Summary
determining that the plaintiff's claims that he was denied the right to view certain pieces of evidence, including unredacted relevant reports, would, if successful, "have an effect on the duration of his overall confinement"
Summary of this case from Adams v. AnnucciOpinion
02-CV-0589(Sr).
March 24, 2004
DECISION AND ORDER
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties have consented to the assignment of this case to the undersigned to conduct all proceedings in this case, including the entry of final judgment. Dkt. #9.
On August 16, 2002, plaintiff filed his complaint pro se, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking compensatory damages and return to the general population, for violations of his constitutional rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Dkt. #1. Specifically, plaintiff claims that on May 9, 2001, officials at Southport Correctional Facility ("Southport"), subjected him to excessive force and then denied him due process at the resulting disciplinary hearing. Dkt. #1. By Order entered July 2, 2003, plaintiff was permitted to amend his complaint to substitute Deputy Superintendent Michael Corcoran in place of Superintendent McGinnis. Dkt. ##43, 61.
Currently before the Court are the following motions:
(1) motion for summary judgment on behalf of defendants Selsky, Corcoran and Donahue (Dkt. #18);
(2) plaintiff's motion to submit interrogatories to defendants Mastrontinio and Marshall (Dkt. #22);
(3) plaintiff's motion to submit interrogatories to defendants Selsky, Hillard and Casslberry (Dkt. #28);
(4) motion for a protective order on behalf of defendants Selsky, Corcoran and Donahue (Dkt. #29);
(5) plaintiff's motion to compel responses to interrogatories by defendants Mastrontinio, Murley and Marshall (Dkt. #37);
(6) plaintiff's motion to resubmit interrogatories to defendants Mastrontinio and Marshall (Dkt. #41);
(7) plaintiff's motion for protection from retaliation seeking transfer out of the Auburn Correctional Facility (Dkt. #62);
(8) plaintiff's motion for judgment with respect to his motion for protection from retaliation (Dkt. #68); and
(9) plaintiff's motion for a preliminary conference.
Dkt. #69.
BACKGROUND
During the time period alleged in the complaint, plaintiff was an inmate at Southport. Dkt. #1. Plaintiff alleges that defendants Murley, Mastrontinio, Marshall, Casslberry, and Hillard subjected him to excessive force on May 9, 2001. Dkt. ##1, 20, 59. Following this incident, plaintiff was subjected to a tier III disciplinary hearing conducted by defendant Donahue. Dkt. ##1, 20, 59. Defendant Donahue found plaintiff guilty of committing an unhygienic act, assault on staff and failing to obey a direct order and sentenced him to two years in SHU (six months suspended); fourteen days restricted diet (seven days suspended); and 12 months recommended loss of good time. Dkt. #21, ¶ 3. Defendants Corcoran and Selsky affirmed plaintiff's sentence following administrative appeal. Dkt. ##1, 20, 59.
"Tier III hearings concern the most serious violations and may result in unlimited SHU confinement (up to the length of the sentence) and recommended loss of `good time' credits." Hynes v. Squillace, 143 F.3d 653, 655 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 525 U.S. 907 (1998).
Prisoners' Legal Services of New York wrote defendant Selsky seeking reconsideration of the results of this disciplinary hearing. Dkt. #20; Dkt. #21, Exh. C; Dkt. #59. Following this communication, defendant Selsky reduced plaintiff's penalty to six months of SHU (suspended); seven days restricted diet (suspended); and six months recommended loss of good time. Dkt. #20, Dkt. #21, ¶ 7; Dkt. #59.
ANALYSIS
Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "In reaching this determination, the court must assess whether there are any material factual issues to be tried while resolving ambiguities and drawing reasonable inferences against the moving party, and must give extra latitude to a pro se plaintiff." Thomas v. Irvin, 981 F. Supp. 794, 799 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (internal citations omitted).
A fact is "material" only if it has some effect on the outcome of the suit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see Catanzaro v. Weiden, 140 F.3d 91, 93 (2d Cir. 1998). A dispute regarding a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 849 (1991).
Once the moving party has met its burden of "demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must come forward with enough evidence to support a jury verdict in its favor, and the motion will not be defeated merely upon a `metaphysical doubt' concerning the facts, or on the basis of conjecture or surmise." Bryant, 923 F.2d at 982. A party seeking to defeat a motion for summary judgment
must do more than make broad factual allegations and invoke the appropriate statute. The [party] must also show, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that there are specific factual issues that can only be resolved at trial.Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 872 (2d Cir. 1995).
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e), affidavits in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment "shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." Thus, affidavits "must be admissible themselves or must contain evidence that will be presented in an admissible form at trial." Santos v. Murdock, 243 F.3d 681, 683 (2d Cir. 2001), citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986); see also H.Sand Co. v. Airtemp Corp., 934 F.2d 450, 454-55 (2d Cir. 1991) (hearsay testimony that would not be admissible if testified to at trial may not properly be set forth in an affidavit).
Defendants Selsky, Corcoran and Donahue argue that plaintiff's denial of due process claims must be dismissed pursuant to the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997). Dkt. #19, p. 3. Plaintiff responds that he is not seeking restoration of his good time credits. Dkt. #57, p. 3
Federal law opens two main avenues to relief on complaints related to imprisonment: a petition for habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and a complaint under . . . 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Challenges to the validity of any confinement or to particulars affecting its duration are the province of habeas corpus; requests for relief turning on circumstances of confinement may be presented in a § 1983 action. Some cases are hybrids, with a prisoner seeking relief unavailable in habeas, notably damages, but on allegations that not only support a claim for recompense, but imply the invalidity either of an underlying conviction or of a particular ground for denying release short of serving the maximum term of confinement. In Heck v. Humphrey, we held that where success in a prisoner's § 1983 damages action would implicitly question the validity of conviction or duration of sentence, the litigant must first achieve favorable termination of his available state, or federal habeas, opportunities to challenge the underlying conviction or sentence. Accordingly, in Edwards v. Balisok, we applied Heck in the circumstances of a § 1983 action claiming damages and equitable relief for a procedural defect in a prison's administrative process, where the administrative action taken against the plaintiff could affect credits toward release based on good-time served. In each instance, conditioning the right to bring a § 1983 action on a favorable result in state litigation or federal habeas served the practical objective of preserving limitations on the availability of habeas remedies.Muhammad v. Close, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 1303, 1304 (Feb. 25, 2004) (citations omitted). "Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidation of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated." Heck, 512 U.S. at 487.
In the instant case, plaintiff complains that his due process rights were denied during a disciplinary hearing when defendants presented plaintiff with redacted copies of use of force and unusual incident reports; refused to allow him to see photographs of the injuries sustained by corrections officers; relied upon misbehavior reports which were not endorsed by the officers involved; and refused to call certain witnesses. Dkt. #1. As a result, plaintiff was ultimately sentenced to six months of SHU (suspended); seven days restricted diet (suspended); and six months recommended loss of good time. Dkt. #20, Dkt. #21, ¶ 7; Dkt. #59.
If plaintiff was able to demonstrate that defendants denied him due process in the disciplinary hearing, there would be no basis for penalizing him with six months loss of good time credits. Thus, plaintiff's claim, if successful, would have an effect on the duration of his overall confinement. Accordingly, plaintiff's claim cannot be commenced pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 absent favorable termination of his available state, or federal habeas, opportunities to challenge the recommended loss of good time credits. See Gomez v. Kaplan, 2000 WL 1458804 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2000); see also McNair v. Sgt. Jones, 2002 WL 31082948 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2002), RR adopted by 2003 WL 22097730 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2003); Hyman v. C. Holder, 2001 WL 262665 (S.D.N.Y. March 15, 2001). Since plaintiff has not successfully challenged the imposition of six months recommended loss of good time, the motion for summary judgment on behalf of defendants Selsky, Corcoran and Donahue is granted.
Discovery
Having granted summary judgment to defendants Selsky, Corcoran and Donahue with respect to plaintiff's claim of denial of due process during a disciplinary hearing, there is no need for plaintiff to obtain discovery from these defendants with respect to that hearing. Accordingly, the motion for a protective order on behalf of these defendants is granted. Inasmuch as defendants Casslberry, Hillard, Mastrontinio, Marshall, and Murley have responded to plaintiff's interrogatories, plaintiff's motions with respect to such interrogatories are denied as moot. Dkt. ##34-35, 47-49). Retaliation
Plaintiff, who has been transferred to Auburn Correctional Facility ("Auburn"), complains that he has suffered retaliation by, inter alia, Sgt. Murray, who now works at Auburn. Dkt. ##62, 68. Plaintiff asks the Court to order his transfer out of Auburn. Dkt. #62, 68.
The Court lacks the authority to order that the defendant be imprisoned in any particular facility. See United States v. Williams, 65 F.3d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1995); Fisher v. Goord, 981 F. Supp. 140, 176 (W.D.N.Y. 1997); United States v. Hollenbeck, 932 F. Supp. 53, 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Moreover, to the extent that plaintiff claims a violation of constitutional rights arising from the conditions of his confinement at Auburn, the appropriate forum for such claims is the Northern District of New York.
Status Conference
A status conference will be held on Monday, April 26, 2004 at 2:00 p.m. The Attorney General should contact Auburn and arrange for the plaintiff to have access to a telephone and plaintiff's legal papers at that time. The Attorney General should contact the Magistrate Judge's Chambers prior to the conference with the telephone number and extension of the plaintiff. The Court will initiate the call. Defendants' counsel need not appear personally but can participate by telephone from his office.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the motions for summary judgment and a protective order on behalf of defendants Selsky, Corcoran and Donahue (Dkt. ##18, 29), are GRANTED and the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in favor of these defendants; plaintiff's motions regarding interrogatories (Dkt. ##22, 28, 37, 41), are DENIED AS MOOT; plaintiff's motions seeking transfer out of Auburn (Dkt. ##62, 68), are DENIED; and plaintiff's motion for a preliminary conference (Dkt. #69), is GRANTED.
The Court hereby certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith, and leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals as a poor person is denied. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962). Further requests to proceed on appeal as a poor person should be directed, on motion, to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in accordance with Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.