Opinion
1:20-CV-00306 EAW
2021-06-28
AMANDA P., Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
Brandi Christine Smith, Kenneth R. Hiller, Law Offices of Kenneth Hiller, PPLC, Amherst, NY, for Plaintiff. Gabriel Deadwyler, Social Security Administration Office of General Counsel, New York, NY, for Defendant.
Brandi Christine Smith, Kenneth R. Hiller, Law Offices of Kenneth Hiller, PPLC, Amherst, NY, for Plaintiff.
Gabriel Deadwyler, Social Security Administration Office of General Counsel, New York, NY, for Defendant.
DECISION AND ORDER
ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD, United States District Judge
INTRODUCTION
Represented by counsel, Plaintiff Amanda P. ("Plaintiff") brings this action pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act (the "Act"), seeking review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner," or "Defendant") denying her application for disability insurance benefits ("DIB"). (Dkt. 1). This Court has jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Presently before the Court are the parties’ cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Dkt. 11; Dkt. 12), and Plaintiff's reply (Dkt. 13). For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff's motion (Dkt. 11) is granted in part, the Commissioner's motion (Dkt. 12) is denied, and the case is remanded for further administrative proceedings.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff protectively filed her application for DIB on March 22, 2016. (Dkt. 10 at 16, 68). In her application, Plaintiff alleged disability beginning March 22, 2016, due to multiple sclerosis, migraines, anxiety, and depression. (Id. at 16, 58-59). Plaintiff's application was initially denied on June 27, 2016. (Id. at 16, 69-74). A video hearing was held before administrative law judge ("ALJ") Timothy Belford in on October 30, 2018. (Id. at 16, 30-57). Plaintiff appeared in Buffalo, New York, and the ALJ presided over the hearing from Lawrence, Massachusetts. (Id. ). On December 19, 2018, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. (Id. at 16-25). Plaintiff requested Appeals Council review; her request was denied on January 13, 2020, making the ALJ's determination the Commissioner's final decision. (Id. at 4-6). This action followed.
When referencing the page number(s) of docket citations in this Decision and Order, the Court will cite to the CM/ECF-generated page numbers that appear in the upper righthand corner of each document.
LEGAL STANDARD
I. District Court Review
"In reviewing a final decision of the [Social Security Administration ("SSA")], this Court is limited to determining whether the SSA's conclusions were supported by substantial evidence in the record and were based on a correct legal standard." Talavera v. Astrue , 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Act holds that a decision by the Commissioner is "conclusive" if it is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). "Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Moran v. Astrue , 569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). It is not the Court's function to "determine de novo whether [the claimant] is disabled." Schaal v. Apfel , 134 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted); see also Wagner v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs. , 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that review of the Secretary's decision is not de novo and that the Secretary's findings are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence). However, "[t]he deferential standard of review for substantial evidence does not apply to the Commissioner's conclusions of law." Byam v. Barnhart , 336 F.3d 172, 179 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Townley v. Heckler , 748 F.2d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 1984) ).
II. Disability Determination
An ALJ follows a five-step sequential evaluation to determine whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Act. See Bowen v. City of New York , 476 U.S. 467, 470-71, 106 S.Ct. 2022, 90 L.Ed.2d 462 (1986). At step one, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful work activity. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step two and determines whether the claimant has an impairment, or combination of impairments, that is "severe" within the meaning of the Act, in that it imposes significant restrictions on the claimant's ability to perform basic work activities. Id. § 404.1520(c). If the claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the analysis concludes with a finding of "not disabled." If the claimant does have at least one severe impairment, the ALJ continues to step three.
At step three, the ALJ examines whether a claimant's impairment meets or medically equals the criteria of a listed impairment in Appendix 1 of Subpart P of Regulation No. 4 (the "Listings"). Id. § 404.1520(d). If the impairment meets or medically equals the criteria of a Listing and meets the durational requirement (id. § 404.1509), the claimant is disabled. If not, the ALJ determines the claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC"), which is the ability to perform physical or mental work activities on a sustained basis, notwithstanding limitations for the collective impairments. See id. § 404.1520(e).
The ALJ then proceeds to step four and determines whether the claimant's RFC permits the claimant to perform the requirements of his or her past relevant work. Id. § 404.1520(f). If the claimant can perform such requirements, then he or she is not disabled. If he or she cannot, the analysis proceeds to the fifth and final step, wherein the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant is not disabled. Id. § 404.1520(g). To do so, the Commissioner must present evidence to demonstrate that the claimant "retains a residual functional capacity to perform alternative substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy" in light of the claimant's age, education, and work experience. Rosa v. Callahan , 168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c).
DISCUSSION
I. The ALJ's Decision
In determining whether Plaintiff was disabled, the ALJ applied the five-step sequential evaluation set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. Initially, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff last met the insured status requirements of the Act on March 31, 2021. (Dkt. 10 at 18). At step one, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful work activity since March 22, 2016, the alleged onset date. (Id. ).
At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from the severe impairments of: multiple sclerosis ("MS"); migraines; fibromyalgia ("FMS"); and depression. (Id. ). The ALJ further found that Plaintiff's medically determinable impairments of obstructive sleep apnea and obesity were non-severe. (Id. at 19).
At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of any Listing. (Id. ). The ALJ particularly considered the criteria of Listings 11.09 and 12.04 in reaching his conclusion. (Id. at 19-20).
Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a), except:
she can only occasionally climb ladders, ramps and stairs, and is limited to simple routine tasks.
(Id. at 20). At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work. (Id. at 23).
At step five, the ALJ relied on the testimony of a vocational expert ("VE") to conclude that, considering Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC, there were jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform, including the representative occupations of table worker, touch-up screener, and laminator. (Id. at 24-25). Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled as defined in the Act. (Id. at 25).
II. Remand of This Matter for Further Proceedings is Necessary
Plaintiff asks the Court to reverse or, in the alternative, remand this matter to the Commissioner, arguing that (1) the ALJ failed to develop the record to obtain additional mental health records, and (2) the physical RFC is not supported by substantial evidence. (Dkt. 11-1 at 1, 11-23). For the reasons explained below, the Court finds that although the physical RFC is supported by substantial evidence, the ALJ erred in his duty to develop the record to obtain Plaintiff's mental health records, and therefore the mental RFC is not supported by substantial evidence. This error requires remand for further administrative proceedings.
A. The Physical RFC
Plaintiff argues that the physical RFC is not supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff specifically takes issue with the ALJ's failure to explain why he did not adopt limitations related to Plaintiff's migraines and relied on his own lay opinion. (Id. at 16). In response, the Commissioner contends that the physical RFC, which requires Plaintiff to perform sedentary work with occasional climbing of ladders, ramps, and stairs, is properly based on the record as a whole. (Dkt. 12-1 at 13).
In deciding a disability claim, an ALJ is tasked with "weigh[ing] all of the evidence available to make an RFC finding that [is] consistent with the record as a whole." Matta v. Astrue , 508 F. App'x 53, 56 (2d Cir. 2013). An ALJ's conclusion need not "perfectly correspond with any of the opinions of medical sources cited in his decision." Id. However, an ALJ is not a medical professional, and "is not qualified to assess a claimant's RFC on the basis of bare medical findings." Ortiz v. Colvin , 298 F. Supp. 3d 581, 586 (W.D.N.Y. 2018) (quotation omitted). In other words:
An ALJ is prohibited from ‘playing doctor’ in the sense that ‘an ALJ may not substitute his own judgment for competent medical opinion.... This rule is most often employed in the context of the RFC determination when the claimant argues either that the RFC is not supported by substantial evidence or that the ALJ has erred by failing to develop the record with a medical opinion on the RFC.
Quinto v. Berryhill , No. 3:17-cv-00024 (JCH), 2017 WL 6017931 at *12, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20030 (D. Conn. Dec. 1, 2017) (citations omitted). "[A]s a result[,] an ALJ's determination of RFC without a medical advisor's assessment is not supported by substantial evidence." Dennis v. Colvin , 195 F. Supp. 3d 469, 474 (W.D.N.Y. 2016) (quotation and citation omitted).
The physical RFC requires that Plaintiff perform sedentary work , except that she only occasionally climb ladders, ramps, and stairs. For Plaintiff's physical impairments, the ALJ explained that he "accounted for [Plaintiff's] subjective reports in combination with the objective evidence by limiting her to less than the full range of sedentary work, subject to the additional postural and environmental restrictions." (Id. at 22).
"Sedentary work involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools. Although a sedentary job is defined as one which involves sitting, a certain amount of walking and standing is often necessary in carrying out job duties. Jobs are sedentary if walking and standing are required occasionally and other sedentary criteria are met." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a).
The Court has reviewed the evidence in the record and the written determination and concludes that the physical RFC is supported by substantial evidence, and it is clear to the Court how the ALJ concluded that the limitations included in the RFC were necessary, considering Plaintiff's objective and subjective limitations. For example, the ALJ referenced both Plaintiff's difficulty standing for long periods of time due to back pain as supporting an RFC for sedentary work, which requires only occasional walking and standing. (Id. at 21). Further, Plaintiff's report that she experienced loss of balance and falls that occur every one-to-three months is accommodated by the additional postural and environmental restrictions in the RFC, which limit her ability to climb ladders, ramps, and stairs. (Id. ). The ALJ also cited to specific medical examinations in the record as supporting an RFC for sedentary work with additional limitations, explaining that Plaintiff's physical examinations during the alleged period were mostly normal, but that she had some abnormal examination findings, including moderate decreased sensation of the bilateral lower extremities and a cautious or narrow-based gait. (Id. ). Again, these impairments are accounted for by the physical RFC, which limits Plaintiff to sedentary work.
Plaintiff raises a laundry list of issues relating to the physical limitations contained in RFC, none of which have any merit. For example, Plaintiff points to the ALJ's assessment of the opinion offered by John Schwab, D.O.—which the ALJ gave "partial weight" because he found Plaintiff more limited than Dr. Schwab—arguing that the ALJ "did not explain why he did not adopt any migraine-related limitations." (Dkt. 11-1 at 18). Plaintiff mischaracterizes the record. Dr. Schwab, a neurologist, examined Plaintiff and found that she "[s]hould avoid any activity that triggers a migraine, otherwise no restrictions based on the findings of today's examination." (Dkt. 10 at 200). In other words, Dr. Schwab found that Plaintiff had almost no physical limitations. The ALJ gave Dr. Schwab's opinion "partial weight" because he found that it did not fully account for Plaintiff's overall functioning, including that she experienced difficulty standing and walking for extended periods of time due to pain and fatigue (id. at 23) which, as explained above, are accounted for in the RFC. Notably, Dr. Schwab did not identify any specific activity that Plaintiff should not perform to avoid triggering a migraine, and Plaintiff does not identify any specific activity the ALJ should have limited Plaintiff to performing to account for this limitation.
In the written determination, the ALJ explained that Plaintiff experienced migraine headaches lasting between seven to ten days, which worsened with loud noises and bright lights, but that her cranial examinations were generally benign, and that Plaintiff had reported "significant improvement in her migraines with increased medication and cessation of daily NSAIDS, which providers concluded caused rebound headaches." (Id. at 22; see also id. at 311 (at appointment on February 6, 2017, noting that Plaintiff's headaches had improved since taking a higher dose of Topamax and decreasing Aleve intake); id. at 305 (at appointment on March 21, 2017, noting that "she feels her headaches are significantly improved after increasing Topamax and stopping daily Aleve use"); id. at 288 (at appointment on June 15, 2017, noting that "her headaches are much improved," and that she "completely stopped Topamax about a month ago and feels she is still well controlled with headaches")). At the administrative hearing in October 2018, neither Plaintiff, nor her mother, discussed or identified any specific limitations caused by migraine headaches. In other words, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any functional limitations caused by migraine headaches that preclude any substantial gainful activity. House v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , No. 7:15-CV-1064 (LEK), 2016 WL 4275732, at *10 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2016) ("It is the burden of the claimant ... to establish the facts necessary to include limitations within an RFC."); see also Bonet ex rel. T.B. v. Colvin , 523 F. App'x 58, 59 (2d Cir. 2013) ("whether there is substantial evidence supporting the appellant's view is not the question here; rather, we must decide whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision "); Danielle S. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , No. 1:20-cv-1013-DB, 2021 WL 2227913, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. June 2, 2021) ("While Plaintiff may disagree with the ALJ's RFC finding, Plaintiff has not shown that no reasonable factfinder could have reached the ALJ's conclusions based on the evidence in the record.").
Plaintiff also contends that because the ALJ did not adopt the entirety of Dr. Schwab's opinion, he created an evidentiary gap in the record because there were no other medical opinions assessing Plaintiff's physical functional limitations. (Dkt. 11-1 at 19). However, it is well-settled that the RFC need not "perfectly correspond" with any one medical opinion. Matta , 508 F. App'x at 56. Simply because the ALJ found that Dr. Schwab's opinion was entitled to "partial weight" does not create a gap in the record and, as explained above, the physical RFC for sedentary work is supported by other evidence in the record. Accordingly, the physical RFC is supported by substantial evidence and, on the record presently before the Court, Plaintiff is not entitled to remand on this basis.
B. Duty to Develop the Record
The Court reaches a different conclusion as to the mental RFC and the ALJ's failure to develop the record to obtain mental health records. In response to Plaintiff's argument that the ALJ failed in his duty to develop the record, the Commissioner contends that the ALJ had sufficient evidence to determine disability, and Plaintiff's contention that there is an "obvious gap" in the record is unsupported by the evidence. (Dkt. 12-1 at 5). In this instance, the Court disagrees.
"Because a hearing on disability benefits is a non-adversarial proceeding, the ALJ generally has an affirmative obligation to develop the administrative record." Perez v. Chater , 77 F.3d 41, 47 (2d Cir. 1996). Specifically, the ALJ must "investigate and develop the facts and develop the arguments both for and against the granting of benefits." Vincent v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , 651 F.3d 299, 305 (2d Cir. 2011). "The ALJ must ‘make every reasonable effort’ to help the claimant get medical reports from his or her medical sources as long as the claimant has permitted the ALJ to do so." Sotososa v. Colvin , No. 15-CV-854-FPG, 2016 WL 6517788, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2016) (quoting Pratts v. Chater , 94 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 1996) ). "The ALJ's duty to develop the record applies to both pro se and represented parties[.]." Lopez v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , No. 17-CV-1504(KAM), 2018 WL 5634929, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2018). However, the ALJ's duty to develop the record is not limitless. "[W]here there are no obvious gaps in the administrative record, and where the ALJ already possesses a complete medical history, the ALJ is under no obligation to seek additional information...." Rosa v. Callahan , 168 F.3d 72, 79 n.5 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
At the administrative hearing, the ALJ discussed the administrative record with Plaintiff, who was proceeding pro se. (Dkt. 10 at 33-34). Plaintiff testified that she had reviewed a CD with exhibit listings and represented that she did not have any concerns, questions, or objections to anything on the list, other than to make sure that the ALJ had received her most current UBMD neurology records up until August 2018. (Id. 34-35). Plaintiff's mother also confirmed that she had reviewed the exhibit list, and noted only a hospitalization from August 2016 when Plaintiff fell off her bike and sustained a concussion and a more recent hospitalization for a pulmonary embolism for which Plaintiff took baby aspirin, which were not included on the exhibit list. (Id. at 54-56). Both Plaintiff and her mother confirmed that Dr. Kolb, Plaintiff's treating neurologist, was the doctor most knowledgeable about Plaintiff's condition. (Id. at 44, 53). Accordingly, the record reflects that the ALJ did take steps at the administrative hearing to develop the record. Craig v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , 218 F. Supp. 3d 249, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (duty to develop record includes "the duty to question the claimant adequately about any subjective complaints and the impact of the claimant's impairments on the claimant's functional capacity" (citation omitted)); see also Vay v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , 382 F. Supp. 3d 267, 273 (W.D.N.Y. 2018) (ALJ took steps to develop record where ALJ asked plaintiff's mother at administrative hearing to supply him with any additional evidence, which she submitted following the hearing).
However, the ALJ's duty to develop the record does not apply only at the administrative hearing. In addition, the ALJ is required to "develop a claimant's complete medical history," including by "obtain[ing] a claimant's medical records and reports[.]" Craig , 218 F. Supp. 3d at 261 (citations omitted); see also Cruz v. Sullivan , 912 F.2d 8, 11 (2d Cir. 1990) ("The ALJ has a duty to adequately protect a pro se claimant's rights by ensuring that all of the relevant facts are sufficiently developed and considered." (quotation, citation, and alteration omitted)); Jones v. Apfel , 66 F. Supp. 2d 518, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (remand required where ALJ failed to obtain medical report from plaintiff's treating physician). Here, Plaintiff cites to medical records she contends should have prompted the ALJ to request additional mental health records, including records indicating that: she began attending counseling on August 1, 2016 at Lakeshore Behavioral Health; she saw a psychiatrist, Dr. Fazikas; she had a history of suicidal ideation and self-mutilating behaviors ; and she completed neuropsychological testing, which showed cognitive dysfunction secondary to MS, and that she was recommended to be placed on disability due to those results. (See Dkt. 11-1 at 13).
The Court has reviewed these records and finds that they should have prompted the ALJ to further develop the record as it relates to Plaintiff's mental health. (See, e.g. , Dkt. 10 at 311) (in treatment note dated February 6, 2017, Dr. Kolb noting that Plaintiff "had complete neuropsych testing done which did show cognitive dysfunction secondary to MS," and that "[s]he was also recommended to be placed on disability based on these results"); see also id. at 324 (on October 31, 2016, Dr. Kolb noting that Plaintiff "sees a psychologist and a psychiatrist," and that Dr. Fazikas at Lakeshore was her psychiatrist); id. at 318 (on December 19, 2016, Dr. Kolb noting that Plaintiff has a history of suicidal ideation and was seen at "CPEP" in the past, and that she sees a psychiatrist and a counselor at Lakeshore). Despite the clear indication that Plaintiff was receiving mental health treatment, none of those records are in the administrative record. The Court is particularly troubled by the ALJ's failure to obtain the records relating to Plaintiff's "neuropsych testing" which, according to Dr. Kolb, resulted in Plaintiff's being recommended to be placed on disability. Further, these records directly undermine the ALJ's assessment of Plaintiff's mental limitations, wherein he found that "[n]otably, aside from medication, there is no indication from the record of dedicated mental health treatment." (Id. at 22).
While the Court recognizes that an ALJ is not necessarily required to obtain all of a plaintiff's medical records in making a disability determination, see Janes v. Berryhill , 710 F. App'x 33, 34 (2d Cir. 2018) (rejecting plaintiff's claim that the ALJ failed to develop the record, which was missing medical records from the Veteran's Administration for the ten months preceding the ALJ's decision, because the record before the ALJ was adequate for the ALJ to make a determination as to disability), in this case, the Court finds that it was necessary for the ALJ to obtain any additional records relevant to Plaintiff's mental functioning. First, the ALJ has a "heightened" duty to develop the record when a claimant is proceeding pro se. Morris v. Berryhill , 721 F. App'x 25, 27 (2d Cir. 2018) ("[w]hen a disability benefits claimant appears pro se , the ALJ must ensur[e] that all of the relevant facts are sufficiently developed and considered" (quotations and citation omitted) (second alteration in original)). Second, the medical record in this case not voluminous, totaling only 149 pages (see Dkt. 10 at 186-335). Despite Plaintiff's severe mental impairments, the record contains very little information relating to her mental functioning, such as treatment notes or psychological testing. In other words, the Court cannot say that there are no "obvious gaps" in the record and that the ALJ possessed a complete medical history and therefore was not required to seek additional information. Rosa , 168 F.3d at 79 n.5 ; see also Martinez v. Saul , No. 3:19-cv-01017-TOF, 2020 WL 6440950, at *7 (D. Conn. Nov. 3, 2020) (where administrative record was "not ‘extensive’ or ‘voluminous,’ " totaled only 485 pages, with only 123 of those being medical records, concluding that "[w]hat there is of the record reveals that there were several ‘obvious gaps’ in the medical records that the ALJ had an obligation to fill"). Finally, Plaintiff's missing records are relevant to her mental impairments, and "[t]he duty to develop the record is particularly important where an applicant alleges [s]he is suffering from a mental illness, due to the difficulty in determining whether these individuals will be able to adapt to the demands or stress of the workplace." Merriman v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 14 Civ. 3510 (PGG/HBP), 2015 WL 5472934, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2015) (quotations, citation, and alteration omitted).
Defendant argues that the RFC is supported by the opinion offered by Gina Zali, Psy.D., the consultative examiner, who found that Plaintiff "evidenced no limitations in the ability to follow and understand simple directions and instructions, perform simple tasks independently, and maintain attention and concentration," and had only a moderate limitation for maintaining a regular schedule and a mild limitation for learning new tasks, as a result of "fatigue secondary to MS." (Dkt. 10 at 196). The Court agrees that the RFC is consistent with Dr. Zali's opinion. However, Dr. Zali rendered her opinion in May 2016, when Plaintiff had no outpatient treatment history and before medical records indicated that she was receiving dedicated mental health treatment. (See Dkt. 10 at 194). Indeed, the ALJ gave Dr. Zali's opinion "great weight" in part because there was "no indication that [Plaintiff's] condition substantially worsened or that a new condition developed that would substantially alter the pertinent findings" (id. at 23) when, as explained above, the medical record does suggest that Plaintiff's mental health worsened following Dr. Zali's evaluation. Accordingly, under the circumstances of this case, Dr. Zali's opinion cannot serve as substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's assessment of the mental RFC.
In sum, considering Plaintiff's pro se status and given that significant mental health treatment records appear to be missing from the administrative record, the Court concludes that remand is required for further development of the medical record. On remand, the ALJ should work to obtain a complete medical history for Plaintiff, particularly with regard to any mental health treatment records, including by obtaining the records for the treatment referenced by Dr. Kolb.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. 11) is granted to the extent that the matter is remanded for further administrative proceedings, and Commissioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. 12) is denied.
SO ORDERED.