Opinion
23A-PC-2837
10-24-2024
Argumedo Alvarez-Madrigal, Appellant-Petitioner v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Cynthia M. Carter Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Robert M. Yoke Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Peggy R. Hart, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 49D31-1901-PC-2806
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Cynthia M. Carter Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Robert M. Yoke Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Tavitas, Judge.
Case Summary
[¶1] In 2015, Argumedo Alvarez-Madrigal was convicted of four counts of child molesting, Class A felonies, and two counts of child molesting, Class C felonies. This Court affirmed his convictions on direct appeal, and our Supreme Court denied transfer. Alvarez-Madrigal then filed a petition for postconviction relief and alleged ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. The postconviction court ("PC Court") denied Alvarez-Madrigal's petition, and Alvarez-Madrigal now appeals. Alvarez-Madrigal argues that his trial counsel was ineffective, but we conclude that the PC Court's denial of Alvarez-Madrigal's petition is not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we affirm.
Issue
[¶2] Alvarez-Madrigal raises one issue, which we restate as whether Alvarez- Madrigal received ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
Facts
[¶3] The facts, as set forth in Alvarez-Madrigal's direct appeal, follow:
When she was ten years old and in the fourth grade, A.M. met and became close friends with fellow fourth-grader S.A.O., whose father is Alvarez-Madrigal. During the summer before the girls entered fifth grade, A.M. spent a lot of time at S.A.O.'s house. S.A.O.'s mother worked nights, and Alvarez-Madrigal watched the children while she slept during the day.
The facts most favorable to the verdict are that, in May 2014, when A.M. was eleven years old, Alvarez-Madrigal began to touch A.M. inappropriately. On May 8 or 9, when A.M. was spending the night at S.A.O.'s house, S.A.O. left the room to use the restroom, and Alvarez-Madrigal put his hand under A.M.'s bra and then felt around her vagina, over her pajamas. From that date to June 6, A.M. went to S.A.O.'s house almost every day, and Alvarez-Madrigal touched A.M. "[e]very time I would go over there." Tr. at 43. A.M. testified that S.A.O. and her mother "saw what was going on" on various occasions. Id. at 93. A.M. was worried that if she told anyone, it would ruin her friendship with S.A.O.
On June 6, 2014, when A.M. entered S.A.O.'s house and began to walk up the stairs to S.A.O.'s bedroom, Alvarez-Madrigal put his hand "on [A.M.'s] butt" under her underwear. Id. at 47. He kept his hand there as A.M. walked up the flight of stairs. When they reached the top of the stairs, S.A.O. came out of her bedroom, "looked surprised," and started yelling at Alvarez-Madrigal. Id. at 48. A.M. testified that S.A.O.'s mother also came out of her bedroom and asked what was going on, but the girls went into S.A.O.'s bedroom without saying anything to S.A.O.'s mother. On June 10, while other household members were elsewhere in the house, Alvarez-Madrigal kissed A.M. on the neck and touched her under her underwear, on her vagina.
On June 14, 2014, Alvarez-Madrigal drove A.M. and S.A.O. to a swimming pool and then back to S.A.O.'s house. S.A.O.'s mother was at home sleeping. A.M. went to the upstairs bathroom to change out of her swimming suit, and while she was still in the bathroom, she heard S.A.O. open the door and go outside the house. A.M. put on a swim cover, which was like a dress, over her underwear and bra. She left the bathroom and went downstairs, and Alvarez-Madrigal appeared, picked her up under the arms, put her back to the wall, and when she started to scream, he put his hand over her mouth. Despite A.M.'s
protests, Alvarez-Madrigal took off her swim cover and her bra. When A.M. would not spread her legs, he hit her in the thigh, which left a mark. Alvarez-Madrigal pulled down her underwear, threw her onto a couch, and had vaginal and anal intercourse with her. When she initially would not open her mouth to perform oral sex, he slapped her on the face, leaving a red mark, and then he stuck his penis in her mouth and moved it back and forth.
When S.A.O. began to enter the house, Alvarez-Madrigal collected A.M.'s clothes and threw them at her and told her to go to the bathroom. A.M. saw S.A.O. peeking around the corner. A.M. hurried to the bathroom, but heard Alvarez-Madrigal talking to S.A.O. in the kitchen and begging S.A.O., "Please don't tell your mother. I'll do anything for you." Tr. at 69. When A.M. left the bathroom, Alvarez-Madrigal "banged [her] against the wall" and told A.M. that he would kill her if she told anyone. Id. at 70. A.M. left the house and spoke to S.A.O. outside, telling her some, but not all, of the things Alvarez-Madrigal had done to her, and A.M. asked S.A.O. to tell her father to stop touching A.M. S.A.O. told A.M. that she would "have a talk with him." Id. at 72. A few weeks after the June 14 incident, A.M. told a friend, P.J., about what S.A.O.'s father had done to her, and P.J. told a mentor. On June 29, 2014, a report was made to Indiana Department of Child Services ("DCS").
When DCS made an unannounced visit to A.M.'s home on or about June 29, A.M. told her mother what Alvarez-Madrigal had done to her. A.M. also told DCS assessment case manager Nola Hunt ("Hunt") and the accompanying Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department ("IMPD") officer about Alvarez-Madrigal's conduct. Hunt paged IMPD Detective Mark Barnett ("Detective Barnett"), the "on-call" child abuse detective. Detective Barnett decided "an immediate response" was warranted "based primarily on the proximity of the alleged victim and suspect . . ., living on the same street." Id. at 187-88. Hunt then transported
A.M. and A.M.'s parents to DCS offices, where A.M. participated in a forensic interview at the Child Advocacy Center with IMPD Detective Nicolle Flynn ("Detective Flynn"). During the interview, A.M. disclosed information of a sexual nature describing what had happened to her about two weeks prior. Hunt and Detective Barnett observed the interview from another room, and based on what he observed, Detective Barnett prepared, and later executed, a search warrant for Alvarez-Madrigal's residence. Detective Barnett interviewed Alvarez-Madrigal and his wife, and, at some point, S.A.O. and P.J. were also interviewed by DCS. A.M. was examined on July 2, 2014, and again on July 9, 2014, at the Riley Hospital Pediatric Center for Hope.
On July 3, 2014, the State charged Alvarez-Madrigal with five counts of Class A felony child molesting and two counts of Class C felony child molesting. At the two-day August 2015 jury trial, the State presented the testimony of A.M., P.J., S.A.O., and S.A.O.'s mother. The State also presented the testimony of Hunt, Detective Flynn, and Detective Barnett. The last witness to testify was Shannon Thompson, M.D. ("Dr. Thompson"), a pediatrician at Riley Children's Hospital ("Riley") on the child abuse protection team.
Dr. Thompson examined A.M. at the second examination, on July 9, 2014. Dr. Thompson stated that the reason A.M. returned to Riley was because she was having "continued genital pain and itching." Id. at 293. Dr. Thompson testified that although neither examination at Riley revealed physical injuries, the lack of physical findings was "very common" in sexual abuse cases. Id. at 296. She explained that there are various reasons for that, including that no injury occurred in the first place or that "disclosure often occurs days to months later," and the genital tissue heals quickly. Id. at 297. She testified that, therefore, it is "very common" for a child to have a normal exam. Id. at 298. The State continued direct examination of Dr. Thompson
regarding the frequency with which she observes physical injuries:
STATE: In terms of the cases you have seen, do you know what percentage of children you see with injuries?
THOMPSON: So overall about 4 to 5 percent of children who have been victims of sexual abuse will have some kind of obvious physical evidence of penetration or sexual abuse. In my experience I've probably seen one.
STATE: One in 10 years of being a child abuse pediatrician?
THOMPSON: 7 1/2 years.
STATE: My math is not great. Okay. And does that mean that all the rest of those children are making up allegations?
THOMPSON: No, it doesn't mean that. It just means it's the nature of the abuse. Like I said, often the disclosure is late, injuries are subtle or even very obvious it healed by the time we get to see them. And in fact some statistics will quote that less than two to three children out of a thousand are making up claims.
Id. at 298-99 (emphasis added).
Alvarez-Madrigal then objected, stating, "This clearly calls for speculation. It's not relevant to the facts in this case." Id. at 299. The State responded, "She's a child abuse expert. She has talked about her evaluation of psychological and emotional mental health. It's part of her job to know statistics." Id. The trial court
did not expressly rule on the objection, but stated, "Then ask her this, ask every question in terms of reasonable medical certainty." Id. The State proceeded to ask Dr. Thompson, "[W]ith regard to this case to a degree of reasonable medical certainty, what's your opinion as to A.M.'s exam?" Id. Dr. Thompson responded that A.M. did not have any overt symptoms or physical findings that would be consistent with sexual abuse, but that lack of physical findings would not be determinative, and that the history that A.M. provided was consistent with sexual abuse. Id. at 299-300.
Upon cross examination, Dr. Thompson acknowledged that, although there was no physical injury or infection observed, A.M. was reporting complaints of physical pain. Dr. Thompson explained that A.M.'s complaints were considered "somatic complaints," which are "fairly common" in sexual abuse victims. Id. at 303, 305. When asked if the terms "somatic" or "psychosomatic" would be used when a patient is misleading a doctor about pain, Dr. Thompson replied, "No, I would not use that term." Id. at 305. She continued, "[I]t's actual physical pain that is manifested because of emotional trauma," which could be, by way of example, pelvic pain, headaches, or abdominal pain. Id. She testified that the "pain that the person is experiencing is real." Id.
At the conclusion of the evidence, Alvarez-Madrigal moved for a directed verdict, which the trial court granted as to one count of Class A felony child molesting. The jury found Alvarez-Madrigal guilty of the remaining four counts of Class A felony child molesting and guilty of two counts of Class C felony child molesting. On October 1, 2015, the trial court sentenced Alvarez-Madrigal to an aggregate sixty-one-year sentence.Alvarez-Madrigal v. State, 71 N.E.3d 887, 889-91 (Ind.Ct.App. 2017) (footnote omitted), trans. denied.
[¶4] On direct appeal, Alvarez-Madrigal argued that Dr. Thompson's testimony was impermissible vouching. This Court disagreed and held: "Dr. Thompson's non-solicited and general statistical statement properly left the determination of A.M.'s credibility to the province of the jury. Accordingly, Dr. Thompson's testimony was not vouching testimony prohibited by Indiana Evidence Rule 704(b), and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the testimony into evidence." Id. at 893. Moreover, this Court held that there was "substantial independent evidence of guilt supporting Alvarez-Madrigal's convictions," and this Court did not find that "Dr. Thompson's isolated factual statistic, which was not elicited and was spontaneously offered, likely had substantial influence on the verdict." Id. at 895. Accordingly, this Court affirmed Alvarez-Madrigal's convictions. Our Supreme Court then denied transfer.
[¶5] In 2019, Alvarez-Madrigal filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which he later amended. Alvarez-Madrigal argued that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel because his trial counsel: (1) failed to file a notice of alibi and present evidence of the alibi; (2) "failed to hire or consult expert witnesses or at least use a learned treatise" in response to Dr. Thompson's testimony; (3) failed to interview P.J.'s mentor and subpoena the social media and cell phone records between A.M. and P.J.; (4) failed to obtain the DCS "311 report"; and (5) failed to investigate and cross-examine P.J. and call P.J. on direct examination. Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 15, 23, 90. The PC Court held evidentiary hearings in July 2021 and September 2022. On November 2, 2023, the PC Court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law denying Alvarez-Madrigal's petition for post-conviction relief. Alvarez-Madrigal now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[¶6] Alvarez-Madrigal appeals the PC Court's denial of his petition for post conviction relief. Post-conviction proceedings are civil proceedings in which a defendant may present limited collateral challenges to a conviction and sentence. Gibson v. State, 133 N.E.3d 673, 681 (Ind. 2019); Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(1)(b). "The scope of potential relief is limited to issues unknown at trial or unavailable on direct appeal." Gibson, 133 N.E.3d at 681. "Issues available on direct appeal but not raised are waived, while issues litigated adversely to the defendant are res judicata." Id. The petitioner bears the burden of establishing his claims by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.; P.-C.R. 1(5).
[¶7] When, as here, the petitioner "appeals from a negative judgment denying postconviction relief, he 'must establish that the evidence, as a whole, unmistakably and unerringly points to a conclusion contrary to the post-conviction court's decision.'" Gibson, 133 N.E.3d at 681 (quoting Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 738 N.E.2d 253, 258 (Ind. 2000)). When reviewing the post-conviction court's order denying relief, we will "not defer to the post-conviction court's legal conclusions," and the "findings and judgment will be reversed only upon a showing of clear error-that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Bobadilla v. State, 117 N.E.3d 1272, 1279 (Ind. 2019). When a petitioner "fails to meet this 'rigorous standard of review,' we will affirm the post-conviction court's denial of relief." Gibson, 133 N.E.3d at 681 (quoting DeWitt v. State, 755 N.E.2d 167, 169-70 (Ind. 2001)).
[¶8] Alvarez-Madrigal claims that the PC Court erred by rejecting his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must show that: (1) his counsel's performance fell short of prevailing professional norms; and (2) his counsel's deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Gibson, 133 N.E.3d at 682 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984))).
[¶9] A showing of deficient performance "requires proof that legal representation lacked 'an objective standard of reasonableness,' effectively depriving the defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel." Id. (quoting Overstreet v. State, 877 N.E.2d 144, 152 (Ind. 2007)). We strongly presume that counsel exercised "reasonable professional judgment" and "rendered adequate legal assistance." Id. Defense counsel enjoys "considerable discretion" in developing legal strategies for a client. Id. This "discretion demands deferential judicial review." Id. Finally, counsel's "[i]solated mistakes, poor strategy, inexperience, and instances of bad judgment do not necessarily render representation ineffective." Id.
[¶10] "To demonstrate prejudice, the defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the proceedings below would have resulted in a different outcome." Id. "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. Failure to satisfy either prong will cause the claim to fail. Grinstead v.
State, 845 N.E.2d 1027, 1031 (Ind. 2006). Most ineffective assistance of counsel claims can be resolved by a prejudice inquiry alone. Id.
[¶11] On appeal, Alvarez-Madrigal argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because trial counsel: (1) failed to present evidence of Alvarez-Madrigal's alibi defense; (2) failed to present an expert or a learned treatise in response to Dr. Thompson's testimony; (3) failed to obtain the DCS Form 311 report; and (4) failed to cross-examine or question P.J. We will address these arguments individually.
Alvarez-Madrigal also notes that the PC Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law matched those proposed by the State. "The practice of adopting a party's proposed findings verbatim is not prohibited." Country Contractors, Inc. v. A Westside Storage of Indianapolis, Inc., 4 N.E.3d 677, 694 (Ind.Ct.App. 2014). "Although we by no means encourage the wholesale adoption of a party's proposed findings and conclusions, the critical inquiry is whether such findings, as adopted by the court, are clearly erroneous." Id. This practice, however, "weakens our confidence as an appellate court that the findings are the result of considered judgment by the trial court." Cook v. Whitsell-Sherman, 796 N.E.2d 271, 274 n.1 (Ind. 2003).
I. Failure to Present Alibi Defense
[¶12] Alvarez-Madrigal first argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file an alibi defense and present evidence of Alvarez-Madrigal's alibi. The charging informations alleged in Counts I through IV that Alvarez-Madrigal committed child molesting against A.M. "[o]n or about June 14, 2014." Direct Appeal ("DA") App. Vol. II p. 31. The charging informations alleged in Counts V through VII that Alvarez-Madrigal committed child molesting against A.M. "[o]n or about or between May 8, 2014, and June 13, 2014." Id. at 31-32. During the trial, A.M. testified that Alvarez-Madrigal touched her on May 8 or 9, 2014; June 6, 2014; June 10, 2014; and June 14, 2014.
[¶13] In the post-conviction proceedings, Alvarez-Madrigal argued that he was attending a three-week CDL driving school in northern Indiana, which was scheduled to occur from May 12, 2014, through June 3, 2014. Alvarez-Madrigal left the school early and rented a car in Chicago on May 24, 2014, to drive home. Alvarez-Madrigal claims that this evidence establishes an alibi for the offenses against A.M.
[¶14] At the post-conviction hearing, Alvarez-Madrigal's trial counsel testified: Q. Mr. Edgar, do you remember your client telling you in this case that he had an alibi? A. I remember no mention of an alibi.
Q. Okay. And do -- do you believe that there were any witnesses that you wanted to call at trial but were unable to do so?
A. No.PCR Tr. Vol. II p. 40. Although Alvarez-Madrigal testified at the postconviction hearing, Alvarez-Madrigal never testified that he told his trial counsel about the alleged alibi evidence.
[¶15] The PC Court found that Alvarez-Madrigal's trial counsel was unaware of alibi evidence or exculpatory witnesses and focused on challenging A.M.'s credibility and "highlighting the deficiencies of the State's investigation." Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 175. The PC Court concluded that trial counsel's performance was not deficient and that the evidence presented at the postconviction hearings "failed to show that [Alvarez-Madrigal] had an alibi for any of the charged crimes." Id. at 177. We agree with the PC Court.
[¶16] The evidence presented at the post-conviction hearing did not demonstrate that Alvarez-Madrigal's trial counsel was even informed of the alleged alibi evidence. Moreover, even if trial counsel had presented this evidence at trial, Alvarez-Madrigal was not out of town on the dates that A.M. testified the abuse occurred. Accordingly, Alvarez-Madrigal failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for alleged counsel's errors, the proceedings below would have resulted in a different outcome. The PC Court's denial of Alvarez-Madrigal's petition for post-conviction relief on this issue is not clearly erroneous.
II. Failure to Present an Expert Witness or Learned Treatise in Response to Dr. Thompson's Testimony
[¶17] Next, Alvarez-Madrigal argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present an expert witness or learned treatise in response to Dr. Thompson's testimony that "some statistics will quote that less than two to three children out of a thousand are making up claims." DA Tr. Vol. II p. 52. In support of his argument, during the post-conviction relief hearing, Alvarez-Madrigal introduced a letter from Dr. Stuart Silverstein, who opined that "studies and medical literature and case studies are often cited by medical experts. It is important that these specific citations get reviewed for relevance by the medical expert on the defense team, before they are presented at trial." Ex. Vol. V pp. 101-02.
[¶18] The PC Court denied Alvarez-Madrigal's claim and found that trial counsel's cross-examination of Dr. Thompson was "skilled and not deficient." Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 178. Further, the letter submitted by Dr. Silverstein during the post-conviction hearings did not contain "any facts of particular value or any facts which would have created a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome ...." Id. at 179. Thus, the PC Court found that Alvarez-Madrigal failed to prove prejudice from his trial counsel's decision not to hire an expert witness to testify.
[¶19] The State argues that Alvarez-Madrigal is merely attempting to "resurrect his direct appeal claim regarding Dr. Thompson's testimony ...." Appellee's Br. p. 26. We agree. On direct appeal, this Court held that Dr. Thompson's testimony was not vouching, and moreover, this Court did not find that "Dr. Thompson's isolated factual statistic, which was not elicited and was spontaneously offered, likely had substantial influence on the verdict." Alvarez-Madrigal, 71 N.E.3d at 895. Issues that have already been decided adversely to the petitioner are barred from re-litigation by the doctrine of res judicata. Matheney v. State, 834 N.E.2d 658, 662 (Ind. 2005).
[¶20] In this appeal, Alvarez-Madrigal essentially argues that, contrary to our holding on direct appeal, Dr. Thompson's testimony did impact the verdict and that he would have had a more favorable outcome if his trial counsel countered the testimony with an expert witness or learned treatise. Given our earlier holding that Dr. Thompson's isolated factual statistic did not substantially impact the jury, Alvarez-Madrigal has failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for trial counsel's failure to present an expert witness or learned treatise, the proceedings below would have resulted in a different outcome. The PC Court's denial of Alvarez-Madrigal's petition for post-conviction relief on this issue is not clearly erroneous.
III. Failure to Investigate DCS Records
[¶21] Alvarez-Madrigal next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present the DCS Form 311 report during the trial. "DCS is statutorily required to assess all reports of child abuse and neglect." In re N.E., 228 N.E.3d 457, 472 (Ind.Ct.App. 2024). A DCS Form 310 is completed after an initial report from the child abuse "hotline." Id. The DCS Form 311 report is then completed after a caseworker conducts an assessment of the report and includes a determination as to whether the report is "substantiated" or "unsubstantiated." Id.
[¶22] Alvarez-Madrigal seems to argue that the DCS Form 311 report was not provided to him during discovery and that the report would have been useful during cross-examination of DCS assessment case manager Hunt. Alvarez-Madrigal claims that, during the jury trial, Hunt was unable to recall the name of the officer that initially talked with A.M. and Hunt, but the officer was identified in the DCS Form 311 report. The officer, however, was also identified in the probable cause affidavit. The PC Court concluded that Alvarez-Madrigal failed to prove any prejudice from trial counsel's failure to obtain the DCS Form 311 report, and we agree. The information that Alvarez-Madrigal identifies as important from the DCS Form 311 report was already available to Alvarez-Madrigal in the probable cause affidavit. Alvarez-Madrigal has failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for trial counsel's failure to obtain the DCS report, the proceedings below would have resulted in a different outcome. The PC Court's denial of Alvarez-Madrigal's petition for post-conviction relief on this issue is not clearly erroneous.
Alvarez-Madrigal also implies that the officer's presence somehow tainted the investigation. This, however, is not an argument related to the Form 311 report, and this argument was raised during the jury trial and presented to the jury. Moreover, Hunt testified that the officer asked A.M. two non-leading questions and that their "interview" of A.M. lasted three minutes. A.M. was then taken for a forensic interview.
IV. Failure to Cross-Examine or Question P.J.
[¶23] Finally, Alvarez-Madrigal argues that his trial counsel failed to properly investigate and examine A.M.'s friend, P.J. Alvarez-Madrigal contends that P.J.'s statement to law enforcement was inconsistent with her testimony at the trial and that his trial counsel should have cross-examined P.J. on the inconsistencies.
[¶24] The State argues that declining to cross-examine P.J. was a matter of trial strategy. During P.J.'s direct examination, Alvarez-Madrigal's trial counsel successfully prevented the messages between P.J. and A.M., which were consistent with A.M.'s testimony, from being admitted into evidence. If Alvarez-Madrigal's trial counsel cross-examined P.J. with her earlier interview, those same hearsay statements would have been presented to the jury. The State argues that "it was a reasonable trial strategy for [trial counsel] to prevent the jury from hearing inadmissible hearsay statements that both vouched for the credibility of A.M. and damaged [trial counsel's] primary trial strategy to discredit [A.M.]." Appellee's Br. p. 32. We agree. Trial counsel's strategy was reasonable, and Alvarez-Madrigal has failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel's performance on this issue was deficient.
[¶25] Moreover, the "inconsistencies" that Alvarez-Madrigal identifies on appeal, however, were merely additional details, not inconsistencies. Alvarez-Madrigal has failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for trial counsel's failure to cross-examine P.J. regarding "inconsistencies" between her trial testimony and her earlier interview, the proceedings below would have resulted in a different outcome. The PC Court's denial of Alvarez-Madrigal's petition for post-conviction relief on this issue is not clearly erroneous.
Conclusion
[¶26] The PC Court's denial of Alvarez-Madrigal's petition for post-conviction relief is not clearly erroneous. We affirm.
[¶27] Affirmed.
May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.