Courts in this Circuit have consistently held that a single denial of proposed vacation days is not an adverse employment action. See, e.g., Allen v. A.R.E.B.A. Casriel, Inc., No. 15-CV-9965, 2017 WL 4046127, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2017) (holding that two denials of vacation time and personal time off were “‘mere inconvenience[s]' that do not rise to the level of adverse employment actions” (quoting Chukwuka v. City of N.Y., 795 F.Supp.2d 256, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2011))); Lambert v. Trump Int'l Hotel & Tower, 304 F.Supp.3d 405, 418-19 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (holding the same for three denials of vacation time); see also Natofsky v. City of New York, 921 F.3d 337, 352 (2d Cir. 2019) (“[I]t is unlikely that these workplaces changes [including a single denial of vacation time] . . . would count as actionable adverse actions.”). After Kovac rejected Sanchez's vacation request because her “[d]ates are back to back following a weekend,” Sanchez does not allege that she requested different days off.

Jackson's “NYCHRL claim must be construed ‘independently from and more liberally than' his federal claim.” Sandler v. Montefiore Health Sys., Inc., No. 16-CV-2258, 2018 WL 4636835, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2018) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ben-Levy v. Bloomberg L.P., 518 Fed.Appx. 17, 19-20 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary order));see also Allen v. A.R.E.B.A. Casriel, Inc., No. 15-CV-9965, 2017 WL 4046127, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2017) (“[T]he analysis mirrors the McDonnell Douglas framework, but accords Plaintiff a lesser burden ....”).

NYCHRL claims are “evaluated separately from . . . state law claims and given liberal, independent construction.” Gorokhovsky v. N.Y.C. Housing Auth., 552 Fed.Appx. 100, 101 (2d Cir. 2014) (summary order) (citation omitted). Under the NYCHRL, a plaintiff bears “a lesser burden of showing only that Defendants' actions were based, in part, on discrimination.” Allen v. A.R.E.B.A. Casriel, Inc., No. 15 Civ. 9965, 2017 WL 4046127, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2017). The NYCHRL, however, “is not a general civility code, and a defendant is not liable if the plaintiff fails to prove the conduct is caused at least in part by discriminatory or retaliatory motives.” Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 113 (2d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

Under the ADA and the NYSHRL, an employer is not required to provide a perfect accommodation or the accommodation most strongly preferred by the employee, but is required to provide an effective reasonable accommodation. See Noll, 787 F.3d at 94; see also Allen v. A.R.E.B.A. Casriel, Inc., No. 15-cv-9965, 2017 WL 4046127, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2017). Where an employer has taken or offered measures to accommodate a disability

Kerman-Mastour v. Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., Inc., 814 F.Supp.2d 355, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting Williams v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 872 N.Y.S.2d 27, 40 (1st Dep't 2009)). The plaintiff also does not need to show that discriminatory animus caused the treatment but must show that the defendants' actions “were based, in part, on discrimination.” Allen v. A.R.E.B.A. Casriel, Inc., 2017 WL 4046127, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2017). The NYCHRL causation standard is equivalent to the “motivating factor” standard under Title VII and the NYSHRL

The fact that Plaintiff resigned after Tuccillo denied her request for non-FMLA time off on December 7, 2021 is similarly unavailing, as courts consider the denial of requests for paid time off to be a “mere inconvenience.” Allen v. A.R.E.B.A. Casriel, Inc., No. 15-cv-9965 (KPF), 2017 WL 4046127, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2017). 9 II. Plaintiff Does Not Allege Any Other Actionable Claim Under the FMLA

See Bahnsen v. Town of Brookhaven, No. 17 Civ. 4545, 2019 WL 7475951, at * 11 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2019) (granting summary judgment for defendant where plaintiff provided only “unsupported assertion[s] that younger individuals were treated differently”); Allenv.A.R.E.B.A. Casriel, lnc., No. 15 Civ. 9965 (KPF), 2017 WL 4046127, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2017) (granting summary judgment to defendant in ADEA case where there was “no inference of age discrimination supported by the record”).

But that is not to say there is unanimity. Allen v. A.R.E.B.A. Casriel, Inc., 2017 WL 4046127, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2017) (Failla, J.) (“[T]he Second Circuit has not made discriminatory intent a required element of a failure to accommodate claim.”)

Under the ADA and the NYSHRL, an employer is not required to provide a perfect accommodation or the accommodation most strongly preferred by the employee, but is required to provide an effective reasonable accommodation. Noll v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 787 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 2015); see also Allen v. A.R.E.B.A. Casriel, Inc., No. 15-CV-9965, 2017 WL 4046127, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2017). Where an employer has taken or offered measures to accommodate a disability, "the employer is entitled to summary judgment if, on the undisputed record, the existing accommodation is 'plainly reasonable.'"

) Defendant's unwillingness to allow Plaintiff to also take off May 10, 2015 does not rise to the level of an adverse employment action. See Allen v. A.R.E.B.A. Casriel, Inc., No. 15-CV-9965, 2017 WL 4046127, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2017) (finding that although the "plaintiff complains forcefully about her denied vacation and personal time off," the "denials were 'mere inconvenience[s]' that do not rise to the level of adverse employment actions" (citing Chukwuka, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 261)). Accordingly, the Court considers the May 16, 2014 Record of Incident and Corrective Action, February 25, 2015 Final Written Warning, March 18, 2015 Final Written Warning, and June 3, 2015 Record of Incident and Corrective Action (the "corrective actions") and Plaintiff's termination as adverse employment actions and examines below whether there is an inference of discrimination as to any of these actions.