Opinion
J-S34001-17 No. 1469 EDA 2016
11-28-2017
MICHAEL ALESSIO, Appellant v. I-FLOW CORPORATION, A/K/A I-FLOW, LLC, KIMBERLY-CLARK, A/K/A KIMBERLY-CLARK CORPORATION, SETH R. KRUM, D.O., PENNSYLVANIA ORTHOPEDIC ASSOCIATES, INC., RICHARD STRULSON, M.D., Appellees
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order Entered April 5, 2016 in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Civil Division at No.: 04202 March Term, 2015 BEFORE: BOWES, J., SOLANO, J., and PLATT, J. DISSENTING STATEMENT BY PLATT, J.:
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. --------
Because I believe that the trial court did not abuse its discretion with respect to its decision to transfer venue, I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the trial court's order.
Our standard of review provides that "[i]f there exists any proper basis for the trial court's decision to grant a petition to transfer venue, the decision must stand." Wentzel by Wentzel v. Cammarano , 166 A.3d 1265, 1268 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).
Here, the trial court found that the operation where the I-Flow infusion pump was installed in Appellant's right shoulder occurred in Montgomery County, as did all follow up care and use of the pain pump. ( See Trial Court Opinion, 12/16/16, at 3). It observed that the MCARE Act states that "a medical professional liability action may be brought against a health care provider for a medical professional liability claim only in the county in which the cause of action arose." ( Id. at 2-3) (quoting 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5101.1(b)) (case citation omitted). Finally, the trial court explained that it transferred venue because "[t]he evidence produced during venue discovery established that the core allegations of negligence and the injury to [Appellant] all occurred in Montgomery County." ( Id. at 3).
Upon review, I would conclude that there existed a proper basis to transfer venue. Therefore, I would affirm the order of the trial court.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.