Opinion
OP 22-0204
05-03-2022
ANTHONY ALFORD, et al, Petitioners, v. MONTANA FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, Honorable David Cybulski, presiding, Respondent.
ORDER
By petition filed April 22, 2022, Anthony Alford (Alford), KJK Trucking LLC (KJK), and Alford Farms LLC (Alford Farms) petition this Court for exercise of supervisory control in the underlying matter of Harmon, et al., v. Dual Trucking, Inc., et al, Cause No. DV-2015-15, Montana Fifteenth Judicial District Court, Roosevelt County.The petition seeks extraordinary review of the District Court's February 7, 2022 order denying a defense motion to dismiss the underlying non-resident defendants Alford, KJK, and Alford Farms on the asserted ground that the State of Montana, by and through the District Court, lacks specific personal jurisdiction (i.e., "long-arm" jurisdiction) over those parties under M. R. Civ. P. 4(b)(1) (in re "any claim for relief arising from the doing ... of any of various enumerated "acts") as interpreted in Cimmaron Corp. v. Smith, 2003 MT 73, 315 Mont. 1, 67 P.3d 258, and other cited authority. In summary essence as outlined in the petition and exhibits, at issue in the underlying matter are various contract, tort, trespass, nuisance, declaratory judgment, and derivative punitive damages claims, inter alia, asserted by the underlying plaintiffs/landowners against a multitude of parties including Alford, KJK, Alford Farms, Dual Trucking of Montana, LLC (DTM), and Dual Trucking and Transport, LLC, (DTT), inter alia, arising from and related to a commercial lease and related business contract(s), transactions, and activities regarding DTM/DTT's construction and operation of a commercial facility near Bainville, Montana, as "a trucking mobilization facility" engaged in the "repair, dispatch[, ] and operation] [of] trucks" including the "specialized hauling, treating, and dispos[al] [of] drill cuttings from the Williston Basin oil field" in Montana and North Dakota. DTM and DTT are Louisiana chartered and resident limited liability companies engaged in "general oil field business activities." Alford is an individual Louisiana resident, engaged in various business ventures including "oil field trucking," inter alia. At all times pertinent, Alford was a or the "managing member of DTT and DTM."
Without reference to the actual petitioners, the petition caption denominates the undersigned counsel as counsel for Dual Trucking of Montana, LLC and Dual Trucking and Transport, LLC.
The petition does not seek extraordinary review of the District Court's coincidental ruling in the same order that Montana lacks general personal jurisdiction over those parties under the alternative provision of M. R. Civ. P. 4(b)(1) (in re any "person found within the state").
In pertinent essence, the District Court ruled that Alford, KJK, and Alford Farms were subject to the specific personal jurisdiction (i.e., "long arm" jurisdiction) of the court under M. R. Civ. 4(b)(1) based on its conclusions that the plaintiffs/landowners made a prima facie showing that: (1) defendant Dual Trucking, Inc. (DTI) was a Louisiana chartered and resident business corporation, engaged in business operations in Montana, and the named leasing party under the subject lease; (2) defendants KJK and Alford Farms were both Louisiana chartered and resident companies and the sole or controlling members of DTM and DTT; (3) Alford was at all times pertinent the president of DTI, a or the managing member of DTM and/or DTT, and the controlling member or principal in interest in KJK and Alford Farms; (4) KJK and Alford Farms were members and/or the sole members of DTM and DTT; (5) in his capacity as the president of DTI, Alford "personally made misrepresentations" that induced the plaintiffs/landowners' execution of the subject lease; (6) in his capacity as the or a managing member of DTM and DTT, Alford allegedly committed acts or omissions at issue in the plaintiffs/landowners' asserted contract and tort claims; (7) subject to proof at trial, defendants Alford, KJK, and Alford Farms may be subject to personal liability on the subject contract and/or tort claims in accordance With pertinent agency and corporate veil-piercing principles recognized, for example, in Weaver v. Tri-County Impl. Co., 2013 MT 309, ¶ 12, 372 Mont. 267, 411 P.3d 808, and White v. Longley, 2010 MT 254, ¶ 37, 358 Mont. 268, 244 P.3d 753, inter alia; (8) subject to proof at trial, Alford also may be separately subject to derivative personal liability pursuant to §§ 35-1-936 and -937, MCA, as in effect in 2017, based on his alleged conduct and/or omissions in the liquidation of the tangible assets of DTT. In response, petitioners essentially assert that specific personal jurisdiction over Alford, KJK, and Alford Farms is lacking under M. R. Civ. P. 4(b)(1) and interpretive authority because: (1) Alford has not "transacted any relevant personal business in Montana"; (2) the subject commercial lease and related business contract(s), transactions, and other conduct or omissions at issue were all executed and/or conducted by Alford in his capacity as corporate agent or by other defendant corporate entities as agents of their respective corporate principals; (3) Alford, KJK, and Alford Farms are thus all shielded from personal liability for the alleged contract breaches and tortious acts or omissions committed in their capacities, as applicable, as corporate agents, officers, or principals; and (4) as a consequence of that immunity, Alford, DTM, and DTT are not subject to specific personal jurisdiction under M. R. Civ. P. 4(b)(1) (in re "claims for relief arising from the doing personally, or through an employee or agent, of any of various enumerated "acts").
Petitioners' stated legal theory of immunity regarding KJK and Alford Farms is similar to that stated for Alford but its precise application to the particular pertinent facts is not entirely clear on the face of the petition.
Alford, KJK, and 'Alford Farms accordingly assert that exercise of supervisory control is warranted pursuant to M. R. App. P. 14(3)(a) and (b) on the asserted ground that the District Court is proceeding under a manifest mistake of law of statewide importance which will result in gross injustice for which ordinary appeal will be an inadequate remedy. As pertinent here, exercise of supervisory control is proper only in our discretion upon an affirmative showing that: (1) the lower court is proceeding under a manifest mistake of law involving purely legal questions not dependent on disputed material facts; (2) under circumstances involving issues of statewide importance, danger of inevitable procedural entanglement, or where the disputed ruling will dramatically affect the cost and scope of trial preparation, presentation, and claim settlement dynamics; and (3) which will thus result in gross injustice for which ordinary appeal will be an inadequate remedy. M. R. App. P. 14(3)(a) and (b); Stokes v. Mont. Thirteenth Judicial Dist. Ct. (Stokes I), 2011 MT 182, ¶¶ 6-8, 361 Mont. 279, 259 P.3d 754; Truman v. Mont. Eleventh Judicial Dist. Ct., 2003 MT 91, ¶ 15, 315 Mont. 165, 68 P.3d 654; Park v. Mont. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct., 1998 MT 164, ¶ 13, 289 Mont. 367, 961 P.2d 1267; Plumb v. Mont. Fourth Judicial Dist. Ct., 279 Mont. 363, 370, 927 P.2d 1011, 1015-16 (1996). However, we will not allow supervisory control to substitute for ordinary appeal at the convenience of the parties-it is generally appropriate "[o]nly in the most extenuating circumstances." State ex rel. Ward v. Schmall, 190 Mont. 1, 4, 617 P.2d 140, 141 (1980).
Upon petition for exercise of supervisory control, we may, in our discretion, either order a summary response from the subject court and/or opposing part(ies) or, alternatively, deny and dismiss the petition as facially insufficient in our discretion. M. R. App. P. 14(7)(a). Upon due consideration of the petition and submitted exhibits (i.e., the plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint and the written ruling and judgment of the District Court), we find and conclude that, without prejudice to ordinary appeal, supervisory control is not necessary or appropriate here because Alford, KJK, and Alford Farms have failed to demonstrate that the District Court is proceeding under a manifest mistake of law involving purely legal questions not dependent on disputed material facts.
IT IS ORDERED therefore that the above-referenced Petition for exercise of supervisory control is hereby DENIED.
The Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to provide immediate notice of this Order to all counsel of record in this matter and to the Clerk and presiding judge in the underlying matter of Harmon, et al, v. Dual Trucking, Inc., et al., Cause No. DV-2015-15, Montana Fifteenth Judicial District Court, Roosevelt County, Hon. David Cybulski, presiding.