No. 05-10-00014-CR
Opinion Filed May 31, 2011. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47.
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F09-56431-H.
Before Justices RICHTER, LANG, and FILLMORE.
Opinion By Justice RICHTER.
A jury convicted Armarniethius Alexander Allen of failure to register as a sex offender. After finding appellant had a prior felony conviction, the jury assessed punishment at eight years' imprisonment. In a single point of error, appellant contends the evidence is legally insufficient to support the verdict. We modify the trial court's judgment and affirm.
Evidence Presented
Dallas police officer Naomi Arroyo testified she responded to a disturbance call involving appellant and a woman named Tabatha Garrett. Appellant and Garrett drove from 3131 Kingsbridge, where the call originated, to police headquarters at 1400 South Lamar to get away from appellant's ex-girlfriend who was firing a gun at them from her vehicle. Arroyo gathered information from Garrett and appellant, and stated a detective would follow-up on their complaint. Appellant gave Arroyo a Texas identification card that recited his address as 904 Muncie. When Arroyo asked appellant if the address on the card was his current address, appellant said he had moved from that address about "a month ago," and was living at 3131 Kingsbridge at his mother's house. Appellant said his ex-girlfriend had chased after him and Garrett with a gun, and that he and the ex-girlfriend had not been together for a while. Arroyo testified she returned the identification card to appellant and concluded her investigation. A short time later, Arroyo discussed the complaint with another officer and told him that appellant said he was living at a different address from the one on his identification card. The other officer searched for appellant's name in the police computer and learned appellant was a registered sex offender. Arroyo testified she did not write in her report that appellant said he was living at 3131 Kingsbridge. Dallas police officer Bret Brown testified that while Arroyo talked with appellant and Garrett, he patrolled the area looking for the suspect vehicle. Appellant and Garrett said they were trying to get away from a suspect named Mekco Holmes who was shooting at them. Brown testified he did not find the suspect vehicle nor any indication that a shooting had actually taken place. Brown returned to police headquarters and talked with Arroyo, who said appellant told her he lived at 3131 Kingsbridge and used to live at 904 Muncie, the address on his identification card. Brown checked appellant's name in the police computer and learned appellant was a registered sex offender with a registered address of 904 Muncie. On June 24, 2009, Brown went to 904 Muncie and talked with Mekco Holmes, the homeowner. Brown testified he did not question Holmes about the alleged shooting, he only asked her if appellant was living there. Holmes said, "[N]o." Brown notified a detective in the sex offender unit that appellant was not living at his registered address. Detective Vidal Olivarez investigates compliance issues involving sex offenders. Olivarez testified a person convicted of a sexual assault offense must register his address and other information with local law enforcement. A sexual assault conviction requires lifetime registration, and a person subject to registration must give seven days' notice before moving to another address. Olivarez testified appellant is required to register every year within thirty days before or after his birthday in October. On appellant's registration in October 2008, he listed his living address as 904 Muncie, and he listed Mekco Holmes as a "relative." Olivarez testified that when he was assigned appellant's case of non-compliance in June 2009, he reviewed the report from Officer Brown and talked with another detective who said Holmes had called the sex offender unit on May 29, 2009 and reported that appellant was not living at his registered address. Olivarez interviewed Holmes at 904 Muncie on June 30, 2009. They sat in the living room, and Olivarez did not look in other rooms of the house. Holmes said appellant was not living there and had been gone for "a month and a half." Holmes gave Olivarez several addresses where he might locate appellant. Olivarez testified he eventually located appellant at a hotel in Mesquite. After viewing a photograph of appellant, the hotel clerk said appellant had been living at the hotel. During the trial, Holmes testified on appellant's behalf. Holmes said she and appellant lived together continuously at 904 Muncie from the time he was released from prison in 2006 until the day he was arrested for failing to register. Holmes testified appellant began having an affair with another woman, and her relationship with appellant deteriorated. Whenever she and appellant argued about the other woman, appellant would go to his mother's house at "3130 Kingsbridge to cool off." However, appellant always came back home, and he spent every night at 904 Muncie. Holmes testified she told the police that appellant was not living at his registered address because she was upset about appellant's affair with the other woman. Appellant did go to a hotel with the other woman, but he always came back to 904 Muncie every night. Holmes testified than whenever she became angry with appellant and "kicked him out," appellant would go to his mother's house. During the prosecutor's cross-examination, an audiotape of Olivarez's telephone call to Holmes and his subsequent interview with her at her home was admitted into evidence and played for the jury. In their telephone conversation, Holmes said appellant was not living at her home at 904 Muncie, and that she had previously called and spoke with another detective to report that appellant was not living there. During the interview at Holmes's residence at 904 Muncie, Holmes said appellant was her boyfriend and he used to live with her. Appellant moved out about "one and a half months ago." Holmes said she believed appellant was living with a "girl named LaSherry" at "3130 Kingsbridge, apartment 23." After the jury heard the audiotape, Holmes testified appellant never moved from her house, and she only said he had because she was mad at appellant about the other woman. Holmes denied that when she was interviewed by one of the prosecutors, she said she would lie or even perjure herself to keep appellant from going to jail. After Holmes's testimony, the State recalled Olivarez, who said he was in the room when a prosecutor talked with Holmes. Olivarez testified he heard Holmes say she would lie on the witness stand "in order for appellant not to go to jail." Applicable Law
In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we examine all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.). We are required to defer to the jury's credibility and weight determinations because the jury is the sole judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given their testimony. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326. Generally, a person commits the offense of failure to comply with registration requirements if the person "is required to register and fails to comply with any requirement" of Chapter 62. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.102 (West 2006). As relevant to his case, a person who is required to register pursuant to chapter 62 fails to comply if he fails to give seven days' notice of intent to change address to the local law enforcement authority designated as the person's primary registration authority. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.055(a) (West Supp. 2010). Here, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant is required to comply with the registration requirements of chapter 62 and he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly failed to report to local law enforcement an intended change of address no later than seven days before he changed address. See id. arts. 62.055(a), 62.102; Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.02(b)-(c) (West Supp. 2010). Discussion
Appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction because he only used his mother's residence as a place to temporarily "cool off" whenever he fought with Holmes, but he neither moved nor had the intention of moving. Appellant asserts that because the officers believed Holmes's statements, even though she was a suspect in a gun offense, the officers never checked to see where appellant kept his belongings or had his mail delivered. Appellant alleges Holmes lied to get back at him. The State responds that the evidence presented is legally sufficient to support appellant's conviction. The jury heard Arroyo's testimony that appellant gave her a Texas identification card listing his registered address, but he verbally stated he had moved from that address. They also heard Brown's testimony that when he learned appellant was a registered sex offender and he was not living at the address listed on his identification card, he contacted the homeowner of the registered address and learned appellant was not living there. Olivarez told the jury about his interview with Holmes, the owner of the residence listed on appellant's identification card. Holmes verified that appellant had not been living at the residence for over a month. Although Holmes told the jury that she had lied to the police about appellant not living at her residence because she was angry about an affair he was having with another woman, the jury heard an audio recording of Holmes's interview with Olivarez. It was the jury's function to resolve any conflicts in the evidence, and the jury was free to accept or reject any and all of the evidence presented by either side. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04 (West 1979); Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Viewing the evidence under the proper standard, we conclude a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant failed to register his change of address as required. Thus, the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction. See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 895. We overrule appellant's sole point of error. Appellant was convicted of failure to register as a sex offender under article 62.102 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.102(a). The trial court's judgment recites the statute for the offense is "22.011 Penal Code." Thus, the judgment is incorrect. We modify the judgment to show the statute for the offense is "62.102(a) Texas Code of Criminal Procedure." See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529-30 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, pet. ref'd). As modified, we affirm the trial court's judgment.