We affirm the grant of summary disposition and dismiss the cross appeal as moot. Allstate Ins Co v Miller (Miller I), 175 Mich. App. 515, 520, 522; 438 N.W.2d 638 (1989); Allstate Ins Co v Miller (On Remand) (Miller II), 185 Mich. App. 345, 347-348; 460 N.W.2d 612 (1990); Allstate Ins Co v Miller (On Remand) (Miller III), unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued October 8, 1993 (Docket No. 161270). Consistent with this Court's recently adopted policy designed to facilitate legal research, we publish our opinion primarily because two of this Court's previous decisions in this case generated published opinions.
On remand, the Miller I panel reaffirmed its original holding, concluding that insanity precluded finding that the insured intended to act in the first instance, thus distinguishing its decision from Freeman.Allstate Ins Co vMiller (On Remand) (Miller II), 185 Mich. App. 345, 348; 460 N.W.2d 612 (1990). Significantly, the panel cited the presence of expert testimony in support of its position that the insured was not in control of his actions when he committed his acts.
The Boughton language is analogous to the language used by the insurer in this case, and, therefore, the result is consistent with this opinion. However, the language used by the insurers in Allstate Ins Co v Miller, 175 Mich. App. 515; 438 N.W.2d 638 (1989), Allstate Ins Co v Miller (On Remand), 185 Mich. App. 345; 460 N.W.2d 612 (1990), and Mattson v Farmers Ins Exchange, 181 Mich. App. 419; 450 N.W.2d 54 (1989), used language requiring the application of the objective standard. Therefore, the objective standard controlled the resolution of that case.
Injury is reasonably expected where it is the natural, foreseeable, expected and anticipated consequence of the intentional or criminal act. Freeman, 687-688; Allstate Ins Co v Miller (On Remand), 185 Mich. App. 345, 347; 460 N.W.2d 612 (1990). Whether an injury is reasonably to be expected requires application of an objective standard.
Injury is reasonably expected where it is the natural, foreseeable, expected and anticipated consequence of the intentional or criminal act. Freeman, 687-688; Allstate Ins Co v Miller (On Remand), 185 Mich. App. 345, 347; 460 N.W.2d 612 (1990). Whether an injury should reasonably be expected requires application of an objective standard.
When, as in this case, the parties opposing a motion for summary judgment have presented evidence on an actor's lack of mental capacity or sanity, the actor's intent to commit murder cannot be inferred from the act of shooting his or her victims. See Congregation of Rodef Sholom, 91 Cal.App.3d at 695-99, 154 Cal.Rptr. at 350-52 (1979); Arkwright-Boston Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dunkel, 363 So.2d 190, 193-94 (Fla.App. 1978); von Dameck v. St. Paul Fire Marine Ins. Co., 361 So.2d 283, 288-89 (La.App. 1978); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Miller, 438 N.W.2d 638, 641-42 (Mich.App. 1989), remanded, 452 N.W.2d 209 (Mich. 1990), after remand, 460 N.W.2d 612 (Mich.App. 1990); Wicka, 461 N.W.2d at 242; Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Turner, 503 N.E.2d 212, 216-17 (Ohio App. 1986). 3.