Opinion
No. 7:20-CV-00202-D
02-23-2021
Mia C. Alford, Plaintiff, v. Kathleen McGettigan, Acting Director of the Office of Personnel Management, Defendant.
Order & Memorandum & Recommendation
This case is the latest of several suits Plaintiff Mia Alford has filed seeking disability retirement benefits from the federal government. Although Alford missed the deadline to file for benefits by 16 years, she claims this should not be held against her because she was mentally ill during the filing period. She asks this court to reverse the Merit Systems Protection Board's 2016 decision dismissing her benefits claim based on the doctrine of laches.
Before the court is Alford's request to proceed without paying the filing fee, otherwise known as proceeding in forma pauperis. Given Alford's request to proceed IFP, the court must also conduct the screening required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
After reviewing Alford's filings, the court will grant Alford's IFP motion. But the court should transfer this matter to the Federal Circuit because that court has exclusive jurisdiction to review the Merit Systems Protection Board's decision.
I. Background
Alford worked for the Drug Enforcement Agency as a clerk-typist. The DEA eventually placed Alford on limited duty because a medical condition required her to avoid strenuous activities. She struggled with her limited duty tasks, especially on days she had therapy. She started not returning to work after therapy and her supervisors believed she was forging her time slips. The DEA terminated her in 1996 for violating its leave policy, although Alford claims that her supervisors never told her that they had fired her.
Alford appealed her termination to the MSPB in January 2013. The MSPB's dismissed Alford's appeal as untimely two months later. It determined that she failed to show that her appeal was timely or that good cause existed for her delay in filing.
After receiving this unfavorable decision, Alford asked the MSPB to review the March 2013 decision. But the board affirmed its initial decision in February 2014. As part of its decision, the board rejected Alford's claim that she was too mentally ill to file her appeal because she filed other claims during the same period.
Alford then appealed to the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit transferred the case to the Eastern District of North Carolina because she included allegations of discrimination in her appeal.
This court vacated the MSPB's decision. It found that Alford suffered from mental illness during the appeal period. So the court ordered the MSPB to waive its timely filing requirement.
When the case returned to the MSPB, the DEA argued that the doctrine of laches barred Alford's claim. The agency explained that, based on the lapse of time, critical witnesses' recollections had faded, and the agency had destroyed relevant documents under its document retention policies. These circumstances, the agency claimed, "materially prejudiced DEA's ability to defend this action." In response, Alford said that she "was mentally ill when [sic] and incapable of handling her affairs."
The MSPB sided with the DEA in August 2016. The Board found that laches barred Alford's appeal because her 16-year delay was unreasonable and materially prejudiced the agency. The MSPB told Alford that if she wanted to appeal the decision, she must do so no later than 30 days after the decision became final (September 9, 2016). And it cautioned her to "be very careful to file on time." But Alford did not appeal the final decision.
Three years later, Alford sued Beth Cobert, the Acting Director of the Office of Personnel Management, and William Barr, the United States Attorney General, for allegedly violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Americans with Disabilities Act. She also brought a defamation claim against them. Alford based her claims on the allegation that the DEA wrongly fired her. This court dismissed her complaint in October 2020 for failure to state a claim.
Alford now returns to this court to try to recover her benefits. She claims that the DEA fired her because of lies by her supervisor. And she asserts that this court previously stated that she was unable to file for disability on her own because of her mental incapacitation. Thus, she argues, the MSPB should not have dismissed her action.
II. Analysis
There are two aspects of Alford's case before the court. First, Alford asks to proceed IFP. The court will grant this request because she lacks the necessary funds to pay the costs associated with litigation.
Second, the court must conduct screening required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The undersigned recommends that the district court transfer this case to the Federal Circuit because it has exclusive jurisdiction over Alford's claim. Alternatively, the court should dismiss Alford's case because it is untimely and barred by res judicata.
A. Alford's IFP Motion
Alford asks the court to allow her to proceed with her action without paying the required filing fee and other costs associated with litigation (colloquially known as proceeding in forma pauperis or IFP). The court may grant her request if she submits an affidavit describing her assets and the court finds that she cannot pay the filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915. In assessing a request to proceed IFP, the court should consider whether the plaintiff can pay the costs associated with litigation "and still be able to provide himself and his dependents with the necessities of life." Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948) (internal quotations omitted).
Alford filed a financial affidavit showing she has little income and no savings. Her lack of financial resources entitles her to IFP status since she cannot afford to pay the costs associated with litigation. So the court grants her IFP Motion.
B. The district court should transfer Alford's case to the Federal Circuit because it has exclusive jurisdiction to review the MSPB's decisions.
Along with determining whether Alford is entitled to IFP status, the court must also analyze the viability of the claims in the Complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The court reviews a complaint to eliminate those claims that unnecessarily impede judicial efficiency and the administration of justice. The court must dismiss any portion of the complaint it determines is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A court may also consider whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction over a complaint as part of the frivolity review. See Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that "[d]etermining the question of subject matter jurisdiction at the outset of the litigation is often the most efficient procedure").
The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 ("CSRA"), 5 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., allows certain federal employees to obtain administrative and judicial review of specified adverse employment actions. An employee has the right to a hearing and representation before the Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB") if the agency takes final adverse action against the him. §§ 7513(d), 7701(a)(1)-(2). The MSPB may order relief to prevailing employees, including reinstatement, backpay, and attorney's fees. §§ 1204(a)(2), 7701(g).
An employee who is dissatisfied with the MSPB's decision is entitled to judicial review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. That court has "exclusive jurisdiction" over appeals from a final decision of the MSPB. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9); see also 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1) (judicial review of an MSPB decision "shall be" in the Federal Circuit).
There is only one exception to the Federal Circuit's exclusive jurisdiction over reviews of the MSPB's decisions. That exception arises "[w]hen a covered employee 'alleges that a basis for the action was discrimination' prohibited by enumerated federal employment laws." Elgin v. Dep't of Treasury, 567 U.S. 1, 13 (2012) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7702(a)(1)(B)). When an employee includes allegations of discrimination with a request to review a MSPB decision, the case may proceed in federal district court, instead of the Federal Circuit. 5 U.S.C. § 7702, 7703(b)-(c).
After reviewing the Complaint, the undersigned concludes that this court lacks jurisdiction over Alford's claim. This only claim here involves reviewing a decision from the MSPB. And Congress has explained "a petition to review a final order or final decision of the Board shall be filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit." 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A).
Alford's only claim is that the 2016 MSPB is incorrect. Lacking any allegation of discrimination, Alford cannot proceed in this court. Instead, she must seek relief from the Federal Circuit. So the district court should transfer this action to that court.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the court grants Alford's IFP motion. D.E. 1. The district court should transfer this matter to the Federal Circuit for further proceedings.
The Clerk of Court must serve a copy of this Memorandum and Recommendation ("M&R") on each party who has appeared in this action. Any party may file a written objection to the M&R within 14 days from the date the Clerk serves it on them. The objection must specifically note the portion of the M&R that the party objects to and the reasons for their objection. Any other party may respond to the objection within 14 days from the date the objecting party serves it on them. The district judge will review the objection and make their own determination about the matter that is the subject of the objection. If a party does not file a timely written objection, the party will have forfeited their ability to have the M&R (or a later decision based on the M&R) reviewed by the Court of Appeals. Dated: February 23, 2021.
/s/_________
ROBERT T. NUMBERS, II
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE