Opinion
No. 4-681 / 04-0218
Filed December 8, 2004
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert J. Blink, Judge.
Respondents appeal from the district court's ruling on judicial review affirming the workers' compensation commissioner's decision. AFFIRMED.
Jeffrey Baker of Patterson, Lorentzen, Duffield, Timmons, Irish, Becker Ordway, L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellant.
Max Schott of Max Schott Associates, Des Moines, for appellee.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Vogel, Zimmer, Hecht, and Eisenhauer, JJ.
Petitioners Allied Group, Inc. (Allied) and Insurance Company of North America appeal from the district court's ruling on judicial review affirming the workers' compensation commissioner's decision. They contend the district court erred in concluding substantial evidence supports the finding respondent Carla Farmer's chronic pain syndrome arouse out of and in the course of her employment with Allied. They further contend Farmer is not permanently and totally disabled. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Carla Farmer worked various unskilled jobs after receiving her GED in 1972. She was injured while working in a laundry in March of 1978 when a hot water pipe exploded, severely burning her lower trunk and legs. Following an extended healing period, Farmer earned an Associate of Arts degree as a legal assistant, and an Associate of Applied Science degree as a computer programmer.
In 1985, Farmer began working as a computer programmer analyst for Unisys Corporation. This position required her to use a keyboard ninety percent of the time. By the early 1990s, Farmer began experiencing symptoms of overuse in her left upper extremity. By the mid 1990s, Farmer was experiencing similar symptoms in her right upper extremity. She underwent surgeries on both extremities. Despite the persistence of some pain, Farmer was returned to work without restrictions. She left employment with Unisys in August of 1996 after the company went out of business.
Farmer worked for another company for approximately one month in September 1996, but quit her position. She then began working for Allied in October 1996. Farmer understood her position with Allied would be analytical and would therefore require significantly less keyboarding than her position at Unisys. However, in early 1997, Farmer was assigned a project that required significant amounts of keyboarding. Farmer's previous overuse symptoms returned, became aggravated, and continually worsened. She consulted several physicians and reported her continued symptoms to her supervisors on November 13, 1997.
In December 1997, Farmer was placed on a six-hour work limitation to help alleviate her overuse symptoms. On May 4, 1998, Farmer's keyboard use was permanently limited to use in forty-five minute increments with a period of fifteen minutes rest during a six-hour workday, or for alternating thirty-minute periods of keyboarding and rest during an eight-hour workday. On May 19, 1998, Farmer underwent knee surgery related to her 1978 burn injury. Because she feared the insufferable pain related to her keyboarding injury, Farmer never returned to work with Allied. By this time, Farmer was experiencing depression resulting from persistent pain. On June 18, 1998, she was terminated from her employment due to her failure to report to work.
Following a February 2001 hearing, the deputy workers' compensation dommissioner awarded Farmer permanent total disability for chronic pain syndrome, depression, and injuries to her right hand, arm, and shoulders. This decision was affirmed by the workers' compensation commissioner in July 2003. Allied filed a petition for judicial review and the district court affirmed in January 2004.
II. Scope and Standard of Review.
We review a district court's review of agency action for correction of errors of law. Midwest Automotive III, L.L.C. v. Iowa Dep't. of Transp., 646 N.W.2d 417, 422 (Iowa 2002). On judicial review of agency action, the district court functions in an appellate capacity, applying the standards of Iowa Code section 17A.19 (2001). Section 17A.19(10)(f) provides that, in a contested case, the court shall grant relief from an agency decision if substantial rights of a person have been prejudiced because agency action is unsupported by substantial evidence in the record made before the agency when the record is viewed as a whole. We give only limited deference to the agency's interpretation of law. Gaffney v. Iowa Dep't of Employment Servs., 540 N.W.2d 430, 433 (Iowa 1995). Our review is limited to determining whether the district court correctly applied the law in exercising its section 17A.19(8) judicial review function. Herrera v. IBP, Inc., 633 N.W.2d 284, 287 (Iowa 2001). We apply the standards of section 17A.19 to the agency action and determine whether our conclusions are consistent with those of the district court. Brown v. Quik Trip Corp., 641 N.W.2d 725, 727 (Iowa 2002).
III. Causal Connection.
Petitioners first contend the district court erred in affirming the workers' compensation commissioner's decision because a causal connection does not exist between Farmer's chronic pain syndrome and her employment with Allied. They argue her injuries manifested during her employment with Unisys and therefore could not have arisen out of and in the course of her employment with Allied.
In reviewing the commissioner's findings of fact, the question is not whether the evidence might support a different finding, but whether it supports the findings actually made. St. Luke's Hosp. v. Gray, 604 N.W.2d 646, 649 (Iowa 2000). The commissioner weighs the evidence, and we should broadly and liberally apply those findings in order to uphold, rather than defeat, the commissioner's decision. Id. We are not free to interfere with a commissioner's decision just because inconsistent conclusions may be drawn from the same evidence. Quaker Oats Co. v. Ciha, 552 N.W.2d 143, 150 (Iowa 1996).
[E]vidence is not insubstantial merely because it would have supported contrary inferences. Nor is evidence insubstantial because of the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from it. The ultimate question is not whether the evidence supports a different finding but whether the evidence supports the findings actually made.
City of Hampton v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 554 N.W.2d 532, 536 (Iowa 1996).
When there are two successive work-related injuries, the employer liable for the second injury is generally held liable for the entire disability resulting from the combination of the prior disability and the present injury. Second Injury Fund v. Nelson, 544 N.W.2d 258, 265 (Iowa 1995). As the district court noted, there is ample evidence in the record to support a finding Farmer's position with Allied aggravated a pre-existing condition, thereby causing her further injury for which petitioners are fully liable. The employer argues no expert testimony or any credible evidence shows Farmer suffered from chronic pain syndrome as a result of her work with Allied. It suggests she had the syndrome before she came to Allied and it did not worsen. However, we agree with the district court when it said, "The medical record demonstrates that the keyboarding activities which Respondent performed for Petitioner did aggravate and exacerbate her earlier work related injuries and ultimately precipitated the chronic pain syndrome which was diagnosed by Dr. Koenig in October of 1999." Because substantial evidence supports the agency's decision, we find no error in the district court's order affirming it.
IV. Permanent and Total Disability.
Petitioners next contend the court erred in affirming the workers' compensation commissioner's decision because substantial evidence does not support a finding Farmer is permanently and totally disabled. We disagree. The district court cites two persuasive sources to support the deputy commissioner's findings. First, Dr. Koenig concluded in an August 9, 2000 report, "I do not believe the patient retains sufficient functional capacity to engage in any type of competitive employment situation." Secondly, a vocational expert classified Farmer as "totally vocationally disabled." This is ample evidence to support the deputy commissioner's finding, and we find no error.