissed in favor of arbitration because all of the issues raised in the district court were arbitrable. See Perera v. H & R Block E. Enters., Inc., 914 F.Supp.2d 1284, 1290 (S.D.Fla.2012) ("The weight of authority clearly supports dismissal of the case when all of the issues raised in the district court must be submitted to arbitration.").
Conclusion
The Undersigned respectfully recommends that the District Court grant Defendants' motion, compel arbitration, and dismiss the case.
OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Magistrate Rule 4(b), the Parties have 14 days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendations to serve and file written objections, if any, with the District Court. Each Party may file a response to the other Party's objection within 14 days of the objection. Failure to file timely objections shall bar the Parties from a de novo determination by the District Court of an issue covered in this Report and Recommendations and bar the Parties from attacking on appeal the factual findings contained herein. LoConte v. Dugger, 847 F.2d 745, 749–50 (11th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 958, 109 S.Ct. 397, 102 L.Ed.2d 386 (1988).
RESPECTFULLY RECOMMENDED in Chambers, in Miami, Florida, on July 6, 2016.