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Alston v. Gallant

United States District Court, D. South Carolina
Jun 24, 2024
C/A 0:24-2044-MGL-PJG (D.S.C. Jun. 24, 2024)

Opinion

C/A 0:24-2044-MGL-PJG

06-24-2024

Londell Lashun Alston, Plaintiff, v. Andrew W. Gallant Et AL, Defendant.


REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

PAIGE J. GOSSETT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Londell Lashun Alston, a self-represented state pretrial detainee, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A. Having reviewed the Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the court concludes that it should be summarily dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.

I. Procedural Background

Plaintiff is an inmate in the York County Detention Center. Plaintiff brings this action against City of Rock Hill Police Officer Andrew W. Gallant, claiming Gallant violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights during a traffic stop in July 2023. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges Gallant swore in an arrest warrant that he found drugs in Plaintiff's possession during the stop, which Plaintiff alleges is false. Plaintiff seeks damages from Gallant pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Plaintiff currently has another case pending in this court in which Gallant is named as a defendant. Alston v. Rock Hill Police Department, C/A No. 0:23-4300-MGL-PJG. In that case, Plaintiff sued Gallant (and others) for damages pursuant to § 1983, claiming Gallant swore out an affidavit in support of an arrest warrant for Plaintiff that included false statements. That case remains pending, but the court recently dismissed Plaintiff's claims against Gallant for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Alston v. Rock Hill Police Department, C/A No. 0:23-4300-MGL-PJG (Docket. No. 47.)

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), including 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit, and is also governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the court to review a complaint filed by a prisoner that seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2009). Section 1915A requires, and § 1915 allows, a district court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

To state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the plaintiff must do more than make mere conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. The reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

This court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints, which are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).

B. Analysis

The court concludes that because this case is duplicative of Plaintiff's previous case against Gallant, this case should be dismissed as frivolous. Generally, duplicative litigation within the federal courts is disfavored. See generally Stone v. Dep't of Aviation, 453 F.3d 1271, 1278 (10th Cir. 2006) (“A plaintiff's obligation to bring all related claims together in the same action arises under the common law rule of claim preclusion prohibiting the splitting of actions.”); Motley Rice, LLC v. Baldwin & Baldwin, LLP, 518 F.Supp.2d 688, 697 (D.S.C. 2007) (quoting Serlin v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 3 F.3d 221, 223 (7th Cir. 1993)). Therefore, courts should dismiss successive actions that are duplicative or redundant of cases already filed in the same court. See Cottle v. Bell, 229 F.3d 1142 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Because district courts are not required to entertain duplicative or redundant lawsuits, they may dismiss such suits as frivolous pursuant to § 1915(e).”) (citing Aziz v. Burrows, 976 F.2d 1158, 1158 (8th Cir. 1992)); McWilliams v. State of Colo., 121 F.3d 573, 574 (10th Cir. 1997) (“ ‘Repetitious litigation of virtually identical causes of action' may be dismissed under § 1915 as frivolous or malicious.”) (quoting Bailey v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir.1988)); Wilson v. Lynaugh, 878 F.2d 846, 850 (5th Cir. 1989) (“To this end, IFP complaints may be dismissed as frivolous pursuant to § 1915(d) when they seek to relitigate claims which allege substantially the same facts arising from a common series of events which have already been unsuccessfully litigated by the IFP plaintiff.”); see also Brown v. Plansky, 24 Fed.Appx. 26, 27-28 (2d Cir. 2001) (affirming the district court's sua sponte dismissal of a complaint that was duplicative of an action previously brought by the plaintiff).

Here, Plaintiff's claim against Gallant is identical to his claim against Gallant in the 2023 case. Plaintiff again seeks damages pursuant to § 1983 against Gallant for false statements Plaintiff alleges Gallant made in the arrest warrant arising out of the July 2023 traffic stop. The court summarily dismissed Gallant as a defendant for Plaintiff's failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against him. Plaintiff provides no indication that his claim against Gallant in this case is based on different or additional allegations, facts, or law that would justify revisiting a claim already dismissed by this court. Thus, Plaintiff has not cured the deficiencies identified by the court in the 2023 case. Therefore, the court concludes that this action is frivolous. See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (providing that a claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact”) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989)).

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the Complaint be dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.

Plaintiff is warned that if this recommendation is adopted, a future court may find that this action constitutes a strike. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (“In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.”); Pitts v. South Carolina, 65 F.4th 141, 150 (4th Cir. 2023) (explaining that a future court may decide that a prisoner's previous filings constitute “strikes” under § 1915(g)).

The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation

The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).

Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:

Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street Columbia, South Carolina 29201

Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).


Summaries of

Alston v. Gallant

United States District Court, D. South Carolina
Jun 24, 2024
C/A 0:24-2044-MGL-PJG (D.S.C. Jun. 24, 2024)
Case details for

Alston v. Gallant

Case Details

Full title:Londell Lashun Alston, Plaintiff, v. Andrew W. Gallant Et AL, Defendant.

Court:United States District Court, D. South Carolina

Date published: Jun 24, 2024

Citations

C/A 0:24-2044-MGL-PJG (D.S.C. Jun. 24, 2024)