The matter was continued for the October term by order of the court, entered on November 3, 1923. Counsel, in support of plaintiff's position that the court lost jurisdiction of the cause, cite the cases of Deering v. Quivey, 26 Or. 556 ( 38 P. 710); Henrichsen v. Smith, 29 Or. 475, 479 ( 42 P. 486, 44 P. 496); Alexander v. Ling, 31 Or. 223 ( 50 P. 915); Purdy v. Van Keuren, 62 Or. 34 ( 123 P. 1070); McMahon v. Hull, 63 Or. 135, 143 ( 119 P. 348, 124 P. 474, 126 P. 3); First Christian Church v. Robb, 69 Or. 283, 286 ( 138 P. 856); Tucker v. Davidson, 80 Or. 254, 255 ( 156 P. 1037). The motion for a new trial was granted within the sixty-day limit provided in Section 175, Or. L.
Indeed, the statute of limitations on chattel mortgages was considered implicit in the four-year period for debts (found formerly in article 5527). Alexander v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 406 S.W.2d 919, 924-25 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana 1966, writ ref. n.r.e.). Consequently, the "lien followed the debt, and was not barred so long as the debt was not barred."
See 16 Am.Jur.2nd ¶ 71, et seq. Since the law of Louisiana was not pled or proved, the pertinent Louisiana law must be presumed to be identical with Texas law. Alexander v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., Tex. Civ.App. 1966, 406 S.W.2d 919; Seguros Tepeyac S.A. Compania Mexicana v. Bostrom, 5 Cir. 1965, 347 F.2d 168, 176. Neither the effort of counsel in complaining of the Allen or "dynamite" charge as given, nor the efforts of the judges of this Court in inquiring about the Louisiana law, can obviate our conclusion that this appeal must turn on whether or not the instruction on assumption of risk was erroneous.
"The court having rendered a final judgment of February 26, 1910, its power to amend the same lapsed with the end of the February term except for mere clerical errors, but not for matters of substance, unless the court retained its jurisdiction over it for subsequent purposes by means of the filing of a motion for a new trial or some such means. Opportunity was given thus to keep the judgment within the breast of the court by filing exceptions to the findings and a motion to the court to render other findings, but this opportunity was allowed to lapse, and, so far as the record before us discloses, nothing was done at the February term that would retain the judgment in this case within the bosom of the court; hence the power of the court over that judgment ceased with the end of its February term. Deering v. Quivey, 26 Or. 556 ( 38 P. 710); Henrichsen v. Smith, 29 Or. 475, ( 42 P. 486: 44 P. 496); Alexander v. Ling, 31 Or. 222, ( 50 P. 915). "Therefore the orders of the court rendered at its March term in this action may be considered void, * * *."
The date on the original decree was changed from April 28, 1923, to April 26, 1924. During the term in which the judgment of the decree is rendered, the court may amend or vacate the decree. But after the expiration of that term the court has no authority to modify or vacate a judgment or decree except by virtue of Section 103, Or. L., unless it appears from the record of the case that the court was without jurisdiction to render the judgment or decree: Alexander v. Ling, 31 Or. 222, 224 ( 50 P. 915); Carmichael v. Carmichael, 101 Or. 172, 179 ( 199 P. 385). The term of court in which the decree was rendered and entered had long expired before the application was made to vacate it. The Western Irrigation Company which the court attempted to substitute for the original plaintiff Western Land and Irrigation Company had not appeared in the suit and was not subject to the jurisdiction of the court: Western Land Irr. Co. v. Humfeld et al., 114 Or. 53 ( 234 P. 796.)
See TEX.BUS. COM. CODE ANN. § 9.203 (Vernon Supp. 1986). As a matter of law, appellee's rights in the mobile homes were superior to any rights of appellants. See Villa v. Alvarado State Bank, 611 S.W.2d 483 (Tex.Civ.App. — Waco 1981, no writ); Leif Johnson Ford, Inc. v. Chase National Bank, 578 S.W.2d 792 (Tex.Civ.App. — Beaumont 1978, no writ); Peerless Equipment Co. v. Azle State Bank, 559 S.W.2d 114 (Tex.Civ.App. — Fort Worth 1977, no writ); see also Texas State Bank v. Foremost Insurance Co., 477 S.W.2d 652 (Tex.Civ.App. — Corpus Christi 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Alexander v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 406 S.W.2d 919 (Tex.Civ.App. — Texarkana 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Sorrels v. Texas Bank Trust Co., 597 F.2d 997 (5th Cir. 1979); In re Samuels Co., Inc., 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834, 97 S.Ct. 98, 50 L.Ed.2d 99 (1976). Appellants also argue that appellee did not act in "good faith" in taking security interests in the mobile homes because appellee knew that appellants had not been paid for the mobile homes.
Federal Electric Co. v. Johnson, 187 S.W.2d 410, 411 (Tex.Civ.App. Galveston 1945, writ dsmd.); Alexander v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 406 S.W.2d 919, 925 (Tex.Civ.App. Texarkana 1966, writ ref. n.r.e.). After the collections had been delivered to the University, some fourteen crates of books and newspapers in 1959 and the remaining major portions in 1960, the president of the University, on October 5, 1960, wrote Mrs. Seb S. Wilcox expressing the 'deep gratitude of the entire University' and stating, 'St.
Ogletree v. Crates, 363 S.W.2d 431 (Sup.Crt.). Alexander v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc. (Tex.Civ.App.) 406 S.W.2d 919 (Ref. N.R.E.).