Opinion
No. 00 C 2907.
January 14, 2005
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before the court are various motions in limine brought by the respective parties. For the reasons set forth below, Mount Sinai's motion in limine No. 3 is granted, motion Nos. 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 are denied, and motion Nos. 1 and 4 are granted in part and denied in part. Dr. Rosman's motion in limine Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25 are denied, and motion No. 1 is granted in part and denied in part. Sinai Group's motion Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25 are denied.
BACKGROUND
In September 1999, Plaintiff, Irma Alexander ("Alexander"), Special Administrator of the Estate of Christen Crutcher, brought suit against the Defendants in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. The complaint sought damages for alleged medical negligence that resulted in the death of Christen Crutcher ("Ms. Crutcher").
For purposes of this opinion, Mount Sinai Hospital Medical Center of Chicago and Sinai Health System will be referred to collectively as "Mount Sinai." Joseph Rosman, M.D. will be referred to as "Dr. Rosman" and Sinai Medical Group will be referred to as "Sinai Group."
Ms. Crutcher underwent surgery on October 2, 1997, to remove a tumor from the right side of her pelvis. Her surgery was performed by Godwin Onyema, M.D. ("Dr. Onyema"). Several days after the surgery, hospital residents suspected that she had a post-operative infection and pneumonia. On October 9, a CT scan revealed that Ms. Crutcher had an abdominal abscess. Her physicians opted to drain the abscess with a CT-guided needle rather than subject her to general anesthesia and surgery. Despite this drainage, Ms. Crutcher's clinical condition worsened, and on October 16, she underwent exploratory surgery. During this surgery, it was discovered that Ms. Crutcher had a bowel perforation. Ms. Crutcher died on November 13, 1997. Alexander claims that the United States' agent, Dr. Onyema, was negligent in allegedly: (1) failing to recognize signs and symptoms of a perforated bowel in a timely fashion; (2) failing to order a surgical consultation sooner; (3) failing to order an infectious disease consultation sooner; and (4) failing to order a CT scan sooner.
Under the Federally Supported Health Care Assistance Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. § 233(g)-(n), federally supported health centers, their employees, and certain contractors are provided coverage under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2671,et seq., for acts or omissions that occurred either on or after January 1, 1993, or when the health center was deemed eligible for coverage, whichever is later. Sinai Family Health Centers was deemed eligible for coverage under the Act on July 1, 1997. At all times relevant to the complaint, Dr. Onyema was considered a federal employee by virtue of his contract with Sinai Family Health Centers.
A civil action that is commenced in state court, which is based upon a tort claim against a federal employee acting within the scope of employment, is removable to federal court at any time before trial, and the United States is substituted as the defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, this case was removed from state court to this court on May 12, 2000, by the United States. Discovery has been completed and the case is poised for trial. The parties have filed various motions in limine.
LEGAL STANDARD
A federal district court's authority to manage trials includes the power to exclude evidence pursuant to motions in limine. Falk v. Kimberly Services, Inc., 1997 WL 201568, *1 (N.D. Ill. 1997). However, a court has the power to exclude evidence in limine only when that evidence is clearly inadmissible on all potential grounds. Hawthorne Partners v. ATT Technologies, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 1398, 1400 (N.D. Ill. 1993). A district court should be mindful that some proposed evidentiary submissions cannot be accurately evaluated in a pretrial context via a motion in limine. Tzoumis v. Tempel Steel Co., 168 F. Supp. 2d 871, 873 (N.D. Ill. 2001). For this reason, certain evidentiary rulings should be deferred to trial so that questions of foundation, relevancy, and potential prejudice may be resolved in proper context. Hawthorne Partners, 831 F. Supp. at 1400. Denial of a motion in limine does not automatically mean that all evidence contemplated by the motion will be admitted at trial. Id. at 1401. Instead, the court will entertain objections to individual proffers as they occur at trial. Id. In any event "the district judge is free, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, to alter a previous in limine ruling." Luce v. U.S., 469 U.S. 38, 41-42 (1984). With these principles in mind, we turn to the present motions.DISCUSSION
A. Mount Sinai's Motions in Limine Motion in Limine No. 1Mount Sinai's first motion in limine consists of various parts. We address each in turn. First, Mount Sinai moves to bar witnesses other than the parties from the courtroom during the testimony of any witness or the presentation of arguments of any party to the court. This motion is denied to the extent that it seeks to exclude all witnesses, whether parties, experts, or the like from the courtroom.
Next, Mount Sinai moves to bar Alexander from attempting to elicit, from any retained witness on direct examination, any opinion other than those previously expressed in depositions or through Fed.R.Civ.P. 26 disclosures. Further, Mount Sinai moves that each party advise his or her retained witnesses, on direct examination, to confine their opinions to those expressed in their respective depositions or through Fed.R.Civ.P. 26 submissions. This aspect of the motion is granted.
Mount Sinai specifically refers to discovery depositions in its motion. Because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure make no such distinction, we treat all depositions taken in the present matter the same.
Mount Sinai also moves to bar Alexander from eliciting testimony from any physician, nurse, Defendant or retained witness regarding the number of malpractice suits in which they have been named as a defendant. Mount Sinai argues that this testimony would only serve to confuse and inflame the jury and is inadmissible. Crucial to any reasonable analysis of this argument is the purpose for which the elicited testimony in question is being offered. At first glance, the danger of unfair prejudice could implicate Fed.R.Evid. 403. However, when offered for another purpose (to cure improper bolstering of the witness on direct or for impeachment purposes, for example), the testimony may become sufficiently probative to support its admissibility. The necessary context is absent without the fuller framework of trial. Thus, this aspect of the motion is denied. Before any such question is asked, however, any attorney must present a request to do so at a sidebar conference.
Mount Sinai also moves to bar Alexander from presenting any photographs, motion pictures, videotapes, or slides depicting Ms. Crutcher and/or her family that have not been provided to the Defendants prior to trial and to which the Defendants have not had the opportunity to object. This aspect of the motion is granted.
Finally, Mount Sinai moves to bar any argument before the jury regarding the existence of any professional liability insurance covering the Defendants. Under Fed.R.Evid. 411, evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not admissible upon the issue whether the person acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully. Rule 411 does not require the exclusion of evidence of insurance against liability when offered for another purpose, such as proof of agency, ownership, or control, or bias or prejudice of a witness. Id. The purpose of this type of evidence can be better addressed in the fuller framework of trial. Thus, this aspect of the motion is denied.
Motion in Limine No. 2
Mount Sinai's second motion in limine seeks to bar Alexander from eliciting testimony regarding a physician or a retained witness's personal preferences or routines in treating, diagnosing, and evaluating patients like Ms. Crutcher. Mount Sinai contends that testimony regarding personal preferences, routines, and practices does not bear upon the issue of medical negligence and that these types of statements are irrelevant. Differences of opinion are consistent with the exercise of due care and the variance of a physician's conduct from the norm does not per se constitute breach of the standard of care. See Campbell v. United States, 904 F.2d 1188, 1192 (7th Cir. 1990). However, absent the development of this type of testimony in the fuller context of trial, we consider it premature to assess what is acceptable in this area. Specific objections can be raised in the more complete framework of trial. Accordingly, we deny Mount Sinai's second motion in limine. Motion in Limine No. 3
Mount Sinai next wishes to bar counsel and any witness from eliciting testimony or commenting on his or her opinions, beliefs, impressions, or conclusions regarding the veracity, believability, consistency or lack thereof, conceivability, or credibility of any statement or testimony offered by any other witness, including the quality of memory of any other witness. The credibility and veracity of a witness's testimony is a determination reserved exclusively for the trier of fact; accordingly, we grant Mount Sinai's motion.
Motion in Limine No. 4
Mount Sinai seeks to bar Alexander's retained witnesses from offering any opinions not previously expressed in their depositions or Fed.R.Civ.P. 26 disclosures. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(2) requires a retained witness to provide a report containing his or her opinions as well as the basis and reasons for those opinions. See Walsh v. McCain Foods Ltd., 81 F.3d 722, 727 (7th Cir. 1996). Subsections (a)(2)(C) and (e)(1) require that disclosures be supplemented if there are any modifications or additions to the information previously disclosed. Id. Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 37, "[a] party that without substantial justification fails to disclose information required by Rule 26(a) or 26(e)(1) shall not, unless such failure is harmless, be permitted to use evidence at trial, at a hearing, or on a motion any witness or information not so disclosed." Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(c)(1). Therefore, unless a party in the present matter seeking to introduce evidence that was not timely disclosed under Rule 26(a) can show that the discovery violation was either justified or harmless, such evidence will be excluded. Motion in Limine No. 5
Mount Sinai seeks to bar Dr. Klotz, one of Alexander's retained witnesses who is board-certified in internal medicine and pulmonary disease, from offering an opinion as to the standard of care for obstetric/gynecology physicians or residents. The substantive law of the state where the injury occurred governs actions brought under the FTCA. Buscaglia v. United States, 25 F.3d 530, 534 (7th Cir. 1994). Mount Sinai correctly asserts that in Illinois medical malpractice cases, it is the plaintiff's duty to establish the proper standard of care to be applied to a defendant doctor's conduct, a breach of that standard, and a resulting injury proximately caused by the breach of the standard of care. Northern Trust Co. v. Moran, 213 Ill. App. 3d 390, 406 (1st Dist. 1991). Unless the alleged negligence is so grossly apparent or within the ken of the average juror, expert testimony is required to establish the standard of care and its breach.Id.
Here, while Illinois substantive law applies with regards to the tort claim, the Federal Rules of Evidence control concerning admissibility determinations. In support of its motion, Mount Sinai improperly cites to Illinois state cases and frames its entire argument based upon Illinois evidence standards. In the present case, we are bound to follow the standards embodied in Fed.R.Evid. 702, which establishes two admissibility requirements for expert testimony. See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993); Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S. Ct. 1167 (1999). We frame our analysis accordingly.
Under Daubert and Kumho Tire, the expert must be qualified, and the subject matter of the proposed testimony must consist of specialized knowledge that will be helpful or essential to the trier of fact in deciding the case correctly. See Fed.R.Evid. 702; see also Buscaglia, 25 F.3d at 533.
Essentially, Mount Sinai criticizes Dr. Klotz's qualifications due to his purported lack of knowledge regarding residents' duties and what actions they should or should not take under particular circumstances. While Dr. Klotz is not board-certified in obstetrics/gynecology, an expert's qualifications to testify are not solely dependent on whether he or she is a member of the same speciality as the defendant. See Fed.R.Evid. 702 advisory committee's note. A witness may qualify as an expert on the basis of knowledge, skill, training, education, or experience. Id. Courts have not required a party to show that the witness is an outstanding expert, or to show that the witness is well-known or respected in the field; these are generally questions of weight, not admissibility. Id. Whether a witness is qualified as an expert can only be determined by the nature of the opinion offered. The respective parties may raise specific competency objections at trial, including expertise sufficient to base an opinion in the non-specialty area of the witness. The motion is denied without prejudice at this time. Motion in Limine No. 6
Mount Sinai seeks to bar Dr. Klotz from offering an opinion as to the standard of care for surgeons or infectious disease specialists. The present motion is denied for the same reasons stated in our ruling regarding Mount Sinai's Motion in Limine No. 5. The respective parties may raise specific competency objections at trial.
Motion in Limine No. 7
Mount Sinai seeks to bar Dr. Berman, Alexander's second retained witness who is board-certified in obstetrics/gynecology, from offering an opinion as to the standard of care for surgeons or infectious disease specialists. Mount Sinai claims that various deficiencies in Dr. Berman's deposition and his Fed.R.Civ.P. 26 submissions warrants the imposition of sanctions, under Rule 37(c)(1), in the form of barring him from proffering expert opinions on the subject at trial. Even assuming that there are deficiencies in Dr. Berman's deposition and Rule 26 submissions, the party to be sanctioned is still afforded the opportunity to show that its alleged violation of Rule 26 was either justified or harmless. Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(c)(1). Accordingly, we deny the present motion. The respective parties may raise specific objections at trial if they become necessary.
Motion in Limine No. 8
Mount Sinai seeks to bar criticism of Drs. Moran and Siddiqui for not reordering an infectious disease consult after October 5, 1997. Essentially, Mount Sinai's argument presupposes that Alexander's retained witnesses will not sustain the requirements that are required for a plaintiff to prove a medical malpractice case. These requirements include that the plaintiff establish, via expert testimony when necessary, the proper standard of care to be applied to a defendant doctor's conduct, a breach of that standard, and a resulting injury proximately caused by the breach of the standard of care. Northern Trust Co., 213 Ill. App. 3d at 406. This request mirrors one of Mount Sinai's more general requests set forth in its first motion in limine. In its first motion in limine, Mount Sinai requested that opinions that are to be expressed at trial be supported by competent factual evidence and a retained witness' testimony establishing to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the Defendant's alleged negligence was a proximate cause of Ms. Crutcher's injuries. We granted that aspect of Mount Sinai's motion as that is the appropriate threshold requirement of such testimony. We will not however bar specific testimony that presupposes that the threshold requirements will not be met. Accordingly, the present motion is denied.
Motion in Limine No. 9
Mount Sinai seeks to bar criticism of Drs. Smith and Moran for not requesting Dr. Onyema to see Ms. Crutcher on October 4 and 5, 1997. The present motion is denied for the same reasons stated in our ruling regarding Mount Sinai's Motion in Limine No. 8. Motion in Limine No. 10
Mount Sinai seeks to bar criticism of Drs. Smith, Moran, and Siddiqui for not ordering a surgical consultant on and after October 5, 1997. The present motion is denied for the same reasons stated in our ruling regarding Mount Sinai's Motion in Limine No. 8.
Motion in Limine No. 11
Mount Sinai seeks to bar criticism of Dr. Smith, Dr. Moran, and the hospital for the alleged failure to order or perform a CT scan until October 9, 1997. The present motion is denied for the same reasons stated in our ruling regarding Mount Sinai's Motion in Limine No. 8.
Motion in Limine No. 12
Mount Sinai seeks to bar Dr. Berman from opining that the residents' alleged negligence lessened the chance of Ms. Crutcher's chance of survival. Assuming Dr. Berman's competency to testify at trial, if he does opine, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, as to what the difference in Ms. Crutcher's chances of recovery would have been if she had undergone surgery earlier, the issue is for the trier of fact to determine. This motion is denied.
Motion in Limine No. 13
Mount Sinai seeks to bar Dr. Klotz from opining that the residents' alleged negligence lessened Ms. Crutcher's chance of survival. We deny the present motion for the same reasons stated in our ruling regarding Mount Sinai's Motion in Limine No. 12.
Motion in Limine No. 14
Mount Sinai seeks to bar Alexander's retained witnesses from offering any criticism of residents other than Drs. Smith, Moran, and Siddiqui. Mount Sinai's proposed reasoning calling for the exclusion of such testimony deals with Alexander's Fed.R.Civ.P. 26 submissions, which has been previously addressed in this opinion. Accordingly, we deny the present motion for the same reasons stated in our ruling regarding Mount Sinai's Motion in Limine No. 7.
Motion in Limine No. 15
Mount Sinai seeks to bar Alexander and her retained witnesses from opining that Ms. Crutcher experienced conscious pain and suffering after October 5, 1997. Mount Sinai's proposed reasoning calling for the exclusion of such testimony deals with Alexander's Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 26 submissions, which has been previously addressed in this opinion. Accordingly, we deny the present motion for the same reasons stated in our ruling regarding Mount Sinai's Motion in Limine No. 7.
B. Dr. Rosman's Motions in Limine
Motion in Limine No. 1
Dr. Rosman's first motion in limine consists of various parts, all of which are identical to the various aspects of Mount Sinai's motion in limine No. 1, and we accordingly grant or deny the various aspects of the present motion for the same reasons.
Motion in Limine No. 2
Dr. Rosman seeks to bar counsel from questioning potential jurors during voir dire regarding specific amounts of monetary damages. We deny the motion as this matter is more appropriately dealt with in the proposed voir dire questions that counsel for all parties are required to submit to the court.
Motion in Limine No. 3
Dr. Rosman next seeks to bar reference to the fact that Dr. Rosman is protected by insurance or some other indemnity agreement. Under Fed.R.Evid. 411, evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not admissible upon the issue whether the person acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully. Rule 411 does not require the exclusion of evidence of insurance against liability when offered for another purpose, such as proof of agency, ownership, or control, or bias or prejudice of a witness. Id. The purpose of this type of evidence can be better addressed in the fuller framework of trial. Thus, the motion is denied. Motion in Limine No. 4
Dr. Rosman seeks to exclude lay witness testimony based only upon speculation, conjecture, and lack of expertise. The determination of the proper foundation of testimony can be more sufficiently addressed in the fuller framework and context of trial. Thus, the present motion is denied.
Motion in Limine No. 5
Dr. Rosman's fifth motion in limine seeks to bar allegedly cumulative testimony. The determination of what constitutes cumulative testimony can be more sufficiently addressed in the fuller framework and context of trial. Thus, the present motion is denied.
Motion in Limine No. 6
Dr. Rosman seeks to bar evidence not previously tendered and produced to him pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rules 214, 237, and 213. Under the Erie doctrine, state procedural rules are inapplicable in federal proceedings, so the cited rules are irrelevant to the case at hand. Accordingly the present motion is denied.
Motion in Limine No. 7
Dr. Rosman seeks to bar Alexander's retained witnesses from relying on or referring to any medical text, journal, treatise, document, article, or literature not expressly enumerated in Alexander's answers to interrogatories, Fed.R.Civ.P. 26 submissions, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 237, or depositions. Under the Erie doctrine and as stated above, we ignore the inapplicable rules that Dr. Rosman has cited. The Federal Rules of Evidence will govern the propriety of questions and the admissibility of answers. We deny the present motion.
Motion in Limine No. 8
Dr. Rosman seeks to exclude reference to deviations of the standard of care without testimony that the deviation proximately caused injury to Ms. Crutcher. The present motion is too broad and vaguely seeks to bar evidence without specific references to proffered testimony. Specific objections can be raised in the fuller framework and context of trial. Accordingly, the present motion is denied.
Motion in Limine No. 9
Dr. Rosman's next motion in limine is identical to one of the aspects of Mount Sinai's motion in limine No. 1, regarding prior lawsuits, and we deny the motion for the same reasons.
Motion in Limine No. 10
Dr. Rosman's next motion in limine seeks to bar reference to whether Dr. Rosman's retained witnesses have ever been named as defendants in medical malpractice or other litigation. Parties are afforded the opportunity to probe into the credibility, interest, and possible bias of a retained expert through cross examination. Specific objections can be raised in the fuller framework and context of trial. Accordingly, the present motion is denied without prejudice. Motion in Limine No. 11
Dr. Rosman seeks to bar testimony regarding whether it is easier to review medical legal matters on behalf of defendants as well as any testimony regarding whether Drs. Berman or Klotz turned down another case reviewed on behalf of Alexander's counsel or his law firm. Again, parties are afforded the opportunity to probe into the credibility, interest, and possible bias of a retained expert through cross-examination. Further, Dr. Rosman has not provided us with any cognizable evidentiary basis or rationale as to why such evidence should be excluded. Specific objections can be raised in the fuller framework and context of trial. Accordingly, the present motion is denied.
Motion in Limine No. 12
Dr. Rosman's next motion contains various aspects, all of which have been addressed in previous motions above. We deny the present motion in its entirety to the extent that it does not conflict with other rulings contained herein.
Motion in Limine No. 13
Dr. Rosman's next motion in limine, entitled "precautionary rulings," is a general motion, raising various issues, some of which involve fundamental evidentiary principles, most of which are vague, and others that are simply redundant. The parties can raise specific objections in the fuller framework of trial. The present motion is denied. Motion in Limine No. 14
Dr. Rosman seeks to bar Dr. Klotz from testifying regarding causation. The present motion is denied for the same reasons stated in our ruling regarding Mount Sinai's Motion in Limine No. 8.
Motion in Limine No. 15
Dr. Rosman's next motion involves the use of medical literature at trial. Nowhere in the motion is there any specific mention regarding what evidentiary ruling Dr. Rosman requests this court to render. The motion, which only cites to Illinois state cases that we are not bound to follow as precedent, instead reads as a tutorial regarding the topic of medical literature. We accordingly deny the present motion.
Motions in Limine Nos. 16-17
Dr. Rosman's next two motions seek to bar various references that he anticipates opposing counsel will make during opening statements and closing arguments. We deny both motions. Specific objections can be made in the fuller context of trial.
Motion in Limine No. 18
Dr. Rosman's motion in limine No. 18 is identical to Mount Sinai's motion in limine No. 2, and we accordingly deny it for the same reasons.
Motion in Limine No. 19
Dr. Rosman's motion in limine No. 19 is identical to Mount Sinai's motion in limine No. 3, and we accordingly grant it for the same reasons. Motion in Limine No. 20
Dr. Rosman adopts Mount Sinai's Motion in Limine No. 4, regarding the adequacy of Alexander's Fed.R.Civ.P. 26 disclosures, in its entirety. Unless a party in the present matter seeking to introduce evidence that was not timely disclosed under Rule 26(a) can show that the discovery violation was either justified or harmless, such evidence will be excluded.
Motion in Limine No. 21
Dr. Rosman's motion in limine No. 21 is identical to Mount Sinai's motion in limine No. 6, and we accordingly deny the it for the same reasons.
Motion in Limine No. 22
Dr. Rosman's motion in limine No. 22 is identical to Mount Sinai's motion in limine No. 7, and we accordingly deny it for the same reasons.
Dr. Rosman apparently misnumbered his motions in limine; two motions are labeled "Motion in Limine No. 21," and none are designated "Motion in Limine No. 25." We have adjusted the numbering of the motions accordingly.
Motion in Limine No. 23
Dr. Rosman's motion in limine No. 23 is identical to Mount Sinai's motion in limine No. 13, and we accordingly deny it for the same reasons.
Motion in Limine No. 24
Dr. Rosman's motion in limine No. 24 is identical to Mount Sinai's motion in limine No. 14, and we accordingly deny it for the same reasons. Motion in Limine No. 25
Dr. Rosman's motion in limine No. 25 is identical to his motion in limine No. 22 and Mount Sinai's motion in limine No. 7, and we accordingly deny it for the same reasons.
C. Sinai Group's Motions in Limine
Motion in Limine No. 1
Sinai Group's first motion seeks to exclude all non-party witnesses from the courtroom during the trial proceedings at times when they are not testifying. This motion is denied to the extent that it seeks to exclude all witnesses, whether parties, experts, or the like from the courtroom.
Motions in Limine Nos. 2-13
Sinai Group's motions in limine Nos. 2-13 are identical to Dr. Rosman's motions in limine Nos. 2-13. Therefore, we deny the present respective motions consistent with our rulings regarding Dr. Rosman's corresponding motions.
Motion in Limine No. 14
Sinai Group's next motion involves the use of medical literature at trial. The present motion essentially raises the same points addressed in Dr. Rosman's motion in limine No. 15. While Sinai Group's motion specifically requests this court for relief whereas Dr. Rosman's motion did not, we deny the present motion for the reasons stated with regard to Dr. Rosman's motion in limine No. 7. Motions in Limine Nos. 15-16
Sinai Group's motions in limine Nos. 15-16 are identical to Dr. Rosman's motions in limine Nos. 16-17. We accordingly deny them for the same reasons.
Motion in Limine No. 17
Sinai Group's motion in limine No. 17 is identical to Dr. Rosman's motion in limine No. 14, and we accordingly deny it for the same reasons.
Motions in Limine Nos. 18-24
Sinai Group's motions in limine Nos. 18-24 are either repetitive or identical to Dr. Rosman's motions in limine Nos. 18-25. Therefore, we deny them consistent with our rulings regarding Dr. Rosman's motions in limine Nos. 18-25.
Motion in Limine No. 25
Sinai Group's final motion seeks to bar Alexander from presenting any evidence against it, other than through the conduct and participation of Dr. Rosman as its agent. Absent the fuller context of trial, we deny this motion.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, Mount Sinai's motion in limine No. 3 is granted, motion Nos. 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 are denied, and motion Nos. 1 and 4 are granted in part and denied in part. Dr. Rosman's motion in limine Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25 are denied, and motion No. 1 is granted in part and denied in part. Sinai Group's motion Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25 are denied.