Opinion
A21-1260
07-22-2022
Davon Allen, petitioner, Appellant, v. State of Minnesota, Respondent.
Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-CR-16-20317
Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Klaphake, Judge. [*]
ORDER OPINION
PETER M. REYES, JR. JUDGE
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. In May 2017, after a court trial based on stipulated evidence, a district court found appellant Davon Allen guilty of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(e)(ii) (2014). Under that statute, a person is guilty of first-degree criminal sexual conduct if he engages in sexual penetration of another person while knowing, or having reason to know, that the other person is physically helpless and causes personal injury. Id. A person is "physically helpless" if that person is "asleep or not conscious." Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 9(a) (2014). The district court found appellant guilty after determining that appellant sexually penetrated the victim without her consent while she was asleep and caused a genital laceration.
2. Appellant challenged the trial procedure in a direct appeal, arguing that he never agreed to the stipulated evidence. State v. Allen, No. A17-1704, 2018 WL 4201206, at *2 (Minn.App. Sept. 4, 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 27, 2018). We affirmed appellant's conviction, and the Minnesota Supreme Court denied review. See id. at *4.
3. Appellant filed his first postconviction petition in July 2019, making the same argument he raised in his direct appeal. The postconviction court dismissed his petition after concluding that it was procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737 (Minn. 1976).
4. Appellant filed a second postconviction petition in April 2021, arguing that he is entitled to a new trial based on the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in State v. Khalil, 956 N.W.2d 627 (Minn. 2021). The postconviction court summarily denied appellant's petition, determining that Knaffla procedurally barred it and that Khalil does not apply to appellant's conviction. This appeal follows.
Appellant originally filed this action as a petition for a writ of mandamus. We construed that petition as an appeal of the postconviction court's denial of his postconviction petition.
5. We review a denial of a postconviction petition for an abuse of discretion. See Matakis v. State, 862 N.W.2d 33, 36 (Minn. 2015). We will not reverse unless the postconviction court acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, based its decision on an erroneous interpretation of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings. Id.
6. Under Knaffla, matters raised or known at the time of direct appeal will not be considered in a later petition for relief. 243 N.W.2d at 741. There are two exceptions: a postconviction court may consider a claim that (1) is "so novel that [its] legal basis was not available" at the time of the direct appeal or (2) "has substantive merit and the petitioner did not deliberately and inexcusably fail to raise [it] in a prior proceeding." Pearson v. State, 891 N.W.2d 590, 597-98 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted).
7. Appellant contends that the sexual acts that occurred were consensual and that his conviction is based on the fact that the victim could not consent to sex due to intoxication. Appellant relies on the Khalil decision. In Khalil, the supreme court held that a person is not "mentally incapacitated" under Minnesota's criminal-sexual-conduct statutes if that person is voluntarily intoxicated. 956 N.W.2d at 634-42.
8. Appellant's arguments regarding the victim's consent and voluntary intoxication are based on alleged facts known to appellant at the time of his direct appeal and are therefore procedurally barred under Knaffla unless an exception applies.
9. Appellant argues that he is entitled to relief because the Khalil decision is recent and therefore novel. But under the first Knaffla exception, a claim must be "so novel that [its] legal basis was not available" in the earlier proceeding. Pearson, 891 N.W.2d at 597-98 (quotation omitted). The legal basis for appellant's argument is a matter of statutory interpretation, which was available to him at the time of his direct appeal. Additionally, even assuming that the supreme court's holding in Khalil regarding mental incapacitation constitutes a novel legal claim not available to appellant during his direct appeal, that holding does not apply to appellant's conviction based on the district court's finding that he sexually penetrated the victim while she was physically helpless because she was asleep.
10. Appellant is also not entitled to relief under the second Knaffla exception, which requires a petitioner's claim to have substantive merit. See Pearson, 891 N.W.2d at 598. As noted above, the district court convicted appellant of sexually assaulting the victim while she was "physically helpless." The supreme court's decision in Khalil interpreted the statutory definition of "mentally incapacitated" and is not applicable to appellant's offense. Accordingly, appellant's claim that he is entitled to relief under Khalil lacks substantive merit. Because no exception to Knaffla applies, the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant's second petition for postconviction relief.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The postconviction court's order is affirmed.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
[*] Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.