The Washingtons' argument does find a foothold, however, in the Nevada cases opining that a motion for reconsideration, even though timely seeking substantive alteration of a judgment, may not qualify as an NRCP 59(e) tolling motion. Compare Able Electric, Inc. v. Kaufman, 104 Nev. 29, 31-32, 752 P.2d 218, 220 (1988) ("We are not persuaded by [respondent's] attempt to convert [appellant's] motion to alter or amend into a non-tolling motion for rehearing"; oddly basing this determination on the fact that "[t]he district court did not consider any new evidence in arriving at its decision to deny [appellant's] motion to alter or amend"), with Alvis v. State, Gaming Control Bd., 99 Nev. 184, 186 n. 1, 660 P.2d 980, 981 n. 1 (1983) ("A review of the [post-judgment] motion . . . reveals that [appellant] merely sought reconsideration of the district court's earlier order dismissing the petition for judicial review. It cannot reasonably be construed as a motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to NRCP 59(e).");see Nardozzi v. Clark Co. School Dist., 108 Nev. 7, 8 n. 1, 823 P.2d 285, 286 n. 1 (1992) (citingAlvis, 99 Nev. at 186 n. 1, 660 P.2d at 981 n. 1, and enlarging its holding to this: "A motion for rehearing cannot reasonably be construed as a motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e).").
In particular, it appeared that an order denying a motion for reconsideration, to alter judgment, and/or to amend findings is not substantively appealable. See Uniroyal Goodrich Tire v. Mercer, 111 Nev. 318, 320 n.1, 890 P.2d 785, 787 n.1 (1995), superseded on other grounds by statute as stated in RTTC Commc'ns, LLC v. Saratoga Flier, Inc., 121 Nev. 34, 110 P.3d 24 (2005); Alvis u. State, 99 Nev. 184, 660 P.2d 980 (1983),' overruled on other grounds by AA Primo Builders, LLC v. Washington, 126 Nev. 578, 245 P.3d 1190 (2010). In addition, to the extent the notice of appeal is construed as an appeal from the underlying order granting in part the petition for judicial review, see Uniroyal, 111 Nev. at 320 n.1, 890 P.2d at 787 n.1, it appeared that the order is not substantively appealable because it remands for further substantive administrative proceedings, see Ayala v. Caesars Palace, 119 Nev. 232, 71 P.3d 490 (2003), overruled on other grounds by Five Star Capital Corp. v. Ruby, 124 Nev. 1048, 194 P.3d 709 (2008).
FN4 Respondents assert that this appeal is untimely because the district court treated the motion to alter or amend as one for reconsideration, and under prior decisional law, motions for reconsideration did not toll the appeal period. See Alvis v. State, Gaming Control Bd., 99 Nev. 184, 186 n. 1, 660 P.2d 980, 981 n. 1 (1983), disapproved of by AA Primo Builders v. Washington, 126 Nev. โโโโ, โโโโ, 245 P.3d 1190, 1195 (2010). Recently, however, we determined that, in most circumstances, there is no valid basis for distinguishing the two types of motions, and thus, timely filed motions for reconsideration may toll the appeal period.
A motion for rehearing cannot reasonably be construed as a motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e). Alvis v. State, Gaming Control Bd., 99 Nev. 184, 186 n. 1, 660 P.2d 980, 981 n. 1 (1983). We therefore conclude that CCSD's argument lacks merit.
According to an order of dismissal submitted by petitioner, the state district court denied his habeas petition in August 2014. ECF No. 6, p. 7. Thus, petitioner has missed his opportunity to appeal that decision. See Alvis v. State, Gaming Control Bd., 660 P.2d 980 (Nev. 1983) (Nevada Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain an appeal where the notice of appeal was filed beyond the time provided in Nev. Rules of App. P. 4(a)). --------
See Nev. Const, art. 6, ยง 6; Waugh v. Casazza, 85 Nev. 520, 521, 458 P.2d 359. 360 (1969) (the district courts have final appellate jurisdiction over cases arising in the justice courts); Alvis v. State, 99 Nev. 184, 186, 660 P.2d 980, 981 (1983), disapproved of by AA Primo Builders, LLC v. Washington, 126 Nev. 578, 245 P.3d 1190 (2010) (an order denying rehearing is not appealable as a special order after final judgment). Accordingly, this court lacks jurisdiction and ORDERS this appeal DISMISSED.
Orders deciding motions for reconsideration or NRCP 59(e) relief are not independently appealable. See A Cab, LLC v. Murray, 137 Nev. 805, 821, 501 P.3d 961, 976 (2021); Alvis v. State, 99 Nev. 184, 186, 660 P.2d 980, 981 (1983), disapproved of by AA Primo Builders, LLC v. Washington, 126 Nev. 578, 245 P.3d 1190 (2010) (an order denying a motion for rehearing is not appealable as a special order after final judgment).
Additionally, this court has held that an order denying rehearing is not independently appealable. Alvis v. State, Gaming Control Bd., 99 Nev. 184, 660 P.2d 980 (1983), disapproved of on other grounds by AA Primo Builders, LLC v. Washington, 126 Nev. 578, 245 P.3d 1190 (2010). Moreover, appellant filed her motion to rehear long after the 28-day time limit allowed under NRCP 59.
To the extent the order denies a motion for reconsideration or rehearing, such orders are not independently appealable. Alois v. State, Gaming Control Bd., 99 Nev. 184, 660 P.2d 980 (1983) (holding that an order denying a motion for rehearing is not appealable), overruled on other grounds by AA Primo Builders, LLC v. Washington, 126 Nev. 578, 245 P.3d 1190 (2010). This court lacks jurisdiction and
We lack jurisdiction to review that order because an order denying a motion for reconsideration is not appealable. See Alois v. State, Gaming Control Bd., 99 Nev. 184, 186, 660 P.2d 980, 981 (1983) (holding that an order denying a motion for rehearing is not appealable), overruled on other grounds by AA Primo Builders , LLC v. Washington, 126 Nev. 578, 245 P.3d 1190 (2010). ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.