Opinion
Civil Action No. SA-98-CA-0193 NSN
May 4, 2001
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT
On this day, the court considered Plaintiff Martin Luther Allen's motion pursuant to FED. R. Civ.P. 59(e) to set aside the judgment entered by this court on September 28, 2OOO. The judgment granted defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiff's civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. All three defendants filed responses to plaintiffs Rule 59(e) motion, and in addition, plaintiff filed a two-page reply brief. After careful consideration, plaintiffs motion to alter or amend the judgment in the case is herebydenied.
Docket Entry 94.
Docket Entry 92.
Docket Entries 95-97.
Contrary to defendant Carroll's assertion in her response, plaintiff's Rule 59 motion was timely filed. Docket Entry 96, at 1-2; and FED. R. Civ. P. 6(a).
A losing party may appeal from a final order granting summary judgment or seek reconsideration of the summary judgment under FED. R.Civ.P. 59 (e) in the trial court. Since specific grounds for a motion to amend or alter are not listed in the rule, the district court enjoys considerable discretion in granting or denying the motion. Reconsideration of a judgment after its entry, however, is an extraordinary remedy which should be used sparingly. In that regard, courts have recognized four basic grounds upon which a Rule 59 (e) motion may be granted. First, the movant may demonstrate that the motion is necessary to correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which the judgment is based. Second, the motion may be granted so that the moving party may present newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence. Third, the motion will be granted if necessary to prevent manifest injustice. And fourth, a Rule 59(e) motion may be justified by an intervening change in controlling law. Significantly, the movant must state the grounds in the motion with enough specificity to put the district court and the opposing party on notice of the reasons for the request for altering or amending the judgment. The purpose of the particularity requirement in FED. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1), made applicable to Rule 59 motions, is to afford notice and an opportunity to respond. Lastly, a Rule 59(e) motion may be not be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.
See Fields, City of South Houston, Texas , 922 F.2d 1183, 1188 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing Lavespere v. Niagara Machine Tool works, Inc ., 910 F.2d 167, 174 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 859 (1993)).
See Edward H. Bohlin Co. v. Banning Co. Inc ., 6 F.3d 350, 355 (5th Cir. 1993) ("The district court has considerable discretion in deciding whether to reopen a case under motions to modify or amend judgment or a motion to vacate judgment, but discretion must be balanced between finality and need to render just decision on basis of all facts."); and Wallace v. Texas Tech University , 80 F.3d 1042, 1052 (5th Cir. 1996).
See Sussman v. Salem, Saxon Nielsen, P.A ., 153 F.R.D. 689 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (where the court stated that reconsideration of a previous order is an extraordinary remedy to be employed sparingly; and thus, concluded that only a change in the law or facts upon which decision is based will justify reconsideration of a previous order); and 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER MARY KAY KANE, FED. PRAC. PROC. Civ. § 2810.1 fn. 13 (2d ed. 1995).
See Brown v. wright , 588 F.2d 708, 710 (9th Cir. 1978); Wilcher v. City of Wilmington , 924 F. Supp. 613, 616 (D. Del. 1996), modified on other grounds, 139 F.3d 366 (3d Cir. 1998), and 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER MARY KAY KANE, FED. PRAC. PROC. Civ. § 2810.1.
See Cambridge Plating Co. Inc. v. Napco, Inc ., 85 F.3d 752, 760 (1st Cir. 1996) (motion for a new trial under FED. R. Civ. P. 59 must state the grounds with particularity); and FED. R .Civ. P. 7 (b)(1).
Cambridge Plating Co ., 85 F.3d at 760; and Registration Control Systems, Inc., v. Compusystems, Inc ., 922 F.2d 805, 807-08 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER MARY KAY KANE, FED. PRAC. PROC. Civ. § 2810.1 fns. 20-22.
Plaintiff's Rule 59(e) motion alleges that the court erred on two basic grounds: (1) by not striking defendants Hall's and Rector's motion for summary judgment as to the defenses of Eleventh Amendment Immunity and Qualified Immunity because they failed to comply with the procedural requirements of Local Rule CV-12, and (2) by granting summary judgment to all three defendants when fact issues remain in dispute. All of these allegations have already been addressed by the court in its Order on summary judgment entered on September 28, 2000. In fact, plaintiff brings nothing new that has not already been considered by the court during the summary judgment proceedings. With respect to plaintiff's allegation that fact issues remain precluding summary judgment in this case, he has failed to specify any summary judgment evidence and/or case authority in support of this allegation. In other words, it is the opinion of this court that plaintiff has failed to meet the particularity requirements of FED.R.CIV.P. 7(b)(1).
Docket Entry 94, at 1-3.
Docket Entry 92, at 12-19.
Having reviewed the record as a whole as well as plaintiffs Rule 59 motion, the court stands, in all respects, by its previous findings as discussed in the "Order Granting Summary Judgment" entered on September 28, 2000. Accordingly,
plaintiffs motion to alter or amend judgment pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 59(e) (Docket Entry 94) is DENIED .