Opinion
CASE NO. 02-CV-71361-DT
April 16, 2002
OPINION AND ORDER OF PARTIAL SUMMARY DISMISSAL
I. Introduction
The Court has before it Plaintiff's pro se civil rights complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has paid the filing fee for this action. Plaintiff is a state prisoner currently confined at the Parnall Correctional Facility in Jackson, Michigan. Defendants are Jackson Police Officers Shane LaPorte and Keith Flores and the Jackson Police Department.
In his complaint, Plaintiff asserts that he was illegally arrested on May 24, 1999 by defendants LaPorte and Flores because they lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him (" Terry stop claim") and did so based upon his race ("racial profiling claim"). Plaintiff further asserts that those officers used excessive force to effectuate his arrest ("excessive force claim"). Plaintiff asserts that the Jackson Police Department failed to adequately train, supervise, or train the officers ("failure to train claim"). Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and other appropriate relief. Having reviewed Plaintiff's complaint, the Court now dismisses the Terry stop and racial profiling claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state claims upon which relief may be granted.
II. Discussion
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub.L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) ("PLRA"), the Court is required to sua sponte dismiss a complaint seeking redress against government entities, officers, and employees which it finds to be frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he was deprived of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the federal Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-57 (1978); Brock v. McWherter, 94 F.3d 242, 244 (6th Cir. 1996). A pro se civil rights complaint is to be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Jones v. Duncan, 840 F.2d 359, 361 (6th Cir. 1988). Despite the liberal pleading standard accorded pro se plaintiffs, the Court finds that Plaintiff's illegal arrest claims concerning the Terry stop and racial profiling are subject to dismissal for failure to state claims upon which relief may be granted. The Court further finds that Plaintiff's excessive force claim and related failure to train claim are not subject to summary dismissal.
A. Terry Stop and Racial Profiling Claims
A claim under § 1983 is an appropriate remedy for a state prisoner challenging a condition of his imprisonment. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499 (1973). In this case, however, it is clear that Plaintiff is actually seeking habeas corpus relief on his racial profiling and Terry stop claims, inasmuch as those claims addresses the validity of his arrest and related state criminal proceedings. See, e.g., McRae v. Marin Co. Sheriff's Dep't., 2000 WL 1482879, *1 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (judgment in plaintiff's favor would imply the invalidity of his conviction because racial profiling claim alleged that he was stopped, his car was searched, and he was arrested without probable cause). Ruling on those claims raised would necessarily imply the invalidity of his continued confinement. Such claims are not properly brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (holding that a state prisoner does not state a cognizable civil rights claim challenging his conviction or imprisonment if a ruling on his claim would necessarily render his continuing confinement invalid, until and unless the reason for his continued confinement has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or has been called into question by a federal court's issuance or a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254); Schilling v. White, 58 F.3d 1081, 1085 (6th Cir. 1995) (Fourth Amendment claim precluded by subsequent conviction); Walker v. Schaeffer, 854 F.2d 138, 142-43 (6th Cir. 1988) (challenge to probable cause for arrest precluded). This holds true regardless of the relief sought by the plaintiff. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487-89. Given that Plaintiff's arrest and/or conviction has not been overturned or declared invalid, his Terry stop and racial profiling claims under § 1983 must be dismissed.
B. Excessive Force Claim and Related Failure to Train Claim
Plaintiff also alleges that defendants LaPorte and Flores violated his constitutional rights by using excessive physical force against him while effectuating his arrest, and that the Jackson Police Department failed to properly train, supervise, and discipline those officers. A prisoner may establish an Eighth Amendment violation under § 1983 if he alleges and proves an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986), or the infliction of pain totally without penalogical justification. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981). Plaintiff's excessive force and failure to train allegations state claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and are therefore not subject to summary dismissal.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state claims upon which relief may be granted regarding the Terry stop and racial profiling illegal arrest claims. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES those claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
Construing the complaint liberally, the Court further concludes that the excessive force claim and the related failure to train claim are not subject to summary dismissal. Accordingly, a copy of the complaint and a copy of this order must be served upon defendants. Plaintiff is responsible for service.
Lastly, the Court concludes that an appeal from this order would be frivolous and therefore cannot be taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 610-11 (6th Cir. 1997).