Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:18-CV-01712
10-30-2018
SHAWN ALLISON, Plaintiff, v. WARDEN, DAUPHIN COUNTY JAIL, et al., Defendants.
(MUNLEY, J.)
() REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Presently before the Court is a complaint seeking damages (Doc. 1) and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2), both filed by pro se prisoner-Plaintiff Shawn Allison (hereinafter referred to as "Mr. Allison"). At the time of the filing of his complaint, Mr. Allison was incarcerated at Dauphin County Prison, located in Dauphin County, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1). In his complaint, Mr. Allison seeks damages against the following Defendants: the Warden of Dauphin County Jail; the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole ("PBPP" or the "Board"); Andrew Johnson, the Supervisor of the BPP ("Mr. Johnson"); and Gregory Brunner, a Parole Agent at the Harrisburg Parole Office ("Mr. Brunner"). The Court has conducted its statutorily-mandated screening of the complaint in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). For the reasons provided herein, it is respectfully recommended that the motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2) be GRANTED, but that the complaint (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
The Court notes that, after having conducted its own search using the inmate locator tool on the DOC's website, it appears that Mr. Allison has since been released from state custody. See http://inmatelocator.cor.pa.gov.; see also http://www.dauphincounty.org/government/departments/prison/prison_list/index.php (last accessed October 29, 2018).
The caption of the complaint identifies the "Pa. State Parole Board" as a Defendant, whereas the body of the complaint identifies the PBPP as a Defendant. Upon review of the complaint, the Court understands these Defendants to be one in the same.
I. BACKGROUND
On August 29, 2018, Mr. Allison, proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In the complaint, which sheds little light on the factual bases of his claims, Mr. Allison alleges that he had an original maximum sentence expiration date ("Max Date") of August 4, 2018. (Doc. 1, at 2). However, while presumably under parole supervision, Mr. Allison claims that the Harrisburg Police Department arrested him on February 7, 2018. (Doc. 1, at 2). As a consequence, the Board subsequently lodged a detainer against Mr. Allison on May 7, 2018, "pending the disposition of [his] criminal charges." (Doc. 1, at 3). Pursuant to Act 122 of 2012, the Board also ordered that Mr. Allison be recommitted to a state correctional institution or county jail to serve six (6) months' time as a technical parole violator ("TPV"). (Doc. 1, at 2-3). The Board further decided that Mr. Allison was to be automatically re-paroled on August 7, 2018 without any further action by the Board. (Doc. 1, at 2-3).
Although Mr. Allison invoked 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to file a complaint against "federal officials," the named Defendants appear to be state entities and employees. (Doc. 1, at 2). Accordingly, in deference to Mr. Allison's pro se status, the Court will liberally construe the complaint as federal civil rights action brought against state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Colon v. Hefferon, No. 1:13-CV-2436, 2013 WL 5674507, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 17, 2013) ("This is case is not a Bivens action because Plaintiff does not seek monetary damages from a federal official for alleged violations of his constitutional rights.") (citing Oriakhi v. Wood, No. 3:CV-05-0053, 2006 WL 859543, at *1 n. 1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2006)); see also Pearson v. Prime Care Med., Inc., No. CIV.A. 12-5076, 2013 WL 5340554, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2013) (same).
"Pursuant to Pennsylvania law, the maximum term represents the sentence imposed for a criminal offense..." Martin v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 840 A.2d 299 (2003).
While Mr. Allison attempts to incorporate the related arrest report by reference, he fails to attach the corresponding record to his complaint. (Doc. 1, at 2).
Mr. Allison presumably refers to Senate Bill 100 passed on July 5, 2012, which amended the recommitment terms for TPV's, as codified under Section 6138 of the Prisons and Parole Code. 61 Pa.C.S.A § 6138; Gerber v. Campbell, No. 1:14-CV-674, 2015 WL 3952765, at *12 (M.D. Pa. June 18, 2015) (citing Barge v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 96 A.3d 360, 361 (2014)).
A TPV violates the terms and conditions of his parole, other than by way of being convicted of a new crime. 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 6138(c). Here, although not entirely clear, it appears that Mr. Allison was recommitted as a TPV for violating condition #3A of his parole for "failure to report as instructed." (Doc. 1 at 3).
When liberally construed, Mr. Allison appears to complain that the recalculated Max Date of August 7, 2018 "over[o]de" his original Max Date of August 4, 2018. (Doc. 1, at 2-3). Mr. Allison also vaguely complains that after August 7, 2018, another Max Date was set for September 20, 2018. (Doc. 1, at 3). As for relief, Mr. Allison seeks damages for the "suffering and stress" arising his placement in Dauphin County Prison, and requests that the named Defendants be held accountable for their actions under Act 122 of 2012. (Doc. 1, at 3).
II. SECTION 1915 STANDARDS
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court is obligated, prior to service of process, to screen a civil complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a); James v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 230 Fed. Appx. 195, 197 (3d Cir. 2007) (not precedential). The Court must dismiss the complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1); Mitchell v. Dodrill, 696 F. Supp. 2d 454, 471 (M.D. Pa. 2010). The Court has a similar obligation with respect to actions brought in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In performing this mandatory screening function, a district court applies the same standard applied to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. Mitchell, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 471; Banks v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 568 F. Supp. 2d 579, 588 (W.D. Pa. 2008).
The Court notes that even if Mr. Allison is no longer deemed a "prisoner" for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the same screening standards apply to his complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
Rule 12(b)(6) of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE authorizes a defendant to move to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that:
Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court's opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), continuing with our opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224 (3d Cir. 2008)] and culminating recently with the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien &Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). A court "need not credit a complaint's 'bald assertions' or 'legal conclusions' when deciding a motion to dismiss." Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court need not assume that a plaintiff can prove facts that the plaintiff has not alleged. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). In order to state a valid cause of action a plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). When ruling on a motion to dismiss, a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which relief can be granted, and should "begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). "[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
In addition to these pleading rules, a civil complaint must comply with the requirements of Rule 8(a) of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, which defines what a complaint should contain:
(a) A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.Thus, a pro se plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint must recite factual allegations which are sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a "short and plain" statement of a cause of action. Indeed, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) requires a "showing that 'the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the...claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007); Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545).
With the aforementioned standards in mind, a document filed pro se is "to be liberally construed." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A pro se complaint, "however inartfully pleaded," must be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers" and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court may also consider the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, as well as "documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice." Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). Further, the Third Circuit has instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).
III. DISCUSSION
The Court recommends that Mr. Allison's complaint be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). As discussed supra, to withstand dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must satisfy the minimum pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. See Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 355 (3d Cir. 2005). Rule 8(d)(1) further instructs that "[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise, and direct." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). Therefore, dismissal under Rule 8 is proper "when a complaint leaves defendants 'having to guess what of the many things discussed constituted [a cause of action];' . . . or when the complaint is so 'rambling and unclear' as to defy response." L. Ruther v. State Ky. Officers, No. 1:13-CV-1641, 2013 WL 3525032, at *4 (M.D. Pa. July 11, 2013) aff'd sub nom. Ruther v. State Ky. Officers, 556 F. App'x 91 (3d Cir. 2014) (not precedential) (quoting Binsack v. Lackawanna Cnty. Prison, 438 F. App'x 158, 160 (3d Cir. 2011) (not precedential)); Tillio v. Spiess, 441 F. App'x 109, 110 (3d Cir. 2011) (not precedential).
Here, even when liberally construed, Mr. Allison's complaint is plainly deficient under the pleading standards set forth in Rules 8 and 12(b)(6) of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. Specifically, the complaint fails to satisfy Rule 8's basic tenet that a pleading must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Further, the complaint fails to identify any facts from which the Court could reasonably infer a cause of action against the Defendants. Indeed, from what the Court can glean, the complaint would leave the Defendants having to guess what claims Mr. Allison intends to levy against them. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). Thus, such pleading deficiencies fall well short of the standards enumerated in Rule 8 of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, and thus fail to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b).
Although Mr. Allison does not expressly state the basis for this Court's subject-matter jurisdiction, as required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1), the Court liberally construes the complaint as being brought pursuant to this Court's Federal Question jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. However, he may clarify the intended grounds of this Court's jurisdiction by way of an amended complaint.
Accordingly, the Court respectfully recommends that Mr. Allison's claims against the Defendants be DISMISSED under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(A) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), as the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. IV. LEAVE TO AMEND
The Court declines to address any other bases for dismissal that may exist, as it finds the severe pleading deficiencies under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) to be dispositive.
The Court recognizes that pro se plaintiffs often should be afforded an opportunity to amend a complaint before the complaint is dismissed with prejudice, see Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 2007), unless granting further leave to amend would be futile or result in undue delay. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235-36 (3d Cir. 2004). As the complaint in its current form does not clearly set forth any claims against the Defendants, dismissal is warranted. However, so as to preserve Mr. Allison's rights as a pro se litigant, the Court will allow him to file a single, unified complaint setting forth his factual allegations and legal claims in a manner that can be reviewed by the Court and, if necessary, answered by the Defendants.
Mr. Allison is advised that the amended complaint must be a pleading that stands by itself without reference to the original complaint. Young v. Keohane, 809 F. Supp. 1185, 1198 (M.D. Pa. 1992) (emphasis added). The amended complaint must also establish the existence of specific actions taken by the Defendants which have resulted in identifiable constitutional violations, to the extent Mr. Allison intends to bring a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Further, the amended complaint must: provide a "short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1); contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); include "a demand for the relief sought," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(3); set forth averments that are "simple, concise, and direct," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1); and state such averments in separately numbered paragraphs describing the date and time of the events alleged and identifying wherever possible the participants in the acts about which he complains. It should also be limited to those claims that arise out of the same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences as averred, albeit vaguely, in the original complaint. Failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with the aforementioned requirements may result in the dismissal of this action in its entirety.
As an additional matter, Mr. Allison is reminded of his affirmative obligation to inform the Court of any changes to his address, as required by the Local Rules and the Court's standing practice order. (Doc. 4, at 4). Indeed, per Local Rule 83.18, it is the responsibility of the plaintiff to maintain on file with the clerk a current address at which all notices and copies of pleadings, motions or papers in the action may be served upon such party. As of the date of the entry of the instant Report and Recommendation, Mr. Allison's address on file with the clerk is one at Dauphin County Prison; however, as mentioned supra, the DOC's online inmate locator indicates that Mr. Allison is no longer being held in DOC custody. Accordingly, Mr. Allison shall immediately notify the Court of his current address.
V. RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that:
1. Plaintiff's complaint (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(A) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii);
2. Plaintiff be given thirty (30) days to amend his complaint that clearly reasserts his claims in accordance with Rule 8(a) and 8(d)(1) of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE and the directives of the instant Report and Recommendation;
3. Plaintiff's Motion to proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2) be GRANTED; and
4. The matter be remanded to the undersigned for further proceedings.
Dated: October 30, 2018
BY THE COURT:
/s/ _________
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK
United States Magistrate Judge NOTICE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered the foregoing Report and Recommendation dated October 30, 2018. Any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Dated: October 30, 2018
/s/ _________
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK
United States Magistrate Judge