Allen v. St. Cabrini Nursing Home, Inc.

20 Citing cases

  1. Kugler v. Donahoe

    11-CV-648 (RRM) (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2014)   Cited 5 times
    Applying Graham and noting that “[t]he employees' situations need not be identical, but must closely resemble each other”

    "Causation may be proved by showing that the retaliatory action was close in time to the protected activities; that other similarly situated employees were treated differently; or by offering direct proof of retaliatory animus." Allen v. St. Cabrini Nursing Home, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 442, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing Clarke v. City of New York, No. 98-CV-3715, 2011 WL 876926 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2001). If a plaintiff satisfies this showing, the burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employment action.

  2. Facci-Brahler v. Montgomery Cnty.

    1:18-CV-0941 (LEK/ATB) (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2021)   Cited 1 times

    Gorman-Bakos v. Cornell Co-op Extension of Schenectady Cty., 252 F.3d 545, 554 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). While a "substantial time lag between the protected activity and the adverse employment action" bodes poorly for a retaliation claim, Allen v. St. Cabrini Nursing Home, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 442, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), a plaintiff may prove causation, alternatively, "by showing . . . that other similarly situated employees were treated differently[.]" Id. (citing Clarke v. City of New York, No. 98-CV-715, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11136, at *18-19 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2001)).

  3. Pruitt v. Metcalf Eddy Inc.

    03 Civ. 4780 (DF) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2006)   Cited 5 times
    Holding that summary judgment dismissing an employee's race discrimination claim under Title VII was appropriate where employee offered conclusory statements without supporting the statements with evidence

    ) As discussed in connection with Plaintiff's race discrimination claim, however, these assertions lack any evidentiary basis in the record, and thus do not raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether Defendants' reasons for Plaintiff's termination were pretextual. See Allen v. St. Cabrini Nursing Home, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 442, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("Where, as in this case, the employer provides convincing evidence to explain its conduct, and plaintiff's argument consists of purely conclusory allegations of retaliation, the Court may conclude that no material issue of fact exists and grant summary judgment for the employer."). Similarly, Plaintiff offers no evidence to support his bare statement that he was terminated for complaining about religious discrimination.

  4. Facci-Brahler v. Montgomery Cnty.

    1:18-CV-941 (LEK/MJK) (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2024)

    ” Gorman-Bakos v. Cornell Co-op Extension of Schenectady Cnty., 252 F.3d 545, 554 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). While a “substantial time lag between the protected activity and the adverse employment action” bodes poorly for a retaliation claim, a plaintiff may prove causation, alternatively, “by showing . . . that other similarly situated employees were treated differently.” Allen v. St. Cabrini Nursing Home, Inc., 198 F.Supp.2d 442, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citation omitted). Employees must be similarly “situated in all material respects.”

  5. Milord-Francois v. The N.Y. State Office of the Medicaid Inspector Gen.

    635 F. Supp. 3d 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2022)   Cited 4 times

    See Mihalik, 715 F.3d at 116; see also Hughes v. Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 3d 429, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (describing how for retaliation claims, Title VII and NYSHRL impose a but for causation, whereas for NYCHRL claims, the plaintiff must show that the retaliation was pretextual or motivated "at least in part" by an impermissible motive). Finally, Defendants contend that Plaintiff has not shown that other similarly situated employees were treated differently, relying on Allen v. St. Cabrini Nursing Home, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 442, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Defendants argue that JDR treated Mandel in a similar manner, who was also on probationary appointment.

  6. Carpenter v. City of Mount Vernon

    15-cv-0661 (NSR) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2018)   Cited 1 times

    Causation may be established by showing that the retaliation was close in time to the plaintiff's protected action, that similarly situated employees were treated differently, or by direct proof of retaliatory intent. Allen v. St. Cabrini Nursing Home, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 442, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); see Barkley v. Penn Yan Sch. Dist., 442 F. App'x 581, 584 (2d Cir. 2011). After the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.

  7. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Jetstream Ground Servs., Inc.

    134 F. Supp. 3d 1298 (D. Colo. 2015)   Cited 19 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that § 706 "authorizes the EEOC to bring suit in its own name, on behalf of a ‘person or persons aggrieved’ by the employer's unlawful employment practice"

    f three shifts. See Cham v. Station Operators, Inc ., 685 F.3d 87, 94 (1st Cir.2012)(holding that an employee's loss of three shifts on holidays "simply does not rise to the level of an adverse employment action"); Embry v. Callahan Eye Found. Hosp ., 147 Fed.Appx. 819, 829 (11th Cir.2005)(an employee's one-day suspension resulting in a loss of $88.73 was not an adverse action because it did not constitute "a serious and material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment"); Shaver v. Rottinghaus Co., Inc ., 09–1193–EFM, 2011 WL 3880893, at *18 (D.Kan. Sept. 2, 2011)(finding that employer's reduction of employee's hours by approximately 2 hours a week was de minimis harm and did not constitute an adverse employment action); Roe v. Estee Lauder Companies, Inc. , 3:04CV429, 2007 WL 1024120, at *11 (S.D.Ohio Feb. 7, 2007)(finding that a "temporary reduction of her work hours" and the resulting "de minimis reduction in pay" were not materially adverse employment action); Allen v. St. Cabrini Nursing Home, Inc. , 198 F.Supp.2d 442, 449 (S.D.N.Y.2002)(denial of opportunity to work one day's worth of overtime not an adverse employment action where plaintiff had other opportunities to earn overtime pay); Rivers v. Potter , No. 05–4868, 2007 WL 4440880, at *7 (D.N.J.2007)(denial of a single instance of overtime work did not constitute an adverse employment action sufficiently impacting the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment). Accordingly, Ms. Haji has failed to allege that she was subjected to a materially adverse action—a necessary element of a prima facie case for religious accommodation, discrimination, and retaliation claims—and her claims will be dismissed.

  8. Lindsey-Grobes v. United Airlines, Inc.

    Case No.: GJH-14-00857 (D. Md. Oct. 14, 2014)   Cited 16 times
    Finding that poor performance reviews, without allegation of injury, were insufficient to constitute a materially adverse action

    Second, even if Plaintiff's overtime opportunities had been guaranteed (and they were not), the loss of those few opportunities did not affect a significant change to her employment status. See e.g., Cham v. Station Operators, Inc., 685 F.3d 87, 94-95 (1st Cir. 2012) (no adverse employment action where plaintiff's claim "is based on the purported loss of three shifts during the weeks encompassing Labor Day, Thanksgiving, and Christmas" because that "reduction simply does not rise to the level of an adverse employment action in the context of a workplace where schedules fluctuate"); Embry v. Callahan Eye Found. Hosp., 147 Fed. App'x. 819, 829 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that an employee's one-day suspension resulting in a loss of $88.73 did not constitute "a serious and material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment"); Allen v. St. Cabrini Nursing Home, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 442, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (denial of opportunity to work one day's worth of overtime not an adverse employment action where plaintiff had other opportunities to earn overtime pay); Rivers v. Potter, No. 05-4868, 2007 WL 4440880, at *7 (D. N.J. 2007) (determining that the denial of a single instance of overtime work did not constitute an adverse employment action that impacts the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment).

  9. Monclova v. City of N.Y.

    12-CV-3187 (KAM)(RML) (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 29, 2014)   Cited 8 times
    Finding that "three months is a 'generally accepted' time-period for raising an inference of retaliation based on temporal proximity"

    While there is no bright-line rule for how close in time the protected activity and the adverse employment action must be, see Gorman-Bakos v. Cornell Co-op Extension of Schenectady County, 252 F.3d 545, 554 (2d Cir. 2001), claims are routinely dismissed when as few as three months elapse between the protected activity and the alleged retaliation. Breeden, 532 U.S. at 273-74 (citing with approval cases dismissing retaliation claims where adverse employment action followed protected activity by three to four months); Hill v. Citibank Corp., 312 F. Supp. 2d 464, 480-81 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Allen v. St. Cabrini Nursing Home, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 442, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Nicastro v. Runyon, 60 F. Supp. 2d 181, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). "If plaintiff sustains the initial burden [to establish a prima facie case], a presumption of retaliation arises.

  10. Farzan v. Wells Fargo Bank

    12 Civ. 1217 (RJS) (JLC) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2013)   Cited 61 times
    Granting summary judgment on NYCHRL retaliation claim because the plaintiff did not "ma[ke] clear her disapproval of the defendant's discrimination by communicating to [the employer], in substance," the alleged illegal treatment

    Because the underlying facts of the offered non-discriminatory reason for termination are thus undisputed, Farzan can raise no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Defendants' reasons were pretextual as a matter of law. See Pruitt v. Metcalf & Eddy Inc., No. 03 Civ. 4780 (DF), 2006 WL 39621, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2006) (no triable issue surrounding pretext because plaintiff conceded facts underlying insubordination, employer's proffered basis for termination); Allen v. St. Cabrini Nursing Home, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 442, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff'd, 64 F. App'x 836 (2d Cir. 2003) (no issue of material fact surrounding alleged pretext where plaintiff admitted she refused to cooperate in internal investigation).