Lillbask, 397 F.3d at 88 n. 3. Rather, “[t]he Court in such cases conducts an ‘independent judicial review,’ ” A.M. ex rel. Y.N. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 964 F.Supp.2d 270, 277 (S.D.N.Y.2013) (quoting Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 129 (2d Cir.1998)), and “base[s] [its] decision[ ] on ‘the preponderance of the evidence,’ ” Grim, 346 F.3d at 380 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B)).

As the Second Circuit has stated, “[t]he sufficiency of goals and strategies in an IEP is precisely the type of issue upon which the IDEA requires deference to the expertise of the administrative officers.” Grim, 346 F.3d at 382; A.M. ex rel. Y.N. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 964 F.Supp.2d 270, 284 (S.D.N.Y.2013). Here, deference is particularly apt where the IHO and SRO decisions are in agreement and are based on the same record as that before the district court.

See R.E., 694 F.3d at 188.See A.M. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 964 F.Supp.2d 270, 286 (S.D.N.Y.2013). Cf. M.S. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., No. 13 Civ. 3719, 2013 WL 6028817, at *4 n. 8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2013).

In deciding a motion for summary judgment in an IDEA case, the court conducts an "independent judicial review" and bases its decision on a preponderance of the evidence. A.M. ex rel. Y.N. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 964 F. Supp. 2d 270, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).

The SRO is also limited to deciding on the claims in the due process complaint. See A.M. ex rel. Y.N. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 964 F. Supp. 2d 270, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); B.P. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 841 F. Supp. 2d 605, 611 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) ("The scope of the inquiry of the IHO, and therefore the SRO . . . is limited to matters either raised in the Plaintiff's impartial hearing request or agreed to by Defendant."). After the SRO issues a decision, the IDEA permits either party to challenge the decision in state or federal court.

Tr. 7-11.See A.M. ex rel. Y.N. v. N. Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 964 F. Supp. 2d 270, 280 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (rejecting argument that a special education teacher did not qualify as district representative when he had "extensive special education experience as a teacher, as a mentor to other teachers, and as a supervisor and district representative for his CSE region"); A.D. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 12 CIV. 2673 (RA), 2013 WL 1155570, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2013) (finding special education teacher qualified as district representative to CSE where there was no evidence that she lacked relevant knowledge of district programs and resources); A.S. ex rel. Mr. S. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 10-CV-9 (ARR) (RML), 2011 WL 12882793, at *11-12 (E.D.N.Y. May 26, 2011) (finding district adequately represented by employees even though district employee testified "I haven't seen [a 6:1:1 site] in a long time" and holding that any potential procedural violation due to the lack of a qualified representative did not impede the parents' opportunity to participate because the mother voiced her concerns

CompareM.O. , 996 F.Supp.2d at 271 (“Plaintiffs argue that the IEP was inadequate due to a variety of defects, most of which were not specifically raised before the state hearing officers and thus are not appropriate for review at this stage.” (internal citations omitted)); andA.M. ex rel. Y.N. v. N.Y. City Dep't of Educ. , 964 F.Supp.2d 270, 282–83 (S.D.N.Y.2013) (holding that a failure to include a challenge to the appropriateness of a recommendation in a due process complaint normally precludes consideration of the claim by the IHO and SRO, as well as the court reviewing those decisions); andB.M. v. N.Y. City Dep't of Educ. , No. 12–cv–3247(JMF), 2013 WL 1972144, at *7 n. 2 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2013) (“The fact that a court may consider new evidence , however, does not mean that it may consider a new argument or claim .” (emphasis in original)), aff'd, 569 Fed.Appx. 57 (2d Cir.2014) ; andB.P. v. N.Y. City Dep't of Educ. , 841 F.Supp.2d 605, 611 (E.D.N.Y.2012) (“The scope of the inquiry of the IHO, and therefore the SRO and this Court, is limited to matters either raised in the Plaintiffs' impartial hearing request or agreed to by Defendant.”) withM.P.G. ex rel. J.P. v. N.Y. City Dep't of Educ. , No. 08–cv–8051(TPG), 2010 WL 3398256, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2010) (“[T]here is arguably no reason that issues not raised in IDEA administrative proc

Nor did the Defendant open the door to Plaintiffs' belated claim for the 2012–13 school year. SeeB.M. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 569 Fed.Appx. 57, 59 (2d Cir.2014) (summary order); A.M. ex rel. Y.N. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 964 F.Supp.2d 270, 283 (S.D.N.Y.2013) ; Scott ex rel.C.S. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 6 F.Supp.3d 424, 438–39 (S.D.N.Y.2014) ; J.C.S. v. Blind Brook–Rye Union Free School Dist., 2013 WL 3975942, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2013). As noted supra p. 679-80 n. 9, it was Plaintiffs who raised the subject of 2012–13 missed sessions during their cross examination of the Defendant's witness, Amanda Altieri, and during their direct examination of Plaintiffs' own witness, Kim Talmor.

Compare M.O., 996 F. Supp. 2d at 271 ("Plaintiffs argue that the IEP was inadequate due to a variety of defects, most of which were not specifically raised before the state hearing officers and thus are not appropriate for review at this stage." (internal citations omitted)); and A.M. ex rel. Y.N. v. N.Y. City Dep't of Educ., 964 F. Supp. 2d 270, 282-83 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding that a failure to include a challenge to the appropriateness of a recommendation in a due process complaint normally precludes consideration of the claim by the IHO and SRO, as well as the court reviewing those decisions); and B.M. v. N.Y. City Dep't of Educ., No. 12-cv-3247 (JMF), 2013 WL 1972144, at *7 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2013) ("The fact that a court may consider new evidence, however, does not mean that it may consider a new argument or claim." (emphasis in original)), aff'd, 569 F. App'x 57 (2d Cir. 2014); and B.P. v. N.Y. City Dep't of Educ., 841 F. Supp. 2d 605, 611 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) ("The scope of the inquiry of the IHO, and therefore the SRO and this Court, is limited to matters either raised in the Plaintiffs' impartial hearing request or agreed to by Defendant.") with M.P.G. ex rel. J.P. v. N.Y. City Dep't of Educ., No. 08-cv-8051(TPG), 2010 WL 3398256, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2010) ("there is arguably no reason that issues not raised in IDEA administrative procee

A professional disagreement is not an IDEA violation. Id.; see also A.M. ex rel. Y.N. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 964 F. Supp. 2d 270, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) ("[A]ll that is required is a parent's participation, not that the parent have the final word.").