Opinion
No. 39142.
April 5, 1954.
1. Workmen's Compensation Act — constitutionally valid — exclusive remedy.
In common-law action by widow and sole heir of deceased employee against employer for damages for death of deceased employee on ground that death resulted from failure of employer to furnish deceased employee a reasonably safe place in which to work and reasonably safe instrumentalities with which to work, and employer by answer set up as a defense its compliance with the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, and that widow was thereby precluded from bringing such suit, and demurrer interposed by plaintiff raised issues that Act was violative of Secs. 1, 2 of Art. 1, Secs. 14, 24, 31 of Art. 3, and Secs. 155, 156 and 172 of Art. 6 of Constitution of 1890, and that Sec. 1453, Code of 1942, as amended by Chap. 248, Laws of 1952, repealed the Workmen's Compensation Act insofar as the wrongful death of an employee was concerned, and reinstated the right to maintain such action as it existed prior to enactment of the Compensation Law, Court held that Workmen's Compensation Act was constitutionally valid, and that the re-enactment of Section 1453, as amended by Chap. 248, Laws of 1952, did not repeal or in any way affect the exclusive remedy for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Chap. 354, Laws 1948 as amended by Chap. 248, Laws 1952; Sec. 1453, Code 1942; Secs. 1, 2, Art. 1, Secs. 14, 24, 31, Art. 3, Secs. 155, 156, 157, Art. 6, Constitution 1890.
Headnotes as approved by Lee, J.
APPEAL from the circuit court of Warren County; R.B. ANDERSON, Judge.
Ramsey Ramsey, John B. Gee, Vicksburg, for appellant.
I. The Constitutional prohibitions are such that an acceptable Workmen's Compensation Law may not be passed by the Mississippi Legislature, in harmony with the Constitution of 1890.
II. The Mississippi Act is unique, in that it does not follow closely the plan of any other state, but is predicated upon and patterned, largely, to the Federal Longshoremen and Habor Workers' Act. 33 U.S.C.A, Secs. 901-50, et seq.
III. The Workmen's Compensation Act violates Sections 1, 2, 14, 24, 31, 155 and 156 of the Constitution of 1890. Brien v. Williamson, 8 Miss. 14, 7 Howard 14; Green v. Weller, 32 Miss. 650; Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431; Warren County v. Stone, 69 Miss. 375, 11 So. 4.
IV. Sections 1 and 2 of the Constitution of 1890. Craig v. N. Miss. Community Hospital, 206 Miss. 11, 39 So.2d 528; Pearl River County v. Lacey Lumber Co., 124 Miss. 85, 86 So. 755; Sec. 172, Constitution 1890; 11 Am. Jur., Sec. 44.
V. Section 14 of the Constitution of 1890. Ballard v. Miss. Cotton Oil Co., 81 Miss. 507, 34 So. 533; Cotting v. Kansas Stockyards Co., 183 U.S. 79; Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. State, 94 Miss. 759, 48 So. 858; Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150; Sec. 3, Workmen's Compensation Act.
VI. Section 24 of the Constitution of 1890. Brown v. Levee Comrs., 50 Miss. 468; Chicago, St. L. N.O. Ry. Co. v. Moss, 60 Miss. 1003; Coffman v. Bank of Kentucky, 40 Miss. 29; State v. Marshall, 100 Miss. 626, 56 So. 792; Constitutions of 1817, 1832, 1869; 16 C.J.S. 1500.
VII. Section 31 of the Constitution of 1890. Dement v. Summer, 165 So. 791; Ex parte Wooten, 62 Miss. 174; Isom v. Miss. Cent. R.R. Co., 36 Miss. 300; Markham v. State, 209 Miss. 135, 46 So.2d 88; Natchez S.R. Co. v. Crawford, 99 Miss. 697, 55 So. 596; Scott v. State, 70 Miss. 247, 11 So. 657; State v. Marshall, supra; Williams Yellow Pine Co. v. Henly, 155 Miss. 893, 125 So. 552; Wolfe v. Martin, 2 Miss. 30, 1 Howard 30; Yazoo M.V. Ry. Co. v. Wallace, 90 Miss. 609, 43 So. 469; Sec. 20, Workmen's Compensation Act; 11 Am. Jur., Sec. 317 p. 1107.
VIII. Sections 155 through 156 of the Constitution of 1890. Houston v. Royston, 8 Miss. 543, 7 Howard 543; Montross v. State, 61 Miss. 429; Moore v. Grillis, 205 Miss. 865, 39 So.2d 505; Speakes v. Knox, 144 Miss. 105; Whitney v. Bank of Greenville, 71 Miss. 1009, 15 So. 33.
IX. Police power. Fletcher v. Peck (U.S. Sup. Ct.), 6 Cranch 87; Masonite Corporation v. Lochridge, 163 Miss. 364, 141 So. 758; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623; Pathfinder Coach Division, etc. v. Cottrell, 216 Miss. 358, 62 So.2d 383; State v. Armstead, 103 Miss. 790, 60 So. 778; Town of McCool v. Blaine, 194 Miss. 221, 11 So.2d 801; 11 Am. Jur. pp. 605, 991-4; United States Law Week (January, 1952), 20 L.W. 1099.
X. Partial repeal of Mississippi Workmen's Compensation Law. Albert v. State, 63 So. 667; Cumberland Tel. Tel. Co. v. State, 99 Miss. 1, 54 So. 446; Gibbon v. Brittenum, 56 Miss. 232; Green v. Weller, supra; Oil Company v. Morrison, 212 U.S. 291; Pagaud v. State, 13 Miss. 491, 5 Sm. M. 491; State v. Wyoming Mfg. Co., 103 So. 11; Stingily v. Jackson, 140 Miss. 19, 104 So. 465; Swann v. Buck, 40 Miss. 268; United States v. New York Cent. Ry. Co., 212 U.S. 509; Yerger v. State, 91 Miss. 802, 45 So. 849; Sec. 1453, Code 1942, as amended; House Bill No. 338 (Advance Sheets, p. 59), Laws 1952.
XI. When the question of the constitutionality of a workmen's compensation statute is raised, it must be viewed from the standpoint of both the employee and the employer. Jensen v. So. P. Co., 215 N.Y. 526, 109 N.E. 600; New York Cent. Ry. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188.
Brunini, Everett, Grantham Quin, Vicksburg, for appellee.
I. The Workmen's Compensation Acts may be classed as elective and compulsory. The Mississippi Act is compulsory.
II. It is firmly established that the enactment of Workmen's Compensation Laws is within the legislative competency, even without any specific constitutional authorization. 58 Am. Jur., Sec. 8 p. 580.
III. It is universally held that workmen's compensation legislation gives to the working man more right than he had under common-law actions, more certainty of compensation, less economic loss, less expense in asserting his claims, more speedy remedy with less delay, expense and hardship. 58 Am. Jur., Sec. 2 p. 575.
IV. The Mississippi Workmen's Compensation Law is a proper exercise of the police power reserved to the State. Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431; Pathfinder Coach Division, etc. v. Cottrell, 216 Miss. 358, 60 So.2d 383; 58 Am. Jur., Sec. 9 p. 581.
V. Appellant's constitutional objections.
A. Judicial powers transferred to executive branch. Craig v. N. Miss. Community Hospital, 206 Miss. 11, 39 So.2d 528; Pearl River County v. Lacey Lumber Co., 124 Miss. 85, 86 So. 755; Secs. 1-2, Constitution 1890; 11 Am. Jur., Sec. 14; 58 Am. Jur., Secs. 13, 25 pp. 583, 592; 71 C.J., Sec. 35 p. 290.
B. Due process of law. Brien v. Williamson, 8 Miss. 14, 7 Howard 14; City of Macon v. Benson (Ga.), 166 S.E. 22; Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co. v. Ind. Comm. (Ill.), 125 N.E. 748; Green v. Weller, 32 Miss. 650; Inspiration Copper Co. v. Mendez, 19 Ariz. 151 (affirmed 250 U.S. 400); Jensen v. So. P. Co., 215 N.Y. 514, 109 N.E. 600; New York Cent. Ry. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188; State v. Clausen (Wash.), 117 P. 1101; Warren County v. Stone, 69 Miss. 375, 11 So. 4; Wasilewski v. Warner Sugar Rfg. Co., 149 N Y Supp. 1035; Sec. 14, Constitution 1890; 58 Am. Jur., Secs. 1-2 p. 584.
C. Equal protection of law. Ballard v. Miss. Cotton Oil Co., 81 Miss. 507, 34 So. 533; Cotting v. Kansas Stockyards Co., 183 U.S. 79; Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Blagg, 235 U.S. 571; Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 61 L.Ed. 685; Penny Stores v. Mitchell, 59 F.2d 789, 287 U.S. 672, 77 L.Ed. 580; Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150; Ward Gow v. Krinsky, 259 U.S. 503, 66 L.Ed. 1033; Warren Brokerage Co. v. Miss. Unemp. Comp. Comm., 194 Miss. 855, 13 So.2d 227; Amend. 14, U.S. Constitution; 58 Am. Jur., Sec. 15 p. 585; 71 C.J., Sec. 27 p. 276 (Note 59).
D. Remedy by due course of law. Brown v. Levee Comrs., 50 Miss. 468; Chicago, St. L. N.O. Ry. Co. v. Moss, 60 Miss. 1003; Coffman v. Bank of Kentucky, 40 Miss. 29; State v. Marshall, 100 Miss. 626, 56 So. 792; Sec. 24, Constitution 1890; 58 Am. Jur., Sec. 20 p. 588; 71 C.J., Sec. 24 p. 272 (Notes 30-38); 16 C.J.S. 1500.
E. Trial by jury. Adams v. Iten Biscuit Co. (Okla.), 162 P. 938; Cunningham v. N.W. Impr. Co. (Mont.), 119 P. 554; Zancanelli v. Central Coal Co. (Wyo.), 173 P. 981; Sec. 31, Constitution 1890; 58 Am. Jur., Sec. 17 p. 586; 71 C.J., Sec. 32 p. 285.
F. Jurisdiction of circuit court impaired. Bell v. City of West Point, 51 Miss. 262; Houston v. Royston, 8 Miss. 545, 7 Howard 545; Montross v. State, 61 Miss. 429; Moore v. Grillis, 205 Miss. 865, 39 So.2d 505; Speakes v. Knox, 144 Miss. 105; Whitney v. Bank of Greenville, 71 Miss. 1009, 15 So. 33; Williams v. Smith (Ark.), 170 S.W.2d 82; Secs. 155-6, 172, Constitution 1890.
VI. Workmen's Compensation Act partially repealed. Secs. 1453, 6998-05, Code 1942.
Mrs. Katherine Allen, widow and sole heir of Emmett Leroy Allen, filed her suit in the Circuit Court of Warren County against R.G. Le Tourneau, Inc. to recover damages for the death of her husband, which resulted from the alleged failure to furnish him a reasonably safe place in which to work and reasonably safe instrumentalities with which to work.
The defendant, in its answer, set up as a defense that it had fully complied with the provisions of Chapter 354, Laws of 1948, being the Workmen's Compensation Act; that the deceased was subject thereto; and that the plaintiff was thereby precluded from bringing a common law action for the death of her husband.
The plaintiff demurred to the answer, setting up that the Workmen's Compensation Act is violative of various sections of the Constitution, and that Section 1453, Code of 1942, as amended by Chapter 248, Laws of 1952, repealed the Workmen's Compensation Act insofar as the wrongful death of an employee is concerned, and reinstated the right to maintain such action as it existed prior to the enactment of the Compensation Law.
The demurrer was overruled.
Thereupon the parties entered into a stipulation by which it was agreed that the defendant was covered by and subject to the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, and had accepted and complied with all of its terms, and that the deceased was an employee of the defendant, at the time of his injury and death.
The plaintiff declined to plead further. Whereupon, the court held to be good the defense as set up in the answer and which, as to the true relation of the parties, was substantiated by the stipulation. The cause was thereupon dismissed, and Mrs. Allen appealed.
The appellant assigns and argues that the Workmen's Compensation Act in question violates the following sections of the Constitution of 1890: Sections 1 and 2, Article 1; Section 14, 24 and 31, Article 3; and Sections 155, 156 and 172, Article 6.
(Hn 1) In the recent case of Mrs. Gladys Walters, et al. v. Bennie L. Blackledge, et al., No. 38,970, decided March 22, 1954, and not yet reported in the bound volumes, it was held that our Workmen's Compensation Act is not violative of Sections 1, 2, 14, 24 and 31, supra.
Since the Act, if complied with, is exclusive, no action, common-law or otherwise, exists whereby the original jurisdiction of the circuit court can be invoked under Section 156, supra. Hence the Act is not in violation of that section; nor does it contravene Sections 155 and 172, supra.
With reference to the further contention that Section 1453, supra, as amended by Chapter 248, supra, operated to repeal the Compensation Act and reinstate the right to maintain an action for the wrongful death of an employee, as it existed prior to the original enactment of the law, it is only necessary to say this: The purpose of the amendment was to permit recovery also "whenever the death of any person shall be caused by the breach of any warranty, express or implied, of the purity or fitness of any food, drugs, medicines, beverages, tobacco or any and all other articles or commodities intended for human consumption, as would, had the death not ensued, have entitled the person injured or made ill or damaged thereby, to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, * * *". In other words, a right of action was given to recover when the wrongful death resulted from a breach of warranty. Now Chapter 354, Laws of 1948, did not expressly repeal Section 1453, supra. It did provide an exclusive remedy when its terms were complied with, but "if an employer fails to secure payment of compensation as required by this act, an injured employee, or his legal representative in case death results from the injury, may elect to claim compensation under this act, or to maintain an action at law for damages on account of such injury or death. In such action the defendant may not plead as a defense that the injury was caused by the negligence of a fellow servant, nor that the employee assumed the risk of his employment, nor that the injury was due to the contributory negligence of the employee." Section 5 thereof.
In other words, if the employer fails to secure payment of compensation, the employee or his legal representative may have the choice between claiming compensation under the Act or suing at law for damages, and, in that event, neither the negligence of a fellow servant, assumption of risk, nor contributory negligence can be plead.
Consequently the re-enactment of Section 1453, as amended by Chapter 248, supra, did not repeal or in any way affect the exclusive remedy for Workmen's Compensation as provided by Chapter 354, supra.
It follows therefore that the judgment of the court ought to be, and is, affirmed.
Affirmed.
All justices concur.