Opinion
No. 95-0662
October 23, 1995
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs, American Canoe Association and three of its Massachusetts members, challenge the constitutionality of a regulation promulgated and enforced by defendant Metropolitan District Commission (MDC). The plaintiffs allege that the regulation, which prohibits the use of paddle boats, but allows other boats on over half of the Quabbin Reservoir, violates federal and state equal protection clauses. The plaintiffs seek injunctive and declaratory relief pursuant to G.L.c. 231A, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Massachusetts Equal Protection Act, G.L.c. 93, § 102. The defendant, David Balfour, as Commissioner of the MDC, moves to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For the reasons stated below, the defendant's motion to dismiss is ALLOWED.
BACKGROUND
The American Canoe Association is a national, ten thousand member, nonprofit association which protects and furthers the interest of its members in recreational canoeing and kayaking. It has approximately 220 members in Massachusetts, including the three individual plaintiffs, David Miller, Clarence Burley, and Lawrence Childs.
The Quabbin Reservoir, a 17.9 mile long public water supply, is part of the Quabbin Watershed, which is located in the counties of Worcester, Franklin, and Hampshire. The Quabbin Reservoir supplies water to parts of Western Massachusetts and forty communities of the Metropolitan Boston area. Over 70,000 people visit the Quabbin Reservoir per year.
The MDC regulates the uses of the Quabbin Reservoir. Because it is a public water supply, a significant goal of the MDC is to ensure the reservoir's water quality. Other goals include the conservation of its wilderness character, maintenance of the natural ecological balance, and provision of appropriate recreational facilities.
In 1988, the MDC issued the "Quabbin and Ware River Watersheds Recreation and Public Access Policy and Plan" (the Plan). The Plan mandates that criteria for determining allowable recreation and public access to the Quabbin Reservoir include consideration of the potential impact of the proposed activity on water quality and the manner in which the proposed activity comports with the agency's resource management and recreation management priorities. In 1992, the MDC issued a second plan, which noted that the use of petroleum-fueled motor boats on the reservoir needed to be evaluated.
The MDC promulgated 350 CMR 11.00, which regulates the Quabbin River. The regulation prohibits all paddle boats, such as canoes and kayaks, from all but two small ponds comprising 1% of the reservoir and allows fishing, by means of outboard-powered boats and oar-powered boats, in over half the reservoir during daylight hours from mid-April to mid-October.
350 CMR 11.09(2)(b) entitled "Special Regulations for Quabbin Reservoir" provides in part:
1. A valid state fishing or sporting license is required by any Person renting or launching a boat at any Commission facilities subject to 350 CMR 11.09. . .
3. Only boats of a minimum length of twelve feet, and of a type considered safe by the Commission representative in charge, shall be used. No inboard motors, . . . pontoon boats, square sterned canoes, or other similar craft will be permitted in the water, and no boats will be permittd in the water except in areas designated for boating by the Commission or its designee. . . . Canoes and jon boats of a minimum length of 12 feet, and of a type considered safe by the Commission representative in charge, shall be used and only in areas designated for boating by the Commission on Pottapaug Pond above the regulating dam and at Gate 31 above the regulating dam. Canoes less than 16 feet and jon boats less than 14 feet six inches in length will be limited to two occupants, and canoes and jon boats in excess thereof may be licensed to carry three occupants. All boats must be in compliance with current Commonwealth Boating Laws. . . . Commission personnel shall have the right to inspect all private boats launched at Commonwealth facilities and have the right to inspect all private boats launched at Commonwealth facilities and may deny access in order to protect water quality or the safety of occupants.
The plaintiffs allege that, in issuing the 1988 and 1992 plans, the defendants failed to allow canoeing or kayaking while permitting other recreational boating. That failure, plaintiffs maintain, resulted in the promulgation of discriminatory rules. Plaintiffs further argue that the exclusion of paddled boats from areas the reservoir where other boats are permitted is unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious and a violation of the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 10 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution. In their complaint against the Commissioner of the MDC, plaintiffs seek relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act, M.G.L.c. 231A (Count I); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count II); and the Massachusetts Equal Rights Act, M.G.L.c. 93, § 102 (Count III). They also seek preliminary and final injunctive relief (Count IV).
The defendant moves to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which the requested relief can be granted.
DISCUSSION
When evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint pursuant to a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint and must draw, in the plaintiff's favor, any reasonable inferences from those allegations. Eyal v. Helen Broadcasting Corp., 411 Mass. 426, 429 (1991), and cases cited. A complaint is not subject to dismissal unless it could support relief under no theory of law. Whitinsville Plaza v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 89 (1979). The court should not dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of its claim which would entitle it to relief. Nader v. Citron, 372 Mass. 96, 98 (1977), quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
A. The Applicable Standard of Review
The plaintiffs, in their response to defendant's request for dismissal, argue that the regulation excluding paddled boats from areas of the reservoir in which other boats are permitted violates federal and state equal protection guarantees, and is arbitrary and capricious. The plaintiffs base this claim on the MDC's failure to consider kayaks and canoes in formulating its policy and in promulgating regulations excluding canoeing and kayaking on those portions of the reservoir where other boats are allowed. Thus, in opposing defendant's motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs attempt to recast their complaint for the purpose of generating a more exacting level of judicial review of the regulations than that commonly employed by courts engaged in equal protection review of administrative regulations. Plaintiffs ask that a "substantial evidence" standard be used to measure the instant regulation in lieu of the traditional "rational relation" litmus.
The plaintiffs are off the mark. They rely upon Personal Watercraft Industry Assn. v. Dept. of Commerce, U.S. D.C. (D.C.), #93-1381 SSH, (1993) for the proposition that the MDC may not arbitrarily distinguish between similar boating activities on the reservoir without a reasoned basis for such distinctions in the administrative record. In Personal Watercraft Industry Assn., the district court allowed the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment challenging a regulation which distinguished between certain classes of boats without justification in the administrative record. In that case, the plaintiff's attacked the regulation as arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). The standard of review for challenges under that statute is whether the agency articulated a rational connection between its factual judgment and its ultimate policy choice, and whether the underlying factual judgments are supported by substantial evidence.
In reversing the district court's judgment in Personal Watercraft Industry Assn., the U.S. Court of Appeals held that the regulation in question was not arbitrary and capricious, and noted "Regulations . . . are not arbitrary just because they fail to regulate everything that could be thought to pose any sort of problem. . . This is a common principle, well known not only in administrative law cases but also in constitutional cases raising equal protection challenges to economic regulations." Personal Watercraft Industry Assn. v. Dept. of Commerce, 48 F.3d 540 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
In contrast, the plaintiffs in the case at bar proceed not under the Administrative Procedure Act, but under the federal and state equal protection clauses, neither of which require that the agency articulate its reasons for drawing distinctions or that the underlying factual judgments of the agency be supported by substantial evidence. Moreover, the plaintiffs will not be heard to claim entitlement to a less deferential standard of review merely by characterizing the challenged regulation as an administrative decision, one to be reviewed under the standards of G.L.c. 30A, § 14. This court will, accordingly, apply the "rational relation" standard common to equal protection analyses and will eschew the "substantial evidence" administrative procedure measuring stick urged upon it by plaintiffs.
The standard of review for equal protection analysis of regulations is the same under the Massachusetts Constitution as under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. MacInnes v. Comm'r of Public Welfare, 412 Mass. 790, 798 (1992), quoting Dickerson v. Attorney General, 396 Mass. 740, 743 (1986). Where, as here, the challenged regulation involves neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class, the regulation will be upheld if it is rationally related to the furtherance of a legitimate state interest. Commonwealth v. B. W. Transportation Inc., 388 Mass. 799, 803 (1983).
Although the plaintiffs claim that there are women and minorities among the Massachusetts members of the American Canoe Association, neither the three individual plaintiffs nor the Association as a whole can be considered a suspect class.
In sum, the MDC regulation at issue can be found violative of federal and Massachusetts equal protection rights only if it is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Cohen v. Board of Water Commissioners, 411 Mass. 744, 752-753 (1992); MacInnes, 412 Mass. at 798. Under that standard of review, the plaintiffs cannot prevail unless they show that there are no conceivable grounds to support the rationality of the regulation. See Zeller v. Cantu, 395 Mass. 76, 84-85 (1985). So long as any basis of fact can reasonably be envisioned as demonstrating that the regulatory distinction made has a fair and rational relationship to the object sought to be accomplished, the legislative classification is not violative of equal protection principles. Aronson v. Commonwealth, 401 Mass. 244, 456 (1987). Although the plaintiffs may introduce evidence in support of their claim that the classification is irrational, they will not prevail if the question of the classification is at least debatable in view of the evidence before the judge. Id. at 803-804. The weight of the evidence is for the agency, not the courts, to determine. Id. at 803.
B. Application of the Standard of Review
It is not within the court's province to determine whether the regulation is wise or effective. Klein, 386 Mass. at 707. Only invidious discrimination, a wholly arbitrary act, will succumb to an equal protection challenge. Klein v. Catalano, 386 Mass. 701, 717 (1982). Rough accomodations which result in some dissimilarity of treatment are permissible unless the classifications are arbitrary or irrational. B. W. Transportation Inc., 388 Mass. at 803. Legislative classifications need not be perfect in order to survive a challenge on equal protection grounds. Commonwealth v. Petralia, 372 Mass. 452, 458 (1977).
The instant plaintiffs cannot show that the challenged regulation is not rationally related to the legitimate government interests of controlling pollution and ensuring safety in the Quabbin Reservoir as well as preserving the MDC's resources. Whether or not this court agrees with the distinctions between paddled boats and fishing boats with respect to an imbalance in the risk of pollution or the diminution of safety and resources, the discrimination cannot be said to lack a nexus to a governmental goal. It is conceivable and at least debatable that the presence of paddled boats increases the likelihood of water pollution from human contact and that that there are greater safety risks involved with rescuing paddled boats. Consequently, their presence might use more MDC resources if they were permitted in those areas of the reservoir open to fishing boats.
This court is persuaded that the regulation excluding paddled boats from parts of the reservoir in which fishing boats are allowed is, irrefutably, rationally related to the legitimate state interests of preventing pollution and protecting the water supply. Applying the highly deferential standard of review of regulations in actions brought under the federal and state equal protection clauses, the court concludes that the plaintiffs can prove no set of facts which would entitle them to relief. Therefore, even if the allegations raised in plaintiffs' complaint are taken as true, the plaintiff is unable to show that no conceivable grounds exist to support the regulation's rationality.
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that the defendant's motion to dismiss be ALLOWED.
Daniel F. Toomey Justice of the Superior Court
Dated: October, 1995