Opinion
No. 2006 CA 0920.
March 28, 2007. NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION.
I disagree with the majority opinion. The trial court's judgment focuses on the refusal of the Second Injury Fund to honor the assignment executed by Lumbermen's in favor of Allied. The majority opinion, however, does not address this issue, which is res nova to the courts. Instead, it interprets La. R.S. 23:1377(C)(3) to find that the statute prohibits reimbursement because Allied is not an "entity required by law to make such payments into the fund," and, therefore, the assignment is prohibited by law. This ignores the fact that Lumbermen's is such an entity and has assigned all of its rights and remedies against the Second Injury Fund relating to the claim of Brouillette to Allied. The majority, by relying on an erroneous (in my opinion) interpretation of the stature, fails to address the crucial issue of whether the assignment is valid. I believe it is a valid assignment and see no reason why it should be prohibited by law.
The opinion further misinterprets the statute in stating "every property and casualty insurer, self-insured employer, and group-self insurance fund, authorized to transact business in Louisiana, makes an annual payment to this fund." It is not every property and casualty insurer authorized to transact business in Louisiana that is required to pay into the fund. Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1377(B)(1) provides in pertinent part: "Every property and casualty insurer, individual self-insurer, and group self- insurance fund that has paid Louisiana workers' compensation benefits under Parts II and III, Chapter 10 of Title 23 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950 shall make an annual payment to the fund."
The fundamental question in all cases of statutory interpretation is legislative intent and the reasons that prompted the Legislature to enact the law. Sultana Corp. v. Jewelers Mut. Ins. Co. 2003-360 (La. 12/3/2003), 860 So.2d 1112, 1115. The meaning and intent of a law is determined by considering the law in its entirety and by placing a construction on the law that is consistent with the express terms of the law and with the obvious intent of the legislature. Sultana, 860 So.2d at 1116. In this case, the intent of the legislature is "to protect employers, group self-insurance funds and property and casualty insurers from excess liability" under the circumstances existing here. The interpretation of La. R.S. 23:1377(C)(3) set forth in the majority opinion does not accomplish this purpose. Further, the statute should be analyzed within the context of the entire workers' compensation scheme, as Sultana makes clear, and as evidenced by the reference to Chapter 10 of Title 23, which the majority apparently overlooked.
The refusal of the Second Injury Fund to pay this claim seems to be based on an objection to paying Allied, rather than a problem with Mr. Brouillete's claim. Allied, as an employer, has obligations established by the workers' compensation law and contracted with Lumbermen's to insure payment of its obligation. Allied possesses a written subrogation to the rights of Lumbermen's and now stands in their shoes. If Lumbermen's would be entitled to reimbursement, then, in my opinion, the Fund cannot legally refuse to pay this claim. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.